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Climbing The Mountain When There Is No Mountain To Climb: Pragmatism and the 
Reconstruction of Moral Philosophy 
by 
Ryan Marshall Felder 
Advisor: Jesse Prinz 
The aim of this dissertation is to leverage philosophical resources given to us by Richard Rorty 
which can show that various diverse and seemingly-incompatible strands in moral theory can be 
reconciled to show that the differences between moral theories are illusory. The strategy is to 
show that Rorty’s approach to philosophy allows a pragmatist reconstruction of several 
prominent positions in normative ethics (Chapters 1 and 2) and metaethics (Chapter 3 and 4), and 
that a Rorty-style pragmatism, with its emphasis on liberal ironism and a relaxed approach to 
semantics and truth, facilitates the moderation of normative theories and metaethical theories, 
and hence that a Rortian perspective allows discourse between diverse and seemingly-
incompatible positions. This result is interesting for two reasons. First, it undermines pragmatist 
orthodoxy, encouraged by Rorty himself, that pragmatists should not try to construct theories. I 
show that this view ignores the possibility that moral and metaethical theorizing may be aided by 
the acceptance of a Rortian perspective, and that methodology in ethics in important ways 
presupposes the truth of pragmatism. Second, the project provides interesting answers to ethical 
questions along the way, and hence indirectly shows that pragmatists can productively engage in 
technical philosophical debates and make legitimate positive contributions. Hence, I see myself 
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PREFACE: A Note on the Plan of the Work 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore what it is like, in a broad sense, for a Rortian 
pragmatist to accept and defend an ethical view. As I will argue in the Introduction, ethical 
views, and moral theories in particular, present a troubling tension for pragmatists. Part 1 of this 
dissertation, comprising Chapters 1 and 2, focuses on this problem from the standpoint of 
normative ethics, here understood as the aim of constructing a moral theory that provides 
principles for dealing with ethical hard cases. Yet this project raises more conceptual, theoretical 
questions about whether any sense can be made of the underlying methodological, semantic, and 
epistemological assumptions thereby made. Part 2, comprising Chapters 3 and 4, hence takes on 
the results of Part 1 from the standpoint of metaethics, and attempts to smooth over possible 
metaethical objections to the purported links between normative ethics and pragmatism. 
The Introduction to this work only addresses the material covered in Part 1. For an 
Introduction to Part 2, the reader should wait until the Interlude, which motivates the reasons for 
pursuing the metaethical foundations of the claims made in Part 1. The Conclusion wraps the 
whole thing up by connecting the results of Parts 1 and 2 to the practice of applied and 
professional ethics. 
In my view, Parts 1 and 2 are deeply intertwined, and best read as a whole, because 
normative ethics raises questions about the possibility of, for instance, moral knowledge, which 
is addressed by a long tradition and a voluminous literature, and correspondingly because 
metaethics demands application as an underlying buttress for normative ethics. To paraphrase 
Kant’s famous dictum (1998, A51/B75), I believe that normative ethics without metaethics is 
empty, and metaethics without normative ethics is blind. Nonetheless, there is also a tradition of 
treating normative ethics and metaethics as separate topics. Therefore, those inclined to do so can 
2 
 
read Part 1 and Part 2 separately from each other: Part 1 as an excursion in normative ethics from 
the pragmatist perspective, Part 2 as an attempt to provide some philosophical defenses of the 























INTRODUCTION: Multi-Level Moral Theories and the Liberal Ironist 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore what it is like for a Rortian pragmatist to 
accept and defend an ethical view. Although there is nothing in Rorty that tells us not to hold 
ethical views, there are features of ethical views that can be hard to capture if one accepts his 
pragmatist, ironist, theory-opposed metaphilosophical framework. For instance, most ethicists 
would agree that ethical views, insofar as they attempt to provide answers to practical questions, 
aim at providing the final word on their subject. A moral theorist constructs a moral theory 
because they want to provide the best theoretical explanation of the moral phenomena. Rorty, 
however, insisted that there are no final vocabularies, ethical or otherwise, that can foreclose 
inquiry into those vocabularies’ foundations (Rorty 1979, pp. 206ff). Hence, Rorty sat 
uncomfortably, at best, with moral theories. As evidence of this, Rorty encapsulated this attitude 
in the Introduction to Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Rorty 1989, p. xv) as follows:  
For liberal ironists, there is no answer to the question “Why not be cruel?” – no non-
circular theoretical backup for the belief that cruelty is horrible. […] This question strikes 
liberal ironists as just as hopeless as the questions “Is it right to deliver innocents over to 
be tortured to save the lives of m x n other innocents? If so, what are the correct values of 
n and m?” […] Anybody who thinks that there are well-grounded theoretical answers to 
this sort of question – algorithms for resolving moral dilemmas of this sort – is still, in his 
heart, a theologian or a metaphysician. He believes in an order beyond time and change 
which both determines the point of human existence and establishes a hierarchy of 
responsibilities. 
 
One reason for this is that all vocabularies are historically- and socially-contingent: we pick up 
the beliefs we have at least in part through socialization, and the aim of providing the final word 
on a subject is to deny this historicist nature of our vocabularies (Rorty 1979, pp. 9-10). Hence, 
as a matter of boring empirical reality, vocabularies tend to reproduce themselves over time and 
sustain themselves through changes, due to the dialectical conflict between the historicist nature 
of vocabularies and the fact that vocabularies are not homogenous within any group (Rorty 1989, 
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pp. 8-9). But a moral theory, assuming that it tries to provide the best explanation, is not 
historically- and socially-contingent, except in the uninteresting sense in which new principles 
and rules must be proposed as history advances. Hence the discomfort implicit in Rorty’s view of 
traditional normative ethics: vocabularies are historically- and socially-contingent, and moral 
theories can be no such thing. However, as we will see, there is some reason to think that this 
discomfort can be dissolved. 
Before this can be explained, though, I have used a number of terms without explaining 
them. I want to rectify this by introducing definitions for ‘vocabulary’, ‘pragmatism’, and ‘liberal 
ironist’. First, pragmatism. The nature and aims of pragmatism are the subject of disagreement 
even among deeply-committed pragmatists. Rather than being comprehensive, I invoke William 
James’s pragmatist notion of the aims of ethics in his oft-quoted paper “The Moral Philosophy 
and the Moral Life”: 
The main purposes of this paper is to show that there is no such thing possible as an 
ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in advance. We all help to determine the 
content of ethical philosophy so far as we contribute to the race’s moral life. In other 
words, there can be no final Truth in Ethics any more than in Physics, until the last man 
has had his experience and said his say (James 1891, p. 330; see also Moody-Adams 
1997, p. 153).  
 
Michele Moody-Adams, whose pragmatist-leaning discussion of moral realism in Fieldwork in 
Familiar Places is brought up for consideration in Chapter 4, approvingly cites James here. 
Although James writes in a way that suggests that a final ethical vocabulary is possible, it is 
important to keep in mind that James’s use of the term ‘last man’ implies that we will never 
achieve a final ethical vocabulary, for no particular strand of ethical inquiry will be expansive 
enough in scope to meet that criterion. The best we can hope for is to simply extend ethical 
discourse to as many people as possible and to encompass the broadest array of ethical concerns. 
But of course, this means that we will simply stop asking questions like the questions quoted in 
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the Contingency, Irony, and Solidary passage above. To be a pragmatist in my sense hence 
means to aim at dissolving traditional philosophical problematics, such as the problematic about 
which values of n and m are correct (Rorty 1991c, p. 127-8). Pragmatism also allows us to think 
as philosophical theories as tools, rather than as attempts to map the reality in their domains. We 
care about ethical vocabularies because they give us a standard by which to approach real 
problems, and hence because they allow people to “cope with their environment” (Rorty 1982a, 
p. xviii; see also West 1989, p. 98). 
A crucial point that this dissertation defends is that, even given this idea of pragmatism, 
there is no reason to think that people need to abandon their ethical vocabularies if they accept 
pragmatism. Instead, people have to balance their commitment to their ethical vocabularies with 
the metaphilosophical pressure that pragmatism imposes on them. Rorty thinks that this shows 
that individuals in liberal societies, for whom the pragmatist pressures can be significant, are 
pushed to view their ethical vocabularies ironically. Hence, Rorty’s character of the liberal 
ironist: one who is faced with the continual challenge of, on the one hand, accepting the 
contingency of the vocabulary that they endorse, and on the other, actually maintaining genuine 
commitment to that vocabulary (Rorty 1989, p. 61). 
Finally, a bit on what I will mean by a vocabulary. This way of talking rises out of 
Quine’s attacks on the verification theory of meaning, an attack whose consequence is that 
holism about meaning is the best available account of meaning. The basic idea is that sentence 
meanings are determined by a sentence’s relation to various other sentences, and not individually 
(Quine 1951, pp. 39-40). Rorty, following Quine, targets whole vocabularies and their collective 
meanings as the proper object of analysis (Rorty 1979, pp. 193-5). We produce lots of kinds of 
vocabularies, each of which has some purpose. We have, for instance, vocabularies of scientific 
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inquiry. We also have vocabularies for ethics. But sometimes, it is argued that a vocabulary is 
final. This implies that the vocabulary gives the final word on a domain. If there were an ethical 
final vocabulary, then that vocabulary would state the final word on all cases in ethics, always 
offering up the right prescription about what we ought to do. In other words, a final ethical 
vocabulary would be a gold-standard moral theory. But as I have already said, Rorty thinks that 
no vocabulary can be final. One reason is the historical and social contingency of vocabularies. 
Another reason, which I discuss in more detail below, is that even a vocabulary that states the 
final word on all cases cannot be taken to be the only way to respond to that case. A vocabulary 
about domain D, hence, is a group of meanings, concepts, and presuppositions that outline the 
things that we can say about D. A final vocabulary purports to exclusively and exhaustively 
explain D. 
The alleged problem for being able to accept, use, and advocate for a moral theory arises 
because of the distinctive pragmatist standpoint that Rorty views as necessary. Yet the problem 
is not quite as bad as we might think. An ethical vocabulary can contain as one of its constituent 
parts a moral theory, and people who accept different ethical vocabularies often as a 
consequence of this accept different moral theories. Hence, even on pragmatist assumptions that 
make it impossible to say that a theory is the true, final theory, we cannot think that a liberal 
ironist is indifferent toward their vocabulary. If a liberal ironist is to make sense of their own 
commitments, they need a way to understand these commitments as integrated in some way. 
Rorty’s answer to this question is to hang a lot of weight on the public/private distinction, and to 
exile questions about ethical vocabularies to the private side, leaving public morality to be 
conducted in the Rawlsian vocabulary of political liberalism (Rorty 1991d). Rorty also thinks 
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that works of literature, which sensitize us to various kinds of cruelty that occur in liberal 
societies, can help us to probe the outer limits of our ethical vocabularies (Rorty 1989, p. 53). 
The aim of the next two chapters, and to a lesser extent the whole dissertation, is to test 
these claims. Is Rorty correct to say that, given the private/public distinction, the most we can 
hope for, in terms of giving some philosophical structure to moral life, is allowing the ‘private’, 
philosophical side to accept all moral theory as an intellectual exile, while letting public morality 
be solely constituted by the terms of political liberalism? I believe that he is not. The 
private/public distinction is itself a matter of philosophical and political adjudication, and private 
ethical vocabularies can, in virtue of their internal substance, be modeled after the public to 
various degrees. When stated out loud, this should not be surprising. Feminists have long argued 
that the various forms and uses of the private/public distinction are tools for instituting patriarchy 
(Okin 1991, ch. 6). This should at least establish the possibility that this distinction is malleable, 
or even rejectable, for some good pragmatist reasons, because Rorty views himself as closely 
allied with feminist aims (Rorty 1998b). Given the pragmatist aims of attacking the 
presuppositions of philosophy, this distinction needs to be on the table, but Rorty’s discussions in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity suggest that it shouldn’t be. In Chapters 1 and 2, I defend 
these claims by providing a proof of concept that attacking the distinction is prescribed by the 
pragmatist framework and the position of the liberal ironist. We should reject the private/public 
distinction because allowing private moral theories to be reconstructed in light of public 
democratic values that supposedly establish the possibility of a liberal society would be a good 
thing, on pragmatist grounds. It offers both the possibility of an inclusive public morality and an 
interlocking system of private moral theories that both support and are supported by public 
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morality, and hence the possibility of overcoming the discomfort expressed by Rorty toward 
normative ethics in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. 
Some further discussion of my sense of pragmatism would be helpful for explaining how 
a liberal ironist can have a moral theory. In using the term reconstruction, which appears in the 
dissertation’s title, to explain my project, I am making a nod to Dewey’s project in 
Reconstruction in Philosophy. There, he writes of a traditional philosophical conception of 
rationality as “a power transcending in origin and content any and all conceivable experience can 
attain to universal, necessary and certain authority and direction” (Dewey 1920, p. 78; see also 
Dewey 2018, p. 314). Yet this conception of rationality, Dewey argues, needs to be rejected in 
favor of a more modest conception of rationality that brings reasoning closer to people’s 
experiences of reasoning (Dewey 1920, p. 87). The pattern of argument: rationality is a practice 
of achieving knowledge, and we need practices of achieving knowledge because of the general 
characteristics of our experiences. Rationality is a way to cope with experience, as is philosophy 
for a Rortian pragmatist. Extrapolating quite a bit, we can say that reconstruction is a way to 
strategically modify our philosophical conceptions in light of the failures of traditional 
conceptions (Dewey 1920, pp. 95-96). Hence, when the conception of rationality that we accept 
doesn’t help to cope with experience, we should reject it and provide a replacement theory that 
better answers to the demands that the practical world, broadly construed, places on it. From this 
arises the impulse to provide what I call multi-level moral theories. A multi-level moral theory is 
distinguished from a single-level moral theory in having different internal aspects that issue in 
their own dictates and potentially point in different directions. A single-level moral theory, by 
contrast, has only one internal aspect that issues in dictates. Peter Singer’s conception of 
utilitarianism in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” is an example of a single-level moral theory 
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because it endorses only the principle of utility as a decision criterion for settling questions about 
our obligations to the global poor. Singer explicitly denies attempts to turn his utilitarianism into 
a multi-level moral theory, when he argues against Sidgwick’s views on moral codes (Singer 
1971, pp. 237-8). On such a view, utilitarianism is not single-level but has multiple internal 
levels, according to which some people ought to believe utilitarianism and act according to it, 
and other people ought not to believe utilitarianism and instead ought to act on some other, 
different theory.  
Rule consequentialism, which is what Singer rejects, and moderate deontology are two 
important examples of multi-level moral theories. In elaborating these theories and giving them 
indirect defenses in Chapters 1 and 2, I aim to show that elaborating a multi-level moral theory is 
aided by thinking of moral theory as a kind of reconstruction of our basic ethical ideas. The 
thesis of this part of my dissertation, therefore, is that multi-level moral theories are a good 
philosophical tool available for a pragmatist liberal ironist to use when confronting ethical 
challenges, public or private, and to properly accommodate the inevitability of the contingency 
of our vocabularies. 
 Part of what makes this project interesting is that I pursue distinctively pragmatist 
attempts at reconstructions. But pragmatism and Richard Rorty are both controversial. Hence, 
why bother to draw on them so heavily? The reason is that not all reconstructions are pragmatist; 
philosophical realists have also attempted to reconstruct moral theories. As we’ll see, 
pragmatism typically provides a more satisfying set of reconstructed moral theories than does 
realism. For example, in Chapter 1, I discuss Derek Parfit’s attempts to reconstruct 
consequentialism in light of the considerations of common-sense morality, which is often taken 
to have strong anti-consequentialist content. In Reasons and Persons, Parfit seems himself as 
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arguing that the distance between consequentialism and common-sense morality is not as large 
as some might have thought, and that we can establish the truth of consequentialism by showing 
that it can be modified to accommodate insights forced upon it by common-sense morality: 
[Consequentialism and Common-Sense Morality] face objections that can be met only by 
enlarging and revising those theories, in ways that bring them closer together. These facts 
natural suggest an attractive possibility. [Consequentialism and Common-Sense 
Morality] may dovetail, or join together to make a larger whole. We might be able to 
develop and develop a theory that includes and combines revised versions of both […]. 
Call this the Unified Theory (Parfit 1984, p. 112). 
 
 Continuing this project in On What Matters, Volume One, Parfit (2011a, pp. 411ff) argues that 
consequentialism, contractualism, and deontology are all paths up the same ethical mountain, 
and that reconstruction in ethics is possible because disparate moral theories all culminate in the 
same moral truth. Although Parfit’s goal is admirable, and partly congenial to the project of 
reconstruction I pursue here, it turns out that Parfit’s insistence on realism about these 
reconstructions is problematic. For instance, although Parfit speaks of reconstruction, he still 
thinks of truth or some closely related notion of theory justification as the criterion for a 
successful theory (Parfit 1984, p. 24). This is problematic because, even granting that a 
reconstruction aims at truth, there might be some theory that helps bridge the gaps between 
competing theories, but is indifferent to the truth. In view of the multiple and diverging aims that 
a moral theory might be thought to serve, the Parfitian realist reconstruction would potentially 
ignore helpful reconstructions. I will argue, therefore, that insofar as reconstruction is crucial in 
view of the general concerns of moral life and the real-world considerations that moral theory 
responds to, and that pragmatism offers the more useful way of thinking about reconstructions, 
this offers some reason to doubt a realist attitude toward ethics. It turns out that we can climb 
Parfit’s mountain, regardless of whether a mountain exists in the first place. 
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 Pragmatism, as Rorty conceives it, tells us that “it is the vocabulary of practice rather 
than theory, of action rather than contemplation, in which one can say something useful about 
philosophical conceptions” (Rorty 1982b, p. 162). I aim to provide theories that are thoroughly 
couched in terms of practice. This conception of pragmatism stresses the importance of doing 
philosophy, rather than merely contemplating. Hence, the best way to elucidate the value of 
pragmatist reconstruction is by actually doing philosophy, in this case normative ethics. So now, 


















CHAPTER 1: Esoteric Morality: A Pragmatist Reconstruction of Some Aspects of Motive-
Consequentialism 
1.1. Introduction: plan of the chapter 
The aim of this chapter is to weave together three important moral ideas that, at first, 
appear to have very little to do to each other, yet on further inspection have deep structural 
similarities: multi-level consequentialism, Rortian neopragmatism, and conceptual feminism. By 
weaving them together, I offer an indirect defense of multi-level consequentialism, insofar as this 
weaving together shows that certain controversial implications of multi-level consequentialism 
are really just a feature of accepting a moral theory in a world like ours. Moral theories that 
attribute different decision procedures depending on the constitution of the person using the 
theory and the context in which it is applied are simply, contra contractualist worries, a feature of 
moral agents existing in a complex world. To see that this broad variety of positions can 
maintain an esoteric status while still providing a moral perspective worthy of our belief and 
allegiance is to see that attempts to reject those theories by appealing to a contractualist notion of 
publicity are fundamentally misguided. Hence, the indirect defense of multi-level 
consequentialism takes a distinctively Rortian, liberal ironist form. This defense, as we will see, 
has the added virtue of bring consequentialism and Rortianism into conversation with 
contemporary developments in feminist philosophy in a surprising and unexpected way. 
1.2. Multi-level consequentialism and the unavoidability of esoteric morality 
When discussing multi-level moral theories, perhaps the first thing to come to mind is 
rule-consequentialism. Rule-consequentialism is an attempt to reformulate the notion of 
consequentialism in response to some prominent objections. From the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, we can begin with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s statement of these ideas: 
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consequentialism tells us that the rightness of an act “depends only on the consequences of that 
act or of something related to that act, such as the motive behind the act or a general rule 
requiring acts of the same kind” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2019). This claim states the basic idea of 
consequentialism, that when we are engaged in moral evaluation, we should look to the 
consequences of the thing being evaluated, as well as the basic idea of rule-consequentialism, 
which is that (at least) sometimes, the thing being evaluated is a rule for conduct. Given that the 
discussion that follows is largely framed in terms of Derek Parfit’s (1984) version of 
consequentialism, I focus on motive-consequentialism, which could also be called belief-
consequentialism or desire-consequentialism. This version of consequentialism is also suggested 
by Sinnott-Armstrong’s definition: at least sometimes, the thing being evaluated by 
consequentialism is our motives for action. 
Motives have a temporal element: having a motive to do something is often stable across 
time. This is important because it means that having motive M, which tells us to do A, might 
have different consequences than A’s just occurring. In particular, M might have consequences 
that affect our actions outside of the contexts where it tells us to do A. Consider, for instance, 
Parfit’s discussion of parent’s dilemma cases, in which a parent who is motivated to treat all 
children equally might bring about bad consequences over the course of their own child’s life, 
because having that motive leads them to neglect their special obligations to their own child 
(Parfit 1984, pp. 96-8). Although it might sometimes be best for a parent to treat all children 
equally in view of the consequences, a life-long motive to do that could lead that parent to 
impose other bad consequences on their child. 
In a parent’s dilemma case, act-consequentialism and motive-consequentialism diverge; 
they tell us to do different things. Act-consequentialism would tell us to consider all children’s 
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well-being equally, but motive-consequentialism, insofar as it is temporally broader, would tell 
us to have motives that lead to our privileging our own child’s well-being. Parfit explains the 
problem as follows:   
It might be claimed that, if Consequentialism sometimes breaks the link between the 
belief that our act is wrong and the belief that we are bad, we would not in fact continue 
to regard morality with sufficient seriousness. Our desire to avoid wrongdoing may be 
undermined if we have other desires which are often stronger. This desire may survive 
only if we believe that it should always be overriding, and feel remorse when it is not. It 
might be claimed, on these or other grounds, that it would make the outcome better if we 
always keep the link between our moral beliefs and our intentions and emotions. If this is 
so, it would make the outcome better if we did not believe [Consequentialism] (Parfit 
1984, p. 40). 
 
It is because our motives are relevant to what we should do, in general, that the problem arises: if 
we have the motives that motive-consequentialism tells us to have in the parent’s dilemma case, 
then motive-consequentialism is divided against act-consequentialism, because act-
consequentialism doesn’t look at the motives we have when determining how we should act. In 
‘breaking the link,’ to borrow Parfit’s phrase, between our actions and our motives, 
consequentialism presents us the problem of reconciling these various aspects of the theory.  
Parfit takes himself to have a good answer to this problem, but others have viewed this as 
a knock-down argument against consequentialism itself. Bernard Williams, for instance, has 
connected this feature of this problem to what I will call the objection from esoteric morality: 
consequentialism tells the elite members of a society to keep the truth of consequentialism away 
from the common folk, and in virtue of that, we should reject consequentialism. The argument 
trades on the claim that it is better, from a consequentialist perspective, if the elites understand 
consequentialism as a philosophical theory when acting from it, while everyone else simply does 
the various things that consequentialism enjoins, justification-free (Williams 1987, p. 108). 
Anecdotally, it seems like consequentialism has this implication. In my own experiences of 
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teaching consequentialism and utilitarianism to my students, about half of them misunderstand 
those views as a kind of hedonism that simply tells us to pursue pleasure, despite repeated 
exposure to the distinction between utilitarianism and hedonism. The argument then claims that 
we should reject esoteric moral theories like Parfit’s, because an esoteric moral theory cannot be 
a way of life for its adherents, and a moral theory must be able to provide a way of life for its 
adherents (Williams 1987, p. 110). 
I want now to offer a more precise definition of an esoteric moral theory, to distinguish it 
from a related notion. According to Ben Eggleston (2013, p. 33), an esoteric moral theory T is 
one whose being believed directs some who believe in it to come to believe some other moral 
theory T*, and others to believe T. Eggleston notes that this notion is often confused with a self-
effacing moral theory, which is a moral theory T whose being believed directs anyone who 
believes it to come to believe some other moral theory T*. In this chapter, I focus specifically on 
esoteric moral theories; I am more concerned with whether consequentialism tells, for instance, 
some parents in parent’s dilemma cases to be motivated by common-sense morality, even 
granted the truth of consequentialism. This would be the case if there were two groups of parents 
in virtue of consequentialism in these cases: one elite group that considers the interests of all 
children equally, and another, larger, folk group that tries to discharge their special obligations 
toward their children. My reason for doing this is that the possibility of a genuinely self-effacing 
morality is hard to see. Parfit (1984, p. 41) writes, for instance, that it is very hard to see how the 
best consequences could be brought about if nobody, ever, anywhere ever tried to bring about the 
best consequences. But this is just what a self-effacing morality would require. Similarly, 
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer argue against EM by pointing out that, in a great 
number of cases, transparency in moral theorizing will bring about the best consequences, and so 
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it seems that at most C could be partly self-effacing (de Lazari-Radek and Singer 2010, pp. 51-
4). 
 In view of these comments, it may be helpful to state the objection from esoteric morality 
as a syllogism: 
1. Consequentialism is esoteric 
2. We should reject a moral theory if it is esoteric 
3. Therefore, we should reject consequentialism (Eggleston 2013, p. 38) 
 
As I have already claimed, Parfit takes himself to have a good response to this objection. In 
Parfit’s view, we should reject premise 2, because it supposes that it is the aim of a moral theory 
to be believed. The aim of a moral theory is not, however, to be believed, but to be true, or to be 
the right moral theory. A theory that meets that condition can be accepted, even if it sometimes 
tells some of its adherents to believe a different theory (Parfit 1984, p. 24). de Lazari-Radek and 
Singer (2010, p. 56) cite this claim uncritically in their defense of consequentialism against the 
objection from esoteric morality. 
 Although this response to the objection is plausible as a first pass, it raises the broader 
question of what constitutes the aim of moral theory. Parfit (1984, p. 43) rightly notes that this is 
not settled by his arguments in Part One of Reasons and Persons. But once this question has 
been opened up, it becomes plausible to wonder whether this conception of the aims of moral 
theory is correct after all. Although such a view is common among consequentialists, 
contractualist moral theories tell a very different story. On a contractualist moral theory, the aim 
of moral theory is to provide a set of moral principles that are the potential object of consensus 
among moral agents. T. M. Scanlon, for instance, thinks that a moral theory aims at the 
presentation of a set of moral principles none of which could be reasonably rejected by moral 
agents (Scanlon 1998, p. 189). Scanlon’s discussions are an expansion and defense of similar 
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claims made by John Rawls, who argues that the aim of moral theory is to provide a publicly-
acceptable set of moral principles which would be accepted by all suitably situated free and 
equal moral agents (Rawls 1999, pp. 10ff). This is the meat of Rawls’s publicity constraint 
(Rawls 1999, p. 115). 
 The debate between those who accept an esoteric version of consequentialism and those 
who accept the publicity constraint shows that moral theorists, depending on their theoretical 
commitments, often hold radically divergent conceptions of the aim of moral theory. A key 
feature of motive-consequentialism, then, is its insistence on truth as the aim of a moral theory. 
Hence, motive-consequentialism contains a normatively neutral conception of the aim of moral 
theory, appealing to a simple standard of truth, with no indication that the notion of truth 
involved differs metaphysically from the notion of truth that might be endorsed in mathematics, 
or in science more broadly (see also Parfit 2011b, p. 501, where Parfit argues that moral 
knowledge is essentially like mathematical knowledge). The aim of moral theory is to discover 
moral truths that exist prior to the theory. Contractualist moral theories, in contrast, typically 
hold that the aim of moral theory is not normatively neutral. The mere pursuit of a moral theory 
presupposes that the moral agents deliberating already accept certain values. For instance, the 
contractualist approach to moral theory works based on the assumption that it is moral agents 
who are already committed to being a part of a normative agreement about the principles of 
morality who ask the question of what principles should govern their relations, and that publicity 
counts as a desideratum on moral theories because an esoteric moral theory would brush up 
against this foundational assumption. This is thought to constrain the principles we might adopt, 
as has been argued at length by Rawls and his followers (Larmore 2003, pp. 369-375). 
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The fact that the contractualist’s position on the esoteric morality question presupposes 
values is marshalled into an objection to the publicity condition by Eggleston, who argues that 
this position requires the contractualist to simply presuppose the truth of their theory, thereby 
begging the most important question against the consequentialist (Eggleston 2013, p. 42). 
Eggleston’s argument is important because it highlights the toothlessness of the contractualist 
view on the matter. Consequentialists like Parfit have gone to great pains to demonstrate the 
incoherence of the contractualist’s Kantian conception of the person as precommitted to certain 
normative projects in virtue of their common humanity. If we look at the metaphysical facts, 
according to the consequentialist, there is no such thing as personal identity, and hence no such 
entity that can serve as the foundation for a moral theory (see Parfit 1984, p. 242 for just one 
example of this kind of argument). So even if one finds the contractualist’s conception of the 
aims of moral theory to be convincing, it is not clear that the contractualist can substantiate their 
own case in a broader sense, if doing so requires debunking the consequentialist’s arguments 
against personal identity (although Korsgaard (1989) has tried valiantly). For doing that would 
require taking exactly the kind of stand on controversial metaphysical questions that the 
contractualist, at least the contractualist with a Rawlsian stripe, argues that we ought to be silent 
on in our justification of moral principles (see also the relevant discussions in Chapters 2 and 4). 
From this is follows that the contractualist’s criticism of the consequentialist is not a genuine 
one. 
If the publicity constraint and the objection from esoteric morality have no teeth as an 
argument against consequentialism, the idea that there is a problem about esoteric morality 
seems to dissolve. It is not a point in favor of contractualism that it requires publicity, and it is 
not a point against consequentialism that it is esoteric. It is simply a feature of those views that 
19 
 
they take these positions. But although it is a feature of those views, it is not an unimportant one. 
The position that one’s moral theory takes in response to the possibility of esoteric morality 
represents the concerns that one has when one constructs a theory. We can say plausibly that the 
attitude that one takes toward this reflects the concerns of one’s moral theory: consequentialism 
is concerned with optimal design, and hence takes no concern to deontological values like 
publicity unless those have consequentialist relevance, and contractualism, concerned as it is 
with openness, deliberation, and whether a moral principle is acceptable to all parties, is 
antithetical to esoteric moralities. 
Further supporting the claim that the problem dissolves is the simple fact that 
consequentialism may be derived regardless of the conception of the aim of moral theory which 
we endorse. Pursuing a moral theory among Parfitian lines might be a reasonable pursuit, even 
granting that moral theory also aims at providing the basis for public agreement, and pursuing a 
moral theory along contractualist lines could be reasonable, even on the assumption that moral 
theory sometimes aims at truth. We should also note that it’s not even uncontroversial among 
consequentialists that it is the aim of a moral theory to specify moral truths: R. M. Hare (1981, 
pp. 35-39), for instance, endorses a version of consequentialism according to which moral 
theories aim at the reconciliation of various complex disputes, and does so without endorsing 
Parfit’s ambitious notion of the conception of moral theory. If it turns out that consequentialism 
is derivable given the aim of some other conception of moral theory, then even if it turns out that 
contractualist views can’t substantiate a conception of the aim of moral theory, then it does not 
follow that we should accept Parfit’s conception of the aims of moral theory. But if we don’t 
have that conception, then it’s not clear how multi-level consequentialism is not subject to the 
esoteric morality objection, because the defense of multi-level consequentialism against this 
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objection presupposed that it was clearly specified that the aim of moral theory is to specify the 
moral truth. 
To conclude this section: It seems like there is no ultimate issue about whether there is an 
objection from esoteric morality. This objection crucially fails, and shows that the esoteric-public 
dimension is not an important one in determining which moral theory we should follow. The 
only way to show that it succeeds is to show that moral theory is, as the contractualist thinks, 
solely aimed at providing principles that form the basis of a moral agreement among free and 
equal parties, which seems unlikely. The result of this is that we should feel free to accept 
esoteric moralities. What comes next is an exploration of how moral theory should respond to 
this fact. In doing this, I appeal to the Rortian pragmatist conception of the aims of moral 
vocabularies. 
1.3. Rortian neopragmatism and the esoteric liberal ironist 
Pragmatism suggests that esoteric moralities can live together with the demand for 
publicity. This is because pragmatism provides a framework for ethical reconstruction, and hence 
the possibility of reconciliation of competing conceptions of the aims of moral theory. Recall 
that I said in the introduction that pragmatism aims at explicating philosophy as a tool for solving 
practical problems. Extrapolating a bit from this, I want to say that pragmatism is an approach to 
philosophical problems that emphasizes the role of philosophical inquiry as ultimately aiming at 
enabling engagement with problems in the world, rather than as trying to construct philosophical 
systems that get at the truth in their intended domains. From this perspective, and in light of the 
further fact that different situations place correspondingly different demands on moral theory, 
pragmatism tells us to try to parse the different requirements and aims that situations demand of 
us, and then judge whether esoteric or transparent moral theory is most recommended. I don’t 
21 
 
pursue a general theory of how we ought to negotiate this dynamic, because answering it would 
require psychological and sociological knowledge that I don’t have. But I can gesture at a few 
things. Maybe, for example, we demand publicity when construing a social contract; this claim, 
of course, makes sense in light of the interpretation as Rawls’s veil of ignorance as a procedure 
aimed at bringing discourse, as much as is possible, to publicity. And we might demand an 
esoteric morality when dealing with young people, or people under extreme situational demands, 
because an esoteric morality allows us to teach them rules of conduct designed to help them 
achieve their narrowly-construed goals, for children, surviving childhood and learning a more 
mature conception of morality, and for adults under extreme situational demands, tools to make 
difficult decisions that approximate, but do not correspond to, the real, better-justified moral 
theory. In view of this, pragmatism basically tells us to be guided by the esoteric-public 
dimension of moral theory when doing that would have pragmatic value. And this, in turn, helps 
us to see why the difference between consequentialism and contractualism may not mean quite 
as much as we think it does. 
However, the pragmatist is not out of the woods yet. I will argue that something like the 
problem of esoteric moralities arises for the pragmatist, and that this problem demands an 
answer. (Spoiler: the pragmatist can provide at least the beginnings of one.) Before I can explain 
this objection, though, I want to comment on a crucial technical move that will inform what is to 
come. 
The discussion so far has taken place in terms of competing moral theories, but the move 
to a pragmatist reconstruction shifts the object of discussion from theories to vocabularies. I 
discussed the idea of a vocabulary in the Introduction, so readers may want to remind themselves 
of some of those things. A vocabulary is far broader than a theory, at least potentially, and a 
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vocabulary might include multiple theories, along with some account of how they fit together. 
This shift is important because, for the pragmatist, a theory can retain its usefulness even without 
anything like a pretension of an appeal to truth. To restate the claims about a pragmatist 
balancing of esoteric and public moralities in the terminology of vocabulary: there can be a 
moral vocabulary, on pragmatist terms, that includes both an esoteric and a public theory, along 
with an account of how they fit together. 
On first pass, therefore, one might think that Rorty should simply treat vocabularies as 
situationally-contingent, and hence think that there is no interesting philosophical issue as to 
whether there should be widespread esoteric moralities. This could be seen as following from his 
arguments that there are no final vocabularies (Ramberg 2009, sec. 2.1). Recall that a final 
vocabulary, were there such a thing, would be a set of meanings, theories, and conceptual 
presuppositions that give the final word on what there is in some aspect of reality. A non-final 
vocabulary, or just a vocabulary, is a set of meanings, theories, and conceptual presuppositions 
that provide a way to talk about some aspect of reality. For example, physics provides a 
vocabulary, because it brings along with it terminology, theories, and concepts that we use to 
make sense of the world around us. Consequentialism provides a vocabulary but in a narrower 
sense than physics, because consequentialism’s vocabulary of consequences and the evaluation 
of them only brings along meanings and such with respect to morally-valenced situations. 
Physics could be a contender for a final vocabulary full-stop, while consequentialism could at 
best be a contender for final moral vocabulary. Rorty thinks that there are no final vocabularies, 
because all attempts to specify final vocabularies have failed, thereby raising tricky questions 
over what criteria a vocabulary would have to meet in order to actually be final, or because 
attempts have succeeded only at the price of being final only in a very narrow and uninteresting 
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sense (Ramberg 2009, id). Consider Rorty and Quine in conversation regarding the latter’s 
attempt to elevate physics as the final vocabulary of all inquiry. According to Rorty, Quine gives 
an account of meaning whereby meaning is purely extensional, in that meanings are specified by 
the behavioral responses that subjects make toward queries about the meanings of terms (Quine 
1960, p. 34; Rorty 1979, p. 204). As it turns out, this is a subtle misreading of Quine, although 
not wholly unreasonable. This view comes in the wake of Quine’s arguments, in “Two Dogmas 
of Empiricism,” that there are no intensional meanings. Intensional meanings are, roughly, 
meanings that are specified by the internal contents of the term whose meaning is in question. 
For Quine, the argument is that intensional meanings presuppose that there is a philosophically-
valid account of synonymy of meanings, which is not possible except by arguing in a circle 
(Quine 1951, pp. 21-25). But clearly, we need some account of meanings. As it turns out, 
though, Quine holds that there cannot be an extensional account of meanings either, insofar as 
extension’s being leveraged for a semantics would require the same notion of synonymy. In a 
later piece, “Notes on the Theory of Reference,” Quine addresses this issue by arguing that, 
although strictly-speaking there is no philosophically-valid account of an extensional semantics 
that does not fall to the problem raised in “Two Dogmas,” something like a semantics can be 
supplied by appealing to the Tarski disquotational schema, which is a “technical construction” 
(Quine 1961, p. 138) that allows us to define the predicate ‘true-in-L’, where L is some language, 
in a way that does not presuppose a notion of synonymy. The disquotational schema does this by 
essentially replacing the theory of meaning with the theory of reference, by defining ‘true-in-L’, 
for a language, as a system of mapping sentences, treated as names, onto statements in the 
language itself (Quine 1961, p. 137); the mapping is explained by the name and the statement 
sharing an extension (Quine 1961, p. 132). In a crucial moment, Quine justifies replacing 
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semantics with the theory of reference just because the ideas of the theory of reference, as he 
sees them, “are so very much less foggy and mysterious than the notions belonging to the theory 
of meaning,” (Quine 1961, pp. 137-8), an idea that proved influential to Donald Davidson as he 
further built out Quine’s notion of reference in “Truth and Meaning” (Davidson 1967, pp. 309-
311). Hence, we can say that, although Quine does not think that there is an extensional account 
of semantics, the thing that we can do that most approaches an account of semantics is a 
disquotational approach to the truth predicate which itself presupposes something like co-
extension. Davidson’s comments in that essay are crucial for understanding another important 
feature of Quine’s account: the claim that this theory is “an empirical theory,” and that “it may 
be tested by comparing some of its consequences with the facts” (Davidson 1967, p. 311). The 
question of what words mean is crucially bound up with empirical investigations into the nature 
of the world. As a consequence, science plays a crucial role in the disquotational approach, 
insofar as physics is the most general empirical investigation and provides the final word, in 
some sense, into the empirical investigations that can explain name-statement mappings. Physics 
is as close as we can get to providing a final vocabulary for all inquiry, and hence the source of 
an extensional account of meaning that allows us to do what we want with our language, because 
physics is the most sophisticated and nuanced method of gathering empirical evidence; it is the 
best way to be sure that our statements and truth-claims conform to observation (Quine 1960, pp. 
17-21). 
In response, Rorty argues that, even if Quine were right and that physics was the final 
vocabulary of all inquiry, in that it gave the final, maximally inclusive word on all aspects of 
reality, it doesn’t follow that physics is exhaustive. This argument would show that physics is 
universal, but it does not show that all other ways of speaking, including the vocabulary of 
25 
 
intensional semantics, are empty (Rorty 1979, p. 207). Even if everything that were relevant, 
including all ethical claims, could be redescribed in the vocabulary of physics, it doesn’t follow 
that we have no reasons to employ other vocabularies. In other words, Rorty holds that the sense 
in which physics is final, even granting Quine’s arguments that it is final, is not the interesting 
sense of finality, hinting at a distinction between a final vocabulary as one that covers all 
conceivable cases and a final vocabulary as simply the one that we have most recently agreed to 
hold constant. 
The fact of the impossibility of a final vocabulary, except in the relevant less interesting 
sense, suggests a pragmatist attitude toward esoteric moralities. An esoteric moral theory can be 
a constituent part of a particular moral vocabulary precisely because the world sometimes, but 
does not always, demand that we employ esoteric moralities. Hence, an esoteric moral theory, 
like any other moral theory, would be poorly-suited as a final vocabulary, but perfectly plausible 
as a constituent part of some carefully worked out and continuously revised ethical vocabulary. 
The issue with esoteric moralities, and the issue that dominated the first section of this chapter, is 
simply that we have no way to say, as a matter of final vocabulary, whether the right moral 
theory is really esoteric, or really public, because we have no answer to the question of the aims 
of moral theory. Publicity and esotericness are simply constituent properties that our broader 
ethical vocabularies have to prepare to respond to. It is pragmatically good, we might say, if our 
moral vocabularies aim to achieve a complex balancing of the various aims of moral theory, 
rather than trying to impose a singular conception. 
Note, further, than this discussion opens up the possibility of a reconstruction of rule-
consequentialism along pragmatist lines. By showing that it is good, from a pragmatic 
perspective, to allow our moral theories to have an esoteric moral component, pragmatism 
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provides an attractive explanation for what appears to be a significant bullet for the 
consequentialist to bite. It looks like a bullet to bite because consequentialists see themselves as 
playing this realist game of showing that their moral theory is true, and therefore superior to 
deontological theories like contractualism. For instance, if consequentialism can be successfully 
defended against the objection from esoteric morality as Parfit thinks it can, then the aim of 
moral theory is to specify moral truths. Since it is not clear what the aim of moral theory might 
be besides this, it is plausible to say that, for Parfit, the aim of moral theory as specification of 
moral truth needs to be part of the final vocabulary of moral theory. It must be part of the 
theory’s set of meanings, theories, and conceptual presuppositions that have the final word about 
some aspect of reality. But Rorty should be committed to denying this, and this is a good thing 
for the consequentialist, because it sure seems like we use moral theory with some other kind of 
aim at some point. Contractualism’s insistence on publicity and its relationship to the social 
contract is an example of this. Further, even granting that Parfit’s conception of the aim of moral 
theory could, somehow, provide a normative vocabulary for all cases, and in that sense could be 
a final vocabulary, that doesn’t exclude the possibility that there are other vocabularies that can 
also be used to make sense of some case. Parfit, then, could claim to have a final vocabulary, but 
only in the less interesting sense in which Quine’s conception of physics provides a final 
vocabulary. So even while being agnostic on the question of whether or not a moral theory aims, 
or should aim, at specifying moral truths, it can be shown that consequentialism does not provide 
a final vocabulary for the proper aim of moral theory, except in an uninteresting sense that it can 
cover all cases non-exhaustively. But appealing to pragmatism allows this problematic to drift 
away, and to instead see this feature of consequentialism as a feature of the fact that there are 
multiple aims for moral theory. The multiple levels, of this consequentialism, of providing 
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general principles (act-consequentialism), say, and explicating a way of life that can actualize 
those principles in persons and their psychologies (motive-consequentialism), are unified by 
Rortian pragmatism. 
Whether this actually is pragmatically good, however, is an legitimate, open question. 
This is a significant problem for the pragmatist attitude toward esoteric moralities, because it 
depends on esoteric morality’s being pragmatically valuable. Consequently, if there is some 
reason to doubt the pragmatic value of esoteric morality, then there are doubts about the 
pragmatist reconstruction of esoteric moralities, and hence multi-level consequentialism, that 
have been offered. We will explore this possibility in the next section. For the moment, however, 
I want to provide one more argument that pragmatism and consequentialism do a better job at 
dealing with these esoteric moralities. Consider the case of esoteric moralities and moral 
education. Adrian M. S. Piper argues that moral education demonstrates the necessity of the 
publicity constraint, insofar as moral education is esoteric and in virtue of that uniquely justified 
in the case of morality for children. We often teach children patently false moral rules, and we do 
this because they have intellectual constraints that would prevent them from learning the right 
rules. Piper argues that this shows that esoteric moral theories are problematic because we do not 
teach people a patently false moral rule when we consider them to be intellectually sophisticated 
enough to learn the true moral rule. Esoteric moralities, hence, treat grown adults as though they 
are children. This in turn supports the objection from esoteric morality, insofar as it supports the 
controversial premise of that argument that we should reject esoteric moralities (Piper 1978, pp. 
205-6). 
 I actually think this argument doesn’t support the objection from esoteric morality. In 
particular, it seems hard to say that we should never treat grown adults in the way that we treat 
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children. For instance, it might be fine to treat a person in the midst of a panic attack as a child, 
by cuddling them and speaking to them in simple, soothing tones. This effect doesn’t seem to 
dissolve as choices become more consequential. If L. A. Paul’s discussions of transformative 
experiences are to be believed, then we are often in a very poor epistemic situation with regard to 
major life decisions that we make, insofar as these decisions affect who we are, and hence 
deprive us of the subjective experiences that would explain whether that change was right (Paul 
2014, esp. pp. 13-14). In those cases, some measure of self-deception might be justified, or even 
unavoidable. It seems to follow that a person undertaking a transformative experience might 
adopt a moral theory that allows self-deception. This is all to say that Piper’s conception of 
publicity is overly strong. It is simply not true that we should always be transparent with grown 
adults, and correspondingly it doesn’t seem always objectionable to treat grown adults like 
children. The fact that in some cases it would be wrong to treat adults like this is also irrelevant, 
because a pragmatist can simply say that theory aims at different things in different contexts. 
With some more nuance as to what it means to say that we should never treat grown adults as 
children, we see that adults and children are relevantly similar, in at least a narrowly-
circumscribed set of cases, and hence that we can’t support the objection from esoteric morality 
by arguing that we should always reject esoteric moralities because they treat grown adults as 
children. 
 Pragmatism and consequentialism explain these conclusions better than a moral theory 
that meets the publicity constraint. A moral theory might aim at a pattern of being believed that 
corresponds to the level of intellectual capacity for differing individuals, insofar as intellectual 
capacity affects the aim to which a person would put the moral theory. We simply allow that 
moral theory aims at what a person, at whatever level of intellectual competence they are at, 
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needs from a moral theory. Hence, contra Piper, there is no reason to think that moral education 
supports the esoteric morality objection. Actually, moral education supports its pragmatist 
dissolution. 
1.4. The esoteric character of conceptual feminism 
Now we know what it is to dissolve the esoteric morality objection by Rortian 
pragmatism, and we have a test case, drawn from the literature on esoteric morality, which shows 
how this could be a good thing for moral theory. Yet with all that has been said, Rorty is not out 
of the woods on esoteric morality. Rorty thinks that, when considering our ethical vocabularies, 
we have to adopt the standpoint of the liberal ironist, a citizen of a democratic society who 
remains committed to their own final vocabulary, and yet realizes that it is a merely contingent 
fact that they have the final vocabulary they do. This person “combine[s] commitment with a 
sense of the contingency of their own commitment” (Rorty 1989, p. 61). A liberal ironist has the 
uncomfortable project of trying to balance maximal openness to reconsideration of their 
vocabulary while still remaining committed to that vocabulary. This fact gives rise to a possible 
objection to Rorty’s response to EM. Requiring theorists who tend to be underrepresented in 
moral theorizing to be liberal ironists could undercut a different legitimate aim of moral theory: 
providing a toolkit for underrepresented individuals to analyze and critique their experiences of 
injustice. If Rorty’s position on esoteric morality ultimately makes it harder to assert the finality 
of one’s social justice vocabulary, and being able to assert this has pragmatic value, then this 
would show that Rorty’s position is bad, from the perspective of pragmatic value. In this section, 
I lay out this objection in more detail, and show how Rorty’s ideas give us the resources to 
account for it. In doing that, I show how a Rortian pragmatist dissolution of the objection from 
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esoteric morality helps us think clearly about the aims of moral theory in high-stakes real world 
cases. 
 Let’s grant, for the sake of argument, that a Rortian pragmatism allows for multiple 
competing conceptions of the aim of moral theory. If my claims about Rorty’s pragmatism in the 
previous paragraph are correct, then it seems like that is just a simple reading off of his view. 
This, however, would entail a substantive commitment on the part of Rorty for moral agents to 
adhere to a broad variety of moral vocabularies, with this adherence determined by the 
situational and dialogical on agents. If this is true, then an agent might face an esoteric morality 
insofar as situations may make differing, incompatible demands of agents. 
 Suppose one thinks that we ought to use conceptual ethics, conceptual engineering, and 
metalinguistic negotiation to develop a sharper, more practically-robust vocabulary for social 
justice projects. Conceptual ethics is the field of ethics that investigates, to quote Herman 
Cappelen and David Plunkett from a recent review article, “normative issues about which 
concepts one should use (and why) and evaluative issues about which concepts are better than 
others (and why)” (Cappelen and Plunkett 2020, p. 4). In this article, I focus on the work of Sally 
Haslanger and numerous philosophers, who have held that certain social justice concepts like 
race and gender (Haslanger 2005, pp. 20-21), misogyny (Manne 2016, p. 44), disability (Barnes 
2016, pp. 39-48), and health (Kukla 2015, pp. 525ff)1 are defined in common parlance in a way 
that robs them of the critical import for which they are needed. A good example is Kate Manne’s 
argument that the term misogyny is defined in common parlance as a universal psychological 
disposition to hate women and to act so as to harm them, that this definition forecloses the use of 
the term for the crucial social justice purposes for which feminists need it, and that we therefore 
 
1 It should be noted that, although it’s quite clear that the approach in this paper mirrors that of Haslanger and the 
others, Kukla does not explicitly use the language proposed by these authors. 
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have reason to push for its redefinition to be more sensitive to the social and political 
components of misogyny (Manne 2016, p. 44). This feminist push for the redefinition of social 
justice terms for specifically feminist reasons I will call conceptual feminism. 
It is not obvious how conceptual feminism relates to moral theory. After all, moral 
theories usually tell us what we should do, not how we should talk. One way to understand how 
this could be is to consider moral theory as an attempt to achieve reflective equilibrium between 
our considered moral judgments, moral principles, and, in a crucial addition made by Norman 
Daniels, our broader background theories, including “theories of the person or of the role of 
morality” that govern the predictions that we make about our normative world (Daniels 1979, p. 
261). If we count theories about language and semantics as a part of our broader social and 
psychological theories, then it seems like giving a complete moral theory would need to answer 
to the possibility of conceptual engineering. The social and psychological theories might, for 
instance, have to contain an account of the rules, both descriptive and normative, of the use of 
the method of conceptual engineering. Daniels, broadly concurring with this, notes that our 
background theories might lead us to reject a principle or a considered judgment, but that a 
principle or a considered judgment might also, possibly counterintuitively, lead us to reject a 
background theory (Daniels 1979, p. 259). It hence seems that conceptual feminism allows us to 
occupy a sort of second-order control over moral theorizing, insofar as it specifies possible 
conditions under which intentional modifications to our language can affect the background rules 
that constrain normative theorizing, and which normative theorizing must be accountable to. 
The possibility of conceptual ethics and a Haslanger-style redefinition of social justice 
concepts raises a problem for a Rortian attempt to dissolve the concern over esoteric moralities. 
Suppose we think that moral theory’s aim is to pursue new vocabularies, to provide vocabularies 
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that are inclusive of a maximal number of perspectives, and to destabilize vocabularies that are 
proposed as final vocabularies. A conceptual engineering project on the concept of misogyny is 
in effect a modification of our moral vocabulary. Which aim of moral theory does this satisfy? It 
doesn’t take much effort to see that it satisfies some, and fails others. Conceived as the aim of 
pursuing new vocabularies and including the maximal number of perspectives, Rorty would 
surely be welcoming of conceptual projects like Manne’s. Yet if moral theory aims to destabilize 
putative final vocabularies, Rorty has to oppose Manne’s project, insofar as Manne is giving an 
analysis of feminist concepts that allows feminists to exclude various other analyses of those 
concepts for social and political reasons. As Nancy Fraser (1991, p. 265) writes, the issue with 
Rorty on these points is that he both requires an account of who has this semantic authority, 
given his explicit commitment to social justice projects, and provides us with an approach to 
moral philosophy that cannot make sense of the question itself. Presumably the feminists on his 
view ought to hold this semantics authority, but Rorty’s esoteric approach to morality seemingly 
requires that this role can only be taken either illicitly, or by someone in a private sphere, cut off 
from a broader discursive community that must be targeted by the project. 
The possibility of conceptual ethics shows, I think, that the broad array of pragmatist 
conceptions of the aims of moral theory pull in different directions in certain contexts. This 
problem is mirrored in some arguments given by Margaret Urban Walker (1996, pp. 284-287), 
who argues that feminist philosophers should oppose esoteric moral theories because of the 
tendency for an esoteric morality to encourage domination of women because it hides crucial 
features of their own experiences of gender oppression from them. To provide women with 
esoteric moralities is to position them in such a way that makes them less likely to participate in 
moral discourse, and hence more likely that we end up with moralities that reinforce patriarchy. 
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Rorty, it could be thought, winds up with exactly the kind of problematic morality that Walker 
repudiates. In an essay called “Feminism and Pragmatism”, Rorty holds that the aim of 
destabilizing patriarchal final vocabularies is among the crucial aims of feminist theory (Rorty 
1998b, p. 8). Conceptual engineering projects, however, show that there is a social justice reason 
to provide final vocabularies whose destabilization we actively oppose. Moreover, the reason 
that we should actively oppose this destabilization is provided by an uncontroversial conception 
of pragmatism. So the pragmatist is tied up in knots, on the one hand with a theory that tells them 
to work toward justice and equity for women, and on the other with a metaphilosophical outlook 
that requires openness to vocabulary modification that could undermine that aim, insofar as it 
allows anyone, up to James’s ‘last man’, to participate. 
The dominant theme of Rorty’s essay is that pragmatist opposition to universalism and 
realism couple well with, and gives a satisfying account of, the feminist critique of 
commonsensical social structures as patriarchal. In writing this, Rorty rightly captures crucial 
facts about these sorts of attempts. Yet when the moment comes to consider what it might take to 
implement feminist discourse, Rorty writes the following: “Although practical politics will 
doubtless often require feminists to speak with the universalist vulgar, they might profit from 
thinking with the pragmatists” (Rorty 1998b, p. 210). This claim is astonishing for a pragmatist 
who talks like Rorty, for it in effect proposes the creation of a set of norms and practices for 
universalist discourse as an aim of feminist theory. If, as seems fair to say, this in effect proposes 
a new pragmatist notion of the aim of moral theory, then it seems that Rorty has endorsed aims 
of moral theory that pull in opposite directions. If Rorty is serious about his allegiance to 
feminism, then this problem demands an answer. 
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I claim that this example shows that esoteric morality seeps in through the back door, 
even for a pragmatist who attempts to defuse theoretical dilemmas like the esoteric morality 
problem. For even if a pragmatist has the aims of destabilizing vocabularies, the aim of 
destabilizing vocabularies may tell a person to come to have beliefs whereby certain 
vocabularies are stabilized. If Rorty is right that practical politics requires a stable vocabulary of 
social justice concepts, as he seems to be forced to by his claim about the ‘universalist vulgar’, 
then insisting on the destabilization of all vocabularies, which in effect treats all attempts to 
stabilize vocabularies as attempts to turn a vocabulary into a final vocabulary, could undercut 
feminist theory exactly where it needs to be elevated. 
A similar kind of argument is made against Rorty by Bernard Williams. In Truth and 
Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (2002), Williams argues that there are things called 
everyday truths, certain kinds of clear truth-claims that we are willing to accept without much 
critical analysis. The everyday truths include truths about the weather and about what things we 
can plainly see; indeed, Williams also refers to these truths as plain truths. One way to read 
Manne’s account of misogyny, and indeed conceptual engineering claims in general, is as an 
attempt to influence what should count as everyday truths about misogyny. For example, Manne 
may be read as advocating that we should understand misogyny in such a way as to say that 
sentences like ‘Misogyny need not be intentional’ are everyday truths (c.f. Manne 2016, p. 61). 
Now Rorty, given his explicit endorsement of the feminist project, should at least in theory be 
amenable to the idea that feminists ought to exert control in this way; Rorty, however, denies 
feminists like Manne the ability to assert everyday truths about misogyny, because as per 
Williams his approach to truth specifically, and moral theory more generally, is thoroughly 
ironist, and hence indifferent to whether there is such a thing as everyday truth. Paraphrasing 
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Williams, Rorty’s pragmatist approach to truth undermines the position that the critic attempts to 
take, because it both requires that certain everyday truths about misogyny be asserted, and that 
there are no truths, save for the ‘truths’ of power (Williams 2002, pp. 8-9; see also Fricker 2013, 
pp. 811-12; Lovibond 2015b, p. 48).2  
Again, taking Manne’s discussions of misogyny as an example, we could read the import 
of that project at the attempt to impose a normative vocabulary, which specifically acts as a tool 
to hammer out socially- and culturally-mediated disputes about the semantics of the term. It is, of 
course, a matter of social-political strategy that Manne appeals to here. She writes that her 
conceptual ethics project is necessary, given how the term misogyny is currently used, to avoid 
silencing women in the attempts to articulate the conditions of oppression (Manne 2016, p. 44). 
On such a view, the utility of the social-political conception of misogyny is in part found in the 
fact that it aims to exclude the individualistic vocabulary from common parlance. What Manne 
does not argue, however, is that appealing to an individualistic account of misogyny is not the 
only way to silence. Any assertion that undermines what we might call the practical force of the 
social-political conception of misogyny might count as silencing, insofar as Manne’s conception, 
it is argued, is necessary for feminist social justice projects. Yet it could plausibly be argued that 
a Rortian pragmatism, targeted at destabilizing final vocabularies, undermines that practical 
force (Lovibond 2015b, Fricker 2013). This follows because Manne’s project in effect aims at 
arguing for the primacy of some vocabulary. In arguing that we have reasons to accept the 
social-political conception of misogyny over the individualistic conception, Manne is committed 
to, if not the claim that her preferred conception is the final vocabulary of the matter, the claim 
that there is an objective ordering of vocabularies over which she has semantic authority, which 
 
2 I am indebted to Miranda Fricker for calling my attention to these texts, and for putting this objection to me. 
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answers to a normative conception outside of those vocabularies. If arguing for the finality of a 
social justice vocabulary is what Manne aims at, then Manne’s aim runs afoul of the broader 
conception of the aims of moral theory that Rorty endorses. But given Rorty’s support for 
feminist projects, this result is unwelcome. 
For Rorty, however, this problem is not insurmountable, and seeing how we address it 
provides a helpful example of the possibility of esoteric discourse which can be seen to be 
acceptable to both those engaged in feminist social justice projects and a Rortian who wants to 
provide a robust account of how moral theory, or something like it, can be philosophically 
responsible, on pragmatist lines. If moral theory serves multiple, divergent aims, each themselves 
a part of a differing moral vocabulary, then a suitable theory of social justice concepts will 
require discourse of a different tenor depending on the demands of the situation, and depending 
on the abilities of the people deliberating within the situation. Feminists of Manne’s stripe need 
an objective ordering of vocabularies, because this objective ordering is itself necessary to retain 
the assertoric force of social justice terms. But the broader aims of feminism as a critical 
philosophy must hold the non-absoluteness of whatever objective ordering is endorsed. It is 
hence a mistake to assume that the fact that there are multiple aims of moral theory makes any 
trouble for conceptual feminism as it exists in the case of the pragmatist reconstruction of 
motive-consequentialism. It is no more troubling than the fact that different audiences, and 
different situations, require theorists to engage in discourse that aims at different things; the 
multiple aims are themselves a consequence of the non-absoluteness of the feminist vocabulary. 
Similarly, with the Williams point, it is simply not right to say that pragmatism like Rorty’s can 
offer us no everyday truths about which feminist claims need to be elevated, and it is simply not 
right to argue that this is because pragmatists are too relaxed toward truth-claims. Pragmatists 
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rather recognize that discourse and persuasion are deeply contextual, and that any attempt to 
state everyday truths about how to pursue social justice projects needs to be placed within the 
context in which the claim is to be made. To say that these contextualized everyday truths are 
genuine truth claims, therefore, can be asserted by pragmatists precisely because it is vacuous, 
and something that anybody can get on the cheap. But it is not clear what more would be 
required in order to drive a social justice project; there is a crucial difference between a truth-
claim and a claim about what reasons people have, and the latter is what really matters. This 
might also be true at the same time as claims about the reasons that people have can be said to be 
true. For instance, if someone is punching me, I can tell them to stop punching me, and whether 
or not they recognize that reason, saying that it is true that the person should stop punching me 
adds nothing to the reason that the person has to recognize the reason. It is an everyday truth, I 
think, that the person should stop punching me, but adding the truth-claim to this adds nothing to 
make that everyday truth more compelling, and if we can find a value in adding the truth-claim, 
so much the better for the pragmatist, as the value would be pragmatic value!3 (See Chapter 4 for 
a more detailed discussion of the pragmatist approach to truth, and why these claims can be 
made.) Feminist theorists, at least potentially, need a vocabulary for engaging women’s problems 
that both allows feminist criticism of real practices and for the vocabulary in which that criticism 
is couched to be the possible aim of reconstruction, whereas women going about their lives 
outside of theory need a vocabulary that places that line differently, and privileges an approach 
that prioritizes the enabling of feminist criticism of real practices. Which of these vocabularies is 
more true or not is not to the point; what matters is whether the selected vocabulary is more 
effective at getting the punching to stop. Note, then, that showing that a pragmatist feminism 
 
3 I am indebted to Jesse Prinz for examples of this kind. 
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endorses an esoteric, ironist conception of the varying levels of feminist discourse is no objection 
to that version of pragmatist feminism. Rather than dividing feminists against themselves, a 
suitably interpreted conception of Rortian pragmatism explains and supports the subtle 
dialectical moves that feminists make to further their causes. 
1.5. Weaving together the threads 
 The puzzle about what we should say in the face of moral theories that license esoteric 
beliefs hence cannot be resolved by taking a pragmatist stance toward the possibility of moral 
theory, but this is not a problem. The puzzle arises because moral theories purportedly aim at 
truth, and truth and belief are not necessarily linked. But even giving up the idea that moral 
theories aim at truth can give rise to a puzzle about esoteric moralities, because a moral theory 
might have multiple, conflicting aims. Of course, although the problem arises for pragmatists as 
though it does realists, the problem does not come with the same kind of stigma that it does for a 
realist. There is no reason to think that there should be neat answers to these problems, and even 
the idea of proposing a moral theory in the first place is hard to square with pragmatist framing 
assumptions. Yet even on all these claims, a theoretical approach to morality along pragmatist 
lines might tell people to disbelieve in pragmatism, for the purpose of practical politics. This is a 
kind of problem of esoteric morality, although again, it is not as serious a problem for the 
pragmatist. There is no reason to think that a pragmatist theory needs to be true or believed in, 
and so it’s not surprising that practically, we can negotiate the strength of that belief when it suits 
our purposes, as when conceptual feminists aggressively insist on an engineered analysis of 
social justice terms. But it does show that even the pragmatist’s attempt to avoid this knotty 
philosophical problem cannot succeed so simply as they’d hope.  
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 These argument show that pragmatism, in the character of the liberal ironist, conceptual 
feminism, and multi-level consequentialism share an internal dialectical structure. Each is an 
attempt to negotiate and substantiate the various aims and needs which motivate moral agents to 
utilize moral theories across time and variable contexts. The idea that we can reject a multi-level 
consequentialism by appealing to a publicity criterion, at the end of this, appears even less 
plausible than it did at first, because appealing to a publicity criterion would make the position of 
the liberal ironist and the conceptual feminist even harder to maintain. But the world demands of 
us that we maintain these positions, insofar as we are sophisticated creatures that aim at radically 
different things depending on our contexts. Hence, we have a pragmatist reason, albeit an 
indirect one, to assent to the standpoint of esoteric, multi-level consequentialism, if that is the 
path we choose to take. 
 This does not amount to a real, direct defense of consequentialism, however. If it were 
direct, then the contractualist would not be able to reconstruct their own position along 
pragmatist lines. But, as I will argue in the next chapter, contractualists, by appealing to the 
broader possibilities that are available in the literature on deontology, can reconstruct their 
theories in much the same way, by appealing to pragmatist framing conceptions about how the 
practices of moral theory are best internally structured and engaged in. The notion of internal 
structure is there leveraged to provide a multi-level deontology that reconciles various 
considerations proposed by deontologists whose projects, on their faces, are radically divergent 






CHAPTER 2: Reconstructing Moderate Deontology in Political Liberalism 
2.1. Introduction: moderate and threshold deontologies 
The previous chapter tried to show that pragmatism can vindicate an important aspect of 
the consequentialist perspective, and hence that pragmatism can raise problems for deontological 
theories like contractualism. Yet this does not amount to a refutation of deontology, because the 
goal in raising those problems was simply to show that a plausible pragmatist reconstruction of 
consequentialism is possible. Consequentialism is a position that a liberal ironist can endorse, 
use, and defend. It is the project of this chapter to show that something similar can be done for 
deontology, in view of the many problems involved in formulating the multi-level deontological 
theory known as moderate deontology. 
It is commonly held that deontologists think that it is impermissible for a physician to kill 
a healthy patient and part out the patient’s body parts for transplant into five other patients, 
whose lives would be saved. Call this the 5-to-1 Case. This is because deontology is a system of 
ethics that typically holds that it is always impermissible to do certain actions that disrespect the 
fundamental moral equality of persons. Killing that one healthy patient seems to do just that. In 
deontological jargon, there are deontological constraints against performing certain actions, and 
these constraints always hold, with no exceptions. Importantly, deontology apparently does not 
allow consequence-based exceptions to constraints. Deontological constraints are supposed to 
hold regardless of the consequences of respecting them (Alexander and Moore 2020, sec. 2).  
Most deontologists, even those who endorse an absolutist conception of deontological 
constraints, recognize that extreme cases put pressure on this standard conception of constraints. 
In a case where a physician could kill one healthy patient and part out that patient’s body parts 
for transplant into 5,000,000 other patients, whose lives would be saved, it seems that the 
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impetus to permit that action is stronger than in the 5-to-1 Case. Call this variation the 
5,000,000-to-1 Case. I assume, for the sake of argument, that the reader has the intuition that 
killing in the 5-to-1 Case would be impermissible, and that killing in the 5,000,000-to-1 Case 
would be permissible. 
This pattern of judgments raises the problem of moderate deontology (Smilansky 2003), 
alternatively called threshold deontology (Alexander 2000, pp. 893-4; Brennan 2009, p. 26), 
non-absolutist deontology (Ellis 1992, pp. 857-8), and weak deontology (Huemer 2009, pp. 464-
5). If killing is impermissible in 5-to-1 but permissible in 5,000,000-to-1, as intuition would have 
it, then there must be some number at which killing switches from being impermissible to 
permissible, some n such that, in n-to-1 cases it is permissible to kill, but in (n-1)-to-1 cases it is 
impermissible to kill. In the jargon of moderate deontology, n is the threshold at which 
deontological constraints are relaxed. 
The problem of moderate deontology is that the possibility of a deontological threshold 
makes trouble for the conception of deontological constraints proposed in the first paragraph. 
Deontological constraints are either absolute or moderate. If deontological constraints are 
absolute, as a straightforward understanding of deontology would suggest, then the intuition that 
killing is permissible in 5,000,000-to-1 would have to be rejected. However, if deontological 
constraints are moderate, and subject to thresholds at which they no longer constrain, then the 
intuition about 5,000,000-to-1 can be accepted. Most, as I have already said, regard this latter 
course as correct. But this move creates a number of significant philosophical problems. A first 
problem regards the question of the placement of n, the threshold. What is the value of n? And 
without a conclusive answer to that question, how can we decide on a value for n? A second 
problem regards the possible manipulability of deontological thresholds. If we are in a situation 
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where a group is one person below tipping a deontological threshold, assuming that we have 
placed n, is it permissible to kidnap a final person and add them to the group, thereby tipping the 
threshold? Intuitively this violates deontological constraints, but it is hard to see how it might be 
ruled out by a moderate deontologist. 
Although both of these problems are interesting and will figure into this chapter at 
various points, a third problem is the primary topic of this chapter. Is moderate deontology 
genuinely deontology? Some, including Saul Smilansky, have raised this question by noting that 
moderate deontology is too weak on the nature of deontological constraints to count as genuinely 
deontological. On such a view, all someone needs to be a deontologist is to accept that there are 
“only some constraints” on our actions, and not absolute constraints that forbid actions that 
violate moral equality. Smilansky grants that moderate deontology trades on a plausible intuition 
for deontologists: that even granting the absoluteness of deontological constraints, people’s well-
being matters quite a lot. He argues, however, that ‘moderate deontology’ is actually not 
deontology at all, but instead is a pluralist ethical view that gives us deontology up to a point and 
consequentialism after that point. But this is too permissive, says Smilansky: “We should retain 
our understanding of the deontological element as pure and absolute, as far as it goes” 
(Smilansky 2003, p. 72). Hence, while moderate deontology might be intuitively satisfying, 
those who see themselves as offering a defense of deontology by appealing to the existence of 
deontological thresholds to answer the problems of absolute deontology cannot make such a 
move. More specifically, Smilansky reconstructs what he takes to be the normative core of a true 
deontology as follows; noting that even granted deontology’s focus on the priority of 




[Deontology has] two sorts of valid concerns: 
 
(a) Deontological concerns proper (e.g. the innocent cannot deserve to be punished, 
hence must not be)[, and] 
(b) Consequentialist concerns (e.g. increasing human well-being would be good). 
  
Nevertheless, and this is the determining point, the deontologist of the sort we are 
considering also has an underlying third principle: 
 
(c) (a) and (b) are lexically ordered: Whenever (a) and (b) conflict, follow (a) (e.g. if 
increasing human well-being in a given case depends upon punishing the innocent, this 
must not be done) (Smilansky 2003, p. 73). 
 
The point is that deontology itself seems to be essentially committed to (c), and that moderate 
deontology is not really deontology if it denies (c), as it seems like it must. Hence, according to 
Smilansky, moderate deontology denies what is essential to deontology. 
In this chapter, I argue that moderate deontologists, contra Smilansky, can deny (c) while 
still remaining deontologists. Although moderate deontology allows cases where consequences 
are determinative of permissible conduct, a moral theory that frames the relationship between (a) 
and (b) in a way that favors, in some technically-defined sense, (a) is still genuinely 
deontological. A deontological constraint can fail to be absolute, yet still rigorously constraining, 
and a deontological constraint can still be deontological even if not lexically prior, in 
Smilansky’s sense, to consequences. A related conclusion that will follow is that moderate 
deontology is best interpreted as not being solely concerned with the problems outlined with 
deontological thresholds above. Moderate deontology is best interpreted along pragmatist lines, 
as being about designing institutions and methods for the placement of deontological thresholds 





2.2. The Legal Model and Rawls’s four-stage sequence 
If we choose to reject (c), we need a non-absolutist conception of deontological 
constraints that captures enough of the nature of a deontological constraint that it is still 
recognizably deontological. I suggested in the previous paragraph that the way this works is that, 
even while rejecting (c), we can hold that our moral theory is framed in a way that favors (a) 
over (b), while stopping short of the overly-strong (c). It is now time to explain how this is 
possible, because I imagine that a proponent of (c) would simply insist that the idea of favoring 
simply shifts the question. What we want is an account of when it is permissible to favor (a) over 
(b), excepting the possibility of reverting to (c), which claims that (a) is lexically, absolutely 
favored over (b). If not cashed out in terms of lexical priority, then what does it even mean to 
favor (a) over (b)? 
In this section, I show how this account is possible. To begin, consider Anthony Ellis’s 
helpful yet under-emphasized discussion of what he calls the Legal Model of specifically 
threshold deontology, as an attempt to answer the placement problem (Ellis 1992, pp. 870ff). 
According to the Legal Model, the problem of the placement of n is addressed through a quasi-
legalistic model of reasoning, whereby decisions about the placement of n are to be governed by 
judgments about what is an acceptable value of n, given that the aim of placing n is a part of a 
theory of regulating moral conduct. Any value of n is acceptable so long as it does not undermine 
the aim of trying to specify deontological thresholds. In this way, Ellis argues that thresholds 
need not be placed arbitrarily, because meeting the constraint of not undermining the aim of 




It is not clear exactly why this model is called the Legal Model. The argument hinges on 
a conception of the aim of providing a theory of deontological thresholds, but many kinds of 
normative theories hinge in some important way on the aim of providing a normative theory. We 
might appeal to the aims of a work of art, for example, in attempting to judge some particular 
work. Conversely, actual legal reasoning may diverge from this kind of aim-based consideration. 
Certain kinds of law, such as statutes governing criminal sentencing, may be based on intuitions 
about the desert of criminals rather than the function of regulating behavior. It seems more 
germane, I propose, to call the model that Ellis proposes the Prudential Model or the Practical 
Model, or even the Political Model. The idea of letting the aim of moral theory determine the 
placement of n in threshold deontology in essence just appeals to what we would want a 
plausible moderate deontology to do. We want it to be able to place broadly acceptable n’s, and 
to do so in a way that can leave us with some confidence that we. This reading of the passage 
brings out a virtue of Ellis’s account: that the Legal Model provides a procedure, or method, for 
placing n, rather than straightforwardly placing n. That is, it tells us how to figure out what n is, 
rather than telling us what n is. In proposing this account, Ellis frames the problem of threshold 
deontology as an interpretive problem. The setting of a deontological threshold is an act of 
approximating, in action, a judgment about what suits the purposes of having moderate 
deontological constraints. 
As it turns out, Ellis’s account survives Smilansky’s challenge in virtue of this fact. 
Because the appeal to the aims of setting deontological thresholds provides a non-arbitrary sense 
in which (a) can favor (b) even if we reject (c), the threshold deontologist can admit the intuition 
in the 5,000,000-to-1 case and remain deontological. 
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In conceiving of the problem of the placement of values of n as a practical, rather than 
theoretical, problem, Ellis shows that we can justify rejecting (c), and hence Smilansky’s concern 
regarding the nature of deontology, by appealing to the fact that a general rule simply stating that 
we occasionally choose (b) over (a) in extreme cases should not be taken to require that we give 
a precise account of in which cases this is justified. It is one thing to have a general principle to 
make sense of exceptions to deontological constraints, but an entirely different thing to design 
institutions and interpersonal norms that come closest to approximating that general principle. 
Yet in admitting that applying the general principles to the world requires those holding the 
principle to make exceptions to that principle does not mean that those individuals no longer 
accept that principle. Similarly, an institutionalized principle that governs exceptions to 
deontological constraints need not mean that those who deliberate about those exceptions, and 
sometimes act consistently with those exceptions, reject those constraints, and thereby stop being 
deontologists. 
Another issue with Ellis’s Legal Model is that it isn’t nuanced enough; although Ellis’s 
project is admirable in attempting to explain how we could bypass concerns about the precise 
placement of deontological thresholds, it should also matter what kinds of things would need to 
be done in actual societies in order to implement the Legal Model, given that placing 
deontological constraints will be a difficult applied philosophical task for individuals to 
undertake. In explaining how application works here, I suggest that we appeal to some comments 
by John Rawls. In an often-overlooked passage in A Theory of Justice, Rawls develops what he 
calls the four-stage sequence of principle application to govern the implementation of his theory 
of justice as fairness in a society (Rawls 1999, pp. 171ff). Principle application is a problem for 
Rawls because he thinks that the selection of the principles of justice occurs behind a veil of 
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ignorance, which denies to the parties to the original position particular knowledge about 
themselves. Depriving choosers of this information is well-motivated because it prevents them 
from making use of this information to design principles that could give certain majority groups 
advantages (Rawls 1999, p. 11). Yet it is also true that applying justice in a society will require 
us to know certain facts about that society, and what it needs from its institutions. So in order to 
apply Rawls’s theory, we need to figure out a way around the informational restrictions imposed 
by the veil of ignorance. In the section at hand, Rawls specifies a method for gradually lifting the 
veil, whereby its restrictions are incrementally lifted as the level of principle application gets 
more and more specific. 
Rawls holds that the original position, with the full veil of ignorance, is the first stage of 
the four-stage sequence. At this stage, parties only know the contents of what Rawls calls the 
circumstances of justice: general facts about social and psychological theory (Rawls 1999, p. 
173). Importantly, they do not know facts such as their own institutional affiliations and the 
general facts about their societies. Here, the principles of justice agreed upon are not sufficiently 
detailed to regulate a society. Agents would need to know some details about the character of the 
society in question, so that the application of the principles can be tailored to what Rawls calls 
the “general facts about [the] society, that is, its natural circumstances and resources, its level of 
economic advancement and political culture, and so on” (Rawls 1999, p. 173). Rawls calls this 
second stage of the sequence the constitutional stage, insofar as this level of principle application 
roughly corresponds to the sort of reasoning that occurs at a constitutional convention. Rawls 
then notes that a constitution is also not sufficient to apply the principles of justice, insofar as 
constitutions are used to guide and restrict the “procedural arrangements” that result (Rawls 
1999, p. 173). A constitution does not, in other words, determine statutes for regulating conduct. 
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Hence, the third stage, which Rawls calls the legislative stage, adds to the constitutional stage the 
task of selecting between various statutory schemes for regulating a society. Rawls mentions no 
changes to the position of the veil of ignorance in this case. Even laws, however, must be 
applied. It is a separate question, after a statutory scheme is implemented, how citizens should 
relate to that scheme. Hence, Rawls introduces the fourth stage, which he does not name but 
which has been called the administrative application stage by Colin MacLeod (2014, pp. 167-8). 
At this stage, the veil of ignorance is fully lifted, and all persons know all relevant facts about 
themselves, in addition to facts about the circumstances of their society and the circumstances of 
justice. Here, application is likened to “the application of rules to particular cases by judges and 
administrators, and the following of rules by citizens generally” (Rawls 1999, p. 175). 
Citizens at the fourth stage may disagree with each other about any number of normative 
claims which are made, and may themselves be unsure as to which decisions would best institute 
the principles of justice. Hence, it seems that the four-stage sequence should lead people to 
accept a lack of precision in their implementations of the principles. Rawls (1999, p. 173) 
suggests this fact when he claims that the constitutional stage gives us the task of selecting from 
the many possible just and feasible arrangements the one that is most likely to give rise to just 
institutions. It is also not clear that demanding more precision would be the best way to institute 
the principles of justice. Yet citizens need not, in spite of this, lose their commitment to the 
principles of justice if they think this way. This is because the principles of justice are 
sufficiently general that one can interpret them in a number of ways and yet remain committed to 
them. To borrow MacLeod’s (2014, p. 169) language, so long as one is not a pluralist about the 
principles of justice themselves, one can be a fairly radical pluralist about the admissible possible 
application schemes for the principles of justice. 
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A further note about the four-stage sequence. If we group the four stages by the epistemic 
constraints placed on them, then it follows that we actually end up with three groupings: the first 
stage, with the full veil, the second and third stages, with a partially-raised veil, and the fourth 
stage, with a fully-raised veil. Supposing we were to imagine ourselves, contra Rawls’s 
conception, as being interested in principles at all of these stages of application, it follows that 
there is in the procedure a tripartite taxonomy of principles, corresponding to the level of 
application and the epistemic specificity it allows. At the first level, we are concerned with 
principles at the highest level of generality, a fact forced upon us by the corresponding strength 
of the veil. At the second and third levels, we are concerned with principles at a middle level of 
generality, answering to general facts about the society in question. Then, we can consider 
principles at a lower level of generality, tailoring them to more specific social conditions, since 
we now don’t have a veil of ignorance to preclude us from doing this. These principles are 
individual level because they are specific, and tailored to persons or groups in view of their 
individual needs. As we’ll see, the idea of a mid-level principle is crucial to our making sense of 
how it could be possible to accept a moderate deontology which solves the placement problem 
and retains genuine commitment to deontology. 
The four-stage sequence appeals to the practical infirmities of applying principles in the 
real world to explain how the principles can be best actualized under conditions that prevent the 
principle from being applied more directly. Hence, threshold deontology can appeal to a similar 
notion of interpretation to explain how threshold deontology can retain what is distinctive about 
deontology, in that it grants a significant favoritism to deontological constraints, without 
providing a precise formulation of the thresholds of deontological constraints. A general 
principle that directs us to favor (a) over (b), but stops short of accepting (c), is hence easy to 
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explain on a threshold deontology that adopts the Rawlsian four-stage sequence of principle 
interpretation. 
2.3. Mid-level principles 
I have argued that Rawlsian methodology can help explain how moderate deontologists 
can reject absolutism yet remain genuinely deontological in their moral theory. In this section, I 
want to further flesh out this view, by showing that this methodology can account for a crucial 
technical issue that has dogged threshold deontologists: the possibility of the manipulation of 
thresholds. Before I explain how I can solve this problem, let me rehearse the problem itself, as 
well as one prominent answer that has been given to it. 
Suppose that we have a case before us where n=1,000; that is, a case where the threshold 
for justifiably overriding a deontological constraint against killing is 1,000 lives. We have before 
us, however, a group of 999 individuals. If one more person were added to the group, then the 
threshold would be triggered, and it would be permissible to override the constraint. Now 
suppose that I can kidnap a person and add them to the group. I now have before me a group of 
1,000 individuals. Suppose further that I can kill one person outside that group to save all 1,000 
members. Call this the 999-to-1-Plus-Kidnap Case. 
Larry Alexander, who formulated the problem, argues that threshold deontologists have 
no principled way to say that it is impermissible to kidnap the one in this case. Yet intuitively, it 
seems like it is impermissible to kidnap the one. Moderate deontologists who focus on thresholds 
are faced with the problem of how to get the intuition to match the theory in this case (Alexander 
2000, p. 903). 
In response to Alexander’s challenge, S. Matthew Liao has argued that threshold 
deontologists can hold that other deontological principles might conflict with, and override, 
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deontological thresholds in these cases (Liao m. s., pp. 30-1). Liao says that, in the 999-to-1-
Plus-Kidnap Case, kidnapping would violate the kidnapped person’s rights. Even granting that 
the tipping of a deontological threshold can justify harming a person as a means to an end, it 
does not mean that all other deontological considerations disappear. Hence, threshold 
deontologists can solve the problem of manipulation by accepting the intuition that it is 
impermissible to kidnap the one in the 999-to-1-Plus-Kidnap Case, while accounting in a 
principled way for why this is. 
Liao further supports this conclusion by showing a case in which threshold manipulation 
seems to be permissible. In this case, n=1,000 and we have before us a group of 1,000 people 
who can be saved by killing one. Just as we have made up our mind and decided to kill the one to 
save the 1,000, one of the group escapes. Now, we have only a group of 999 people who will be 
saved by killing the one. The escape triggers the deontological threshold in the opposite 
direction; the case now falls below the threshold. Call this the 1,000-to-1-Plus Escape Case. 
Liao suggests that threshold deontologists can accommodate this case. Because we are 
justified in killing in order to save 1,000 lives, to go through with the action in 1,000-to-1-Plus 
Escape would still result in the requisite number of lives having been saved. It’s just that, 
because of contingent circumstances, one of those lives was saved in a different manner. And, 
crucially, it doesn’t seem as if any additional rights violations occur in this case. Hence, as seems 
intuitive, threshold deontologists can say that it would be permissible to act in this case, and can 
do so for a reason that comports with the theory in a broadly satisfying way. 
I don’t wish to controvert Liao’s solutions. The relevance of these solutions is to point 
out that threshold deontologists can appeal to mid-level principles in their interpretation of the 
general statement of threshold deontology, as requiring us to significantly favor deontological 
52 
 
considerations over consequentialist considerations. Corresponding to the Rawlsian four-stage 
sequence, these principles would fall into the level of the second and third stages of theory 
interpretation. Starting from the general idea of threshold deontology as a part of the first level, 
we then specify restrictions on the application of threshold deontology. We should significantly 
favor deontological constraints over consequences. Now, more specifically, we want to know 
how to favor deontological constraints over consequences; we want a more robust interpretive 
principle that tells us that further rights violations than just the one required to act according to 
the deontological threshold are impermissible, to help us cash this idea out. In other words, we 
want a mid-level interpretation of threshold deontology that captures the importance of other 
deontological values, such as rights. Maybe, then, something like a principle arises from Liao’s 
response to Alexander: do not favor consequences over deontological constraints in such a way 
that violates rights in addition to the rights-violation that would have to be violated in order to 
abide by the deontological threshold. Once we know how to answer concerns about the 
manipulation problem in this way, we can then proceed to a further stage down the sequence, 
where we get clear on the problems with having actual people attempt to reason about 
deontological thresholds. 
Once we have a grasp on a version of threshold deontology that instructs us to 
significantly favor deontological constraints over consequences at the highest level of abstraction 
on the four-stage sequence, we can start to interpret this at a mid-level such that its significance 
with respect to other, potentially-competing deontological notions is brought out. Once we know 
what kinds of mid-level possibilities for threshold deontology are open to us, we can begin the 
low-level investigations of threshold deontology, such as the question about where n is to be 
placed. Hence, I argue that my conception of moderate deontology, which provides a genuinely 
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moderate deontology by appealing to Rawlsian methodologies of principle interpretation, can 
easily accommodate Liao’s response to Alexander, and hence can further show how, contra 
Smilansky, threshold deontology need not cease to be a genuinely deontological moral theory. 
2.4. Non-lexical moderate deontology: answering Smilansky’s challenge 
The second section of this chapter attempted to expand and motivate Ellis’s Legal Model 
for threshold deontology by fleshing it out in a Rawlsian framework of principle interpretation. 
In doing this, the hope is to show that even a loose method of interpretation of a general principle 
can result in a moral theory that retains the spirit of the general principle in a meaningful way. 
This is possible even if, as I have argued, the adjudication of thresholds on deontological 
constraints must be situational and will be imprecise. My discussion of Ellis, in essence, suggests 
a principled basis for replacing Smilansky’s claim that deontology’s distinctive feature is that it 
treats deontological constraints as lexically prior to consequences. By appealing to the Rawlsian 
four-stage sequence, I showed that deontologists can get by without lexical priority, making use 
of the imprecision inherent in the application of general principles downstream from their 
formulation. In this section, I further defend these claims by motivating the deontological 
character of this method. The problem I want to address arises for considerations of the 
following sort. For all I have said, nothing is to stop agents from using the four-stage sequence to 
develop a radically permissive threshold deontology. For instance, people may decide to set n=5, 
especially once we remember that, at the fourth stage of interpretation, anyone is conceived as 
engaged in interpretation of the general principle under the condition of full information. Hence, 
people may use the Rawlsian method to derive a low-level deontological principle which says 
that it is permissible to kill in the 5-to-1 Case discussed in the first section. If this is possible, and 
totally valid on the Rawlsian model for threshold deontology that I have proposed, then my 
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model appears too permissive. The four-stage sequence may be able to be applied in a perfectly 
sound way, but result in the general principle being applied in a way that is not deontology-
preserving.  
 One possible answer to this problem is to argue that this kind of reasoning is just 
irrational for individuals who have accepted the non-lexical threshold deontology that I have 
proposed. To decide that it is permissible to kill in the 5-to-1 Case is just to think that 
deontological constraints are not to be significantly favored over consequences. If it is 
permissible to kill one as a means to saving five, then the constraint against this kind of killing 
just is not significant. So it’s not clear how someone could reach this conclusion in the first 
place, if they understand the idea of deontology even a little bit. Yet I think we should not 
answer the problem this way, because it seems likely that bargaining down on deontological 
thresholds would be a significant phenomenon. If we set n=10,000, which is a number that some 
deontologists would find plausible as an a priori first pass at the matter, then it seems plausible 
that an objector might insist on a trivially lower threshold, such as n=9,995. It may be hard to see 
the relevant difference, from the standpoint of the interpretation of non-lexical threshold 
deontology, between n=10,000 and n=9,995. Now suppose that the objector wins out, and the 
threshold is set at n=9,995. A new objector might plausibly insist that n=9,990 is a plausible 
alternative to n=9,995. And so on. In this way, it is implausible to insist that setting n at a very 
low number is a priori irrational, give that thresholds will tend to be sorites-susceptible.1 
 A different method for dealing with this seems necessary. I suggest that, instead of trying 
to deny outright that threshold deontologists can never set n=5, we undermine the reasons that 
 
1 Obviously, the question of how to deal with the Sorites paradox is a large one, and many solutions have been given 
(for an overview, see Hyde and Raffman 2018). Here, I specifically bracket all of this and pursue the question of 
how, morally, we ought to reason about practical Sorites paradoxes. This qualification is due to Gary Ostertag. 
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they might have for wanting this in the first place by getting clearer about what it means to 
institutionalize a moral theory. In doing this, I do not show that n=5 is an unacceptably low 
number, but that setting n=5 would require the threshold deontologist to shore up their moral 
theory in other regards, thereby imposing something like a mid-level principle that could 
disincentivize individuals from stretching threshold deontology that far. 
 Once we reach the fourth level of the four-stage sequence, mid-level principles govern 
the applicability of deontological thresholds with respect to other deontological values. As our 
discussion of Liao’s response to Alexander showed, the second and third stages of the four-stage 
sequences could be marshaled to require deontological thresholds to be balanced against a 
person’s rights to not be involved in harms in certain ways. At a mid-level, those involved in 
setting deontological thresholds might decide that individual attempts to press n downward are 
ruled out in a certain way. It might be held, for instance, that there are rules about how drastic 
changes to n might be: it may be simply decided that it is impermissible for people interpreting 
threshold deontology at the fourth stage to make more than a 5% change to the placement of the 
deontological threshold at any given time. In this way, some liberty to interpret threshold 
deontology at the lowest level might be accepted, while still constraining that liberty in a way 
that prevents people from bargaining down the threshold aggressively to get the result that killing 
is permissible in the 5-to-1 Case. 
 Importantly, this response introduces deontological considerations to explain why 
bargaining down the threshold would not be deontology-preserving. If mid-level principles were 
set up in this way, then radically bargaining down the value of n would require violating 
principles that themselves had a deontological foundation. This is because the mid-level 
principles are constructed through a public, quasi-democratic method, and hence are made by 
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moral legislators who are concerned to implement a plausible social system that instantiates 
moderate deontology. 
To some more traditionally-minded moral theorists, this move will seem strange, and like 
it shifts the question. It might be thought that this procedure uses political fiat to set moral 
principles, rather than testing moral principles in the more traditional philosophical methods of 
normative ethics, such as intuition and reflective equilibrium. Yet it might be insisted that ethics 
and politics are not the same thing, and that there is no reason to think that appealing to a 
political notion would produce an answer to the ethical questions raised. In other words, this 
view might be construed as a kind of ethical skepticism, that says that ethical analysis past the 
first stage of application is just not possible except through non-ethical political analysis. 
Although there is something to this challenge, I think the worry that it raises actually 
demonstrates a feature, not a bug, of the moderate deontology that I propose here. Suppose that 
it's right to say of this view that it shifts certain aspects of moral judgment to the political. To say 
that this undermines this view as a legitimate moral view assumes that there is no moral element 
to, or moral justification for, certain acts of political deliberation. But this is at least 
controversial, and at best irrelevant. It’s not obvious that political deliberation, even at the 
highest level of abstraction, is non-ethical. Rawls’s process for selecting the principles of justice 
are constructed in a way that brings moral considerations directly to bear. Similarly, insofar as 
persons lower in the four-stage sequence use those principles, as well as whatever else has been 
made available, to guide them in their various tasks, those persons make use of ethical analysis. 
In other words, we could see the insistence that the defense of deontology be separate from 
political notions such as democratic deliberation puts things exactly the wrong way. It is because 
a plausible Rawlsian political methodology is structured in a way that is answerable to ethical 
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considerations at bottom that the four-stage sequence understanding of the placement problem is 
plausible. It is also the explanation for why applying the four-stage sequence to define the 
contours of deontological thresholds is genuinely deontological. The sequence embodies the 
deontological assumptions that underlie the distinctively deontological considerations of 
Rawlsian liberalism.  This is, of course, not an argument that we should accept moderate 
deontology, or any other moral theory, but just an argument that my approach to the placement 
problem is a genuine version of deontology, and hence is a response to Smilansky’s challenge. 
2.5. Rorty, political liberalism, and the method of moderate deontology 
The four initial sections of this chapter connect the problems surrounding threshold 
deontology to a broader Rawlsian application procedure for deontology. The broader purposes of 
this dissertation, however, go far beyond this, toward the subject of Rortian reconstructions in 
normative ethics and metaethics.2 Recall that the goal was to provide Rortian pragmatist 
reconstructions of moral theories that both answers to the need to endorse a moral theory as 
one’s own and to do so in a way that respects the contingency of that person’s vocabulary. To 
see how the Rawlsian considerations at play in this chapter connect to this broader project of 
demonstrating the possibility of pragmatist reconstructions, it is helpful to consider some of the 
claims made in Rorty’s essay on Rawlsian liberalism, “The Priority of Democracy to 
Philosophy” (Rorty 1991d). 
In that essay, Rorty sees Rawls’s conception of liberalism as congenial to his general 
pragmatist framework, because both think that democracy, in political philosophy, is prior to 
philosophy. Rorty targets a conception of philosophy that takes its goal as stating metaphysical 
and epistemological truths about human nature that transcend local facts about humans located 
 
2 It is of tangential interest that Rawls (1980, p. 516) spoke highly of Dewey’s pragmatism, insofar as both shared an 
interest in putting deontology in its proper place. The details of this don’t matter much for our purposes. 
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where they actually are. Rorty’s thesis in that essay is that he and Rawls are allied against 
philosophy, in this sense. Rawls, for instance, supposes that the principles that are derived at the 
first stage of application are principles that anyone would have reason to agree to, regardless of 
their broader philosophical beliefs about the nature of human beings and their views on the good. 
This is important because broader philosophical beliefs are never going to be the subject of the 
kind of agreement that needs to be in place if there is to be a legitimate conception of justice that 
can be applied in the four-stage sequence. Rorty, accepting Rawls’s view on this matter, hence 
reads Rawls as holding that democracy is prior to philosophy in the sense that a democratic 
agreement can be set up and agreed upon totally independently of these broader philosophical 
questions, and can do so in a way that subordinates particular persons’ philosophical conceptions 
to that democratic conception. In filling out the ideal of a democratic conception, Rorty appeals 
to Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear, which views the abhorrence of cruelty as a sort of minimal 
floor that all liberals can agree upon, with no reference to private philosophical argument (Shklar 
1984, pp. 8-9, 32-34; Rorty 1989, p. 146). 
In understanding how this project works, it is crucial that, for Rawls, even though the 
democratic procedures envisioned in his works can be the subject of reasonable agreement while 
not hinging on any of these substantive philosophical conceptions, which in later Rawlsian 
terminology are known as comprehensive doctrines (Rawls 2005, p. 12), one’s endorsing a 
comprehensive doctrine should not preclude one from endorsing the democratic conception. 
Given the central role that diversity of viewpoint and toleration of diversity plays in a Rawlsian 
social contract, the democratic agreement reached has to be one that can accommodate many 
different substantive philosophical conceptions. If Rawls is right, then Kantians, devout Hindus, 
and utilitarians should all be able to agree on the democratic conception from within their 
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comprehensive doctrines. Again invoking later Rawlsian terminology (2005, p. 15), it must be 
possible for there to be an overlapping consensus on the democratic conception that 
accommodates all the comprehensive doctrines. Rorty does, however, read Rawls as committed 
to the claim that those whose philosophical conceptions require them to reject the idea of the 
overlapping consensus, which place them necessarily outside of it, cannot be a part of the 
democratic conception (Rorty 1991d, pp. 187-189). It is an open question what we should do 
with these individuals, given that toleration comes from within a democratic conception, and 
hence seems to exclude them. 
There is now a problem facing us. Initially, I’m inclined to say that Rorty would count 
moderate deontology as a private moral theory, and hence as a philosophical conception. Yet the 
Rawlsian procedure that I have invoked to provide a plausible account of moderate deontology is 
substantially public, a crucial aspect of Rawls’s free-standing, non-philosophical democratic 
conception. This might be taken to show that, from a pragmatist perspective like the one that 
Rorty endorses, I have made a kind of category mistake in trying to make moderate deontology 
more legalistic, procedural, and public. The account would no longer belong clearly to the 
public/democratic or to the private/philosophical. The distinction between democracy and 
philosophy strongly suggests a distinction between the public and the private: philosophical 
conceptions are relegated as a matter of individual or group conviction, while democracy, along 
with its requirements for radical toleration and accommodation, is supposed to form the 
available-to-all normative substance that conditions the possibility of a society. My project faces 
the further question about whether non-lexical moderate deontology can avoid being philosophy, 
in the pejorative sense endorsed by Rorty in “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy”. It’s not 
clear why a first-level deontological principle that requires us to grant some priority to 
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deontological considerations should be the object of democratic consensus, given that democratic 
societies must speak to the concerns of all citizens, and that utilitarians number among those 
citizens. So there is now the worry that, in setting up this system the way I have, I have not 
succeeded in providing a conception of threshold deontology that is an adequate reconstruction 
of deontology, better tailored to the facts of pluralism and disagreement about moral theories, but 
instead simply provided one private moral theory among others.  
I think we should resist this line of argument, because it fails to appreciate the value in 
modifying deontology in this way. Suppose we think that democracy is prior to philosophy. 
Viewing that as an objection to modifying a private moral theory to make it closer in form to the 
form of a conception that could have a place in a democratic consensus is to effectively assume 
that democracy has to be totally abstracted from philosophical conceptions in all cases. But as 
both Rorty and Rawls grant, this is unrealistic, and to ignore the historicist and culturally-
mediated character of persons (Rorty 1991d, pp. 180-1). We all find ourselves as a part of an 
already-existing tradition. Hence, it is a crucial project, in order to have actual public discourse 
with a diverse group of individuals, to find aspects of our own, private philosophical conceptions 
that can be tweaked and revised so as to enable that discourse. Rawls, in other words, as well as 
the conception of moderate deontology I have outlined here, can be read through a Rortian lens 
as offering a methodology for moving our comprehensive doctrines into the public sphere, by 
applying the more general conception which might indeed be private to application schemes that 
render them more particular and more sensitive to the rhetorical demands that diversity places on 
moral agents. 
Incorporating a democratic consideration into one’s private philosophical view is nothing 
close to a vice, or even less a category mistake. It is merely a way to recognize the contingency 
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of the constituents of one’s moral vocabulary. This effect, I think, is greatly freeing. It shows that 
embracing contingency, and allowing it to filter down and inform our own moral theorizing, can 
produce the benefit of incentivizing us to make more flexible, nuanced theories. I should also 
mention in passing that the possibility of pursuing private moral theory in this way raises a 
serious pragmatist question about Rorty’s use of the public/private distinction in Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity. Dividing the moral world up in this way makes sense to Rorty because he 
views private moral theory through a pragmatist lens that is inherently skeptical about the value 
of private morality (Rorty 1989, p. xiv). Philosophy in the pejorative sense is incompatible with 
the burdens placed on citizens in a democratic society that itself demands legitimation. But 
pragmatism provides us the tools and motivations to shape our philosophical conceptions in light 
of the democratic conceptions that we find ourselves a part of. Citizens interested in engaging 
with the public considerations of a democratic society can do so in a way that is consistent with 
their own private values, at least sometimes, because there is this methodology of reconstructing 
one’s own moral vocabulary in light of the demands that democratic society places on citizens. 
A brief conclusion. This chapter deals with the relationship between moderate 
deontology, the Rawlsian four-stage sequence, and Rorty’s reading of the latter in terms of the 
private/public distinction. The idea is that a suitably moderate deontology, augmented by the 
Rawlsian structure to explain how deontological considerations can be prioritized without 
endorsing lexical priority, is acceptable on a Rortian conception of the liberal ironist and the 
various vocabularies that they must reconcile. A moderate deontologist should be a better-
engaged liberal ironist, involved in the difficult and ongoing task of sensitizing one’s own 
philosophical conceptions to public considerations, and vice versa. A liberal ironist can be a 
moderate deontologist, and can do so in a way that is predicted by and appropriately responsible 
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to the aims of a pragmatic liberal ironist. It also follows that threshold deontology cannot be 
meaningfully applied without mid-level principles, and hence that any attempt to reduce 
moderate deontology to threshold deontology is bound to be incomplete. Hence, this chapter has 
both made a contribution to the technical literature on moderate deontology and made a broader 
point about how pragmatists and liberal ironists can relate endorse, use, and defend deontology 











INTERLUDE: From Pragmatist Normative Ethics to Pragmatist Metaethics 
Recall that Chapters 1 and 2 were pitched as a way to show that Rorty was wrong in his 
insistence that pragmatism and liberal ironism must be skeptical of the idea of a moral theory, 
because moral theories improperly aim to provide a final vocabulary for ethical inquiry. Rorty is 
wrong about this because the Rortian pragmatist just needs to do some work to make moral 
theory practical without final vocabularies. It is indeed possible to hold fast to a conviction in a 
moral theory in a meaningful way. It is also possible to do so in a way that makes it possible to 
actively debate our moral theories, and to restructure them in response to criticism. In short, the 
project of moral theory can be vindicated even on pragmatist assumptions about the difficulty of 
doing normative ethics. This is because moral theories can be multi-leveled, containing complex 
internal structures that allow them the plasticity to pivot to the situational demands placed on 
them, enabling the reconstruction of moral philosophy. I take this as a significant point in favor 
of Rortianism. 
 However, a serious problem still looms over this pragmatist reconstruction of normative 
ethics. Many have thought that the positive project of normative ethics requires a realist 
metaethical theory which provides at the very least a realist account of moral methodology that 
gives moral claims a strongly realist epistemology and an account of moral semantics that makes 
sense of now moral sentences refer to ontologically-real moral properties. Again recall Parfit’s 
claim, cited in the Introduction and discussed in Chapter 1, that aiming at truth, in an ambitious 
sense comparable to the sense of truth that is found in mathematics, guides the project of moral 
theory. Without having been able to provide this, instead opting to take a pluralistic attitude 
toward theories that aims to let various moral theories live together, it might be said that my 
arguments do not really vindicate moral theory. The arguments in Chapters 1 and 2 give us some 
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indirect reason to think that Parfit, and others who agree with him, are wrong about this. If they 
were right about this, then the perspective present in those chapters would not have been able to 
be made to look plausible. But I think it would be better to attack the issue straightforwardly. 
Hence, Chapters 3 and 4 aim to directly show that Rorty’s pragmatism, with some modifications, 
is well-placed to do moral theory while remaining separated from realist metaethics. The method 
for doing this is specifically pragmatist in spirit: it surveys various realist and antirealist 
metaethical positions, and aims to take their influences on board and to construct a distinctively 
pragmatist approach to metaethics that emphasizes the possibility of talking the talk of certain 
moral realist commitments, like the concept of moral objectivity and the method of intuitions, in 
a way that legitimately answers the concerns of those who take those commitments seriously. In 















CHAPTER 3: Intuitions in Ethics From a Pragmatist Perspective 
3.1. Introduction: pragmatist skepticism about intuitions 
Historically, pragmatists have been highly skeptical about the role of intuition in 
philosophy. This is because intuition is often linked with various heavy-handed philosophical 
notions such as the quest for a priori knowledge, foundationalism, or non-naturalism, notoriously 
hard to make sense of on the pragmatist framework. C. S. Peirce, for example, argues that 
intuition, understood as “a cognition not determined by a previous cognition of the same object, 
and therefore so determined by something out of the consciousness” (Peirce 1992, p. 11), even 
on the supposition that it is possible, is methodologically infirm, in that we can’t know anything 
about whether some cognition is intuitive or not (Peirce 1992, p. 20). Hence, it is unclear how 
intuition could matter to a pragmatist, assuming that we need to know stuff about our intuitions 
in order to use our intuitions as a tool to aid inquiry. Although Quine said little about intuition, 
and although Quine was happy to appeal to intuition in his arguments, for example in his 
discussion of natural kinds (Quine 1969b, p. 125), it seems plausible to say that Quine would 
reject the granting of a strong epistemological role to intuition insofar as that granting 
presupposed some account of the a priori or of analyticity. And of course Rorty, in Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature, voices skepticism about the possibility of intuition’s being able to 
prove dualist claims in the philosophy of mind insofar as intuition is understood on a 
Wittgensteinian tack as a mere certain kind of step in a language-game (Rorty 1979, p. 34), and 
hence as having no a priori role in philosophy. Intuition, on his view, is historically-conditioned 
down to the bottom. Cornel West concurs with Rorty, specifically noting Dewey’s rejection of 
the a prioricity of all forms of evidence, intuition presumably among them (West 1989, p. 110).  
66 
 
 Yet, with all that has been said, and with all the intellectual weight behind these claims, I 
will argue in this chapter that this approach to intuition in epistemology and ethics is wrong. 
Because we can sever the link between intuition and the metaphilosophically-bloated 
epistemological notions often associated with it, it is possible to account for intuition in a way 
that makes sense of the crucial role that intuition plays in our practices. Indeed, then, we see that 
intuition not only survives an anti-realist critique, but does so for reasons that are deeply related 
to the core of pragmatism’s aim to reconstruct philosophical notions by strategically revising 
them in light of the failure of the traditional conceptions to do what they need to do. It is because 
our actual, reasonably-accepted practices demand this role for intuition that we can justifiably, 
sometimes, rely on intuitions in argument. 
 With that said, it’s time to begin. The first task is explicating more clearly the concept of 
intuition, insofar as Peirce’s notion has been surpassed by a century and a half of philosophical 
work. Hence, in the next section, I show that there are two notions of intuition, which we might 
call the rationalist and the empiricist conceptions, that are nonetheless unified by their attempt to 
play a certain methodological role in moral and epistemic discourse. Then, in the successive 
sections, I will argue that neither the rationalist not the empiricist conception can actually play 
that role. Rationalists, it is argued, cannot provide an account of a methodology for disagreement 
resolution for intuitions, in virtue of their overly demanding notion of what our practice of 
eliciting intuitions aims at. Empiricists, in contrast, due to their more relaxed conception of the 
aims of intuition, can make sense of the methodological efficacy of intuition, but cannot make 
sense of its non-emotional surface form and cannot make sense of the rational revisability of our 
intuitions. I then proceed to argue that naturalism about intuitions can both avoid all of these 
problems and be shown to comport with pragmatism: its aims are properly in step with its 
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methodological possibilities, and can make sense of the surface form and rational revisability of 
intuition. 
3.2. Some views of intuitions 
The locus classicus of the empiricist conception of intuition is Jonathan Haidt’s “The 
Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail”, in which empirical results, notably the phenomenon of 
moral dumbfounding, are taken to show that intuitions about ethics are primarily affective, that 
is, driven by emotional gut reactions to our consideration of ethical cases. Certain gut responses 
to cases are famously immune to reasoning; it is very difficult to use rational argument to get a 
person to give up their intuition that for example incest is morally wrong.  
Haidt’s discussion in that paper draws out a number of key features of intuitions, but in 
this paper I will focus on Haidt’s definition of intuition, which on his view is “the sudden 
appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, 
like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of searching, 
weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (2001, p. 818). In defining intuition this way, 
Haidt assumes something like the dual process theory of moral judgment, according to which 
moral judgments are either the result of intuition, conceived of as analogous to the ‘automatic’ 
mode of a camera, or reasoning, conceived of as analogous to the ‘manual’ mode of a camera 
(Greene 2014, p. 696). 
Extrapolating a bit from that definition, it seems fair to say that, on Haidt’s view, 
intuitions are immediate (see also Sinnott-Armstrong, Young, and Cushman 2010, p. 246). An 
intuition is immediate just in case it “[does] not arise from any process that goes through 
intermediate steps of conscious reasoning” (Sinnott-Armstrong, Young, and Cushman 2010, pp. 
246-7). Although it is an interesting empirical fact that many of the judgments we have that arise 
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from intuition are immediate, it is also important to keep this in mind, because the rationalist 
conception of intuition is also beholden to this fact, for similar reasons, but spins this fact in a 
different kind of direction. We will distinguish causal immediacy from epistemic immediacy. 
Causal immediacy is the property analogous to what Jonathan Dancy calls a “presentational 
state” according to which intuitions are, as a matter of psychological fact, “fundamentally 
nonvoluntary, being things that just happen to us, come upon us unasked” (Dancy 2014, p. 792). 
Although Haidt doesn’t use this term, the idea of a presentational state is endemic to his 
definition of intuition, and is quite nearly built into Greene’s idea of automatic, intuitive 
reasoning as reflex-like (Greene 2014, p. 696). 
The empiricist conception of intuition has been taken to have skeptical consequences. 
Suppose that the social intuitionist’s conception of intuition is correct when it claims that most 
moral judgments are based on intuition, the way the social intuitionist conceives of it.  If moral 
reasons have to be objective and have to be reasons-responsive, then the social intuitionist’s 
conception of intuitions cannot account for moral reasons (Juzaszek 2016, p. 64). All it can give 
us is, to borrow Haidt’s term quoted above, affective valence, and nothing that can play the 
epistemic role of justifying a moral judgment. Since most metaethicists and normative ethicists 
accept the empirical facts that motivate the empiricist conception of intuition, it has become 
incumbent to show how intuitions can play this epistemic role, in the face of these challenges. 
How might an intuition play an epistemic role, given that intuitions are immediate and not 
conscious in their phenomenology? The answers we are about to give to this question will allow 




The rationalist conception of intuitions holds that intuitions can sometimes be 
epistemically immediate, meaning that the presentational and immediate status of intuitions 
sometimes itself has an epistemic valence. Although this position has been held by many 
(Shafer-Landau 2003, p. 238; Audi 2004, p. 15; Parfit 2011b, pp. 502-3; Huemer 2005, p. 102), 
and we are often comfortable appealing to our intuitions in moral contexts where the goal is to 
support or make a knowledge claim, it can be hard to see the reasons that someone might hold 
such a view. To account for this, I want to explain two possible ways to account for epistemic 
immediacy. 
The first answer to this question requires us to delve into the idea of intuition as 
intellectual seeming. The question above asks how intuitions can play an epistemic role, given 
that they are immediate, not conscious, and hence cannot be the product of explicit reasoning. 
The answer to this is to give an account of how people can form judgments in an epistemically 
reliable way without requiring actual reasoning. But this, perhaps, is not so hard to understand. 
Consider a commonsensical account of how perception works. Our visual perception is quite 
epistemically robust, even without being consciously controlled or explicitly undertaken. Under 
normal conditions, when I see the white wall in front of me, I would be epistemically justified to 
a high degree of confidence that there is a white wall in front of me. We might also say that, 
without significant evidence that there is not a white wall there and that my perception is not 
functioning correctly, there is a presumption in favor of believing that my judgments are correct. 
This presumption is named Phenomenal Conservatism by Michael Huemer, who explains the 
epistemic status of intuition by analogy to the epistemic status of perception (2005, p. 99-105). 
To bring out more specifically what this involves, take George Bealer’s formulation of the idea 
of rational intuition (Bealer 1998, pp. 208, 216-7), according to which intuitions are intellectual 
70 
 
seemings that are strongly modally connected to the truth (see Pust 2000, p. 39, for a similar 
view). When a person is in ideal cognitive conditions, its seeming to that person, intellectually, 
that p is strong evidence that p. Bealer introduces terms like “ideal cognitive conditions” and 
“strong modal connection’ because he wants to account for both the fact that people’s intuitions 
are sometimes wrong and the fact that, even in spite of this, we have a strong justification for 
relying on intuitions. This grants a presumption in favor of accepting our intuitions. 
Ernest Sosa has questioned the intuition/perception analogy, and defended a rationalist 
conception of intuition that grounds the epistemic role of intuition in terms of epistemic virtue. 
For Sosa, intuition and perception are importantly disanalogous in that there are no experiences 
present in the act of intuition that play the role of sensory experience in perception: “What 
intuitive justification lacks is any correlate of the visual sensory experience beyond one’s 
conscious entertaining of the propositional content, something that distinctively exerts a thereby 
justified attraction to assent” (2007, p. 55). Yet Sosa accepts that intuitions are intellectual 
seemings (2007, p. 54). He hence explains the epistemic role of intuitions as issuing from 
epistemic competences. Sosa writes that “a competence is a disposition, one with a basis resident 
in the competent agent, one that would in appropriately normal conditions ensure (or make 
highly likely) the success of any relevant performance issued by it” (2007, p. 29). To have a 
justification on the basis of an intuition, then, is to have a certain intellectual seeming that is 
competent. Sosa avoids the problem of the intuition/perception analogy by showing that intuition 
and perception are both epistemic competences, albeit in different modes, in that they are 
different sorts of intellectual activities (c.f. the discussion of colorblindness, Sosa 2007, p. 59). 
Considering Bealer’s and Sosa’s accounts in tandem is helpful because it shows us that 
the rationalist account of intuitions endorses a methodological claim and meets the justification 
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challenge of empiricism. We might take Bealer as specifying the concept of intuition as 
appealing to intellectual seemings to explain its epistemic role, and Sosa as working out an 
account of what criterion we might appeal to in order to explain what, in a more commonsensical 
way, an intuition really is. 
So far, Bealer and Sosa have established the possibility of a rationalist epistemology of 
intuitions, but let’s go deeper into how something like a method of intellectual seemings is 
operationalized. Robert Audi (2004, pp. 45ff) proposes a method for doing just this by appealing 
to what might be called the method of holistic reflection. Audi thinks that we have the capacity 
to allow our judgment to be influenced by broad-scale, holistic consideration of the relevant 
features of the situation in which we are to form our judgment. Audi likens the experience to that 
of judging the quality of a painting from considering its various physical properties in this 
manner. Appealing to something quite like Bealer’s ideal cognitive conditions, Audi’s idea is 
that in at least some cases, forming our intuitions in this way is warranted. Hence, Audi can be 
read as expanding Sosa’s conception of intuition as intellectual competence, by specifying a 
method by which reflection can be made competent, and hence able to play an epistemic role. 
Earlier, I pitched this discussion as one way to answer the question regarding how an 
intuition could play an epistemic role, given that intuitions are immediate and not conscious in 
their phenomenology. One way intuitions could play this epistemic role is by being an 
intellectual seeming. A second way, that I will now address, is by being granted a certain status 
for the purpose of normative reasoning. On this view, intuitions are the data points that 
normative ethical theorizing responds to. I call this the intuition as data point view. This view is 
discussed in the first section of Shelly Kagan’s paper “Thinking About Cases.” Kagan writes 
that, in the course of trying to construct a moral theory, “[i]ntuitive reactions to cases—real or 
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imagined—are carefully noted, and then appealed to as providing reason to accept (or reject) 
various claims” (Kagan 2001, p. 44). Kagan then proceeds to claim that intuitions are taken to be 
evidence for or against moral theories, but not absolute evidence, as we typically treat our 
intuitions as possibly revisable or rejectable. This is even more crucial when we note that we 
sometimes have intuitions about our principles as well, and that sometimes our intuitions about 
cases and intuitions about principles will pull in different directions. 
In explaining the intuition as data point view, it is helpful to consider some arguments 
given in Frances Kamm’s Intricate Ethics (2007), which shows this way of thinking about 
intuitions out in full force. According to the intuitions as data points view, it is the aim of a moral 
theory to account for our intuitions. Intuitions are the data which check our moral theories, and 
which can be used to press for changes in moral theories. Consider Kamm’s discussion of the 
Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), in particular the way that it is used to provide a solution to the 
Trolley Problem. Kamm’s problem is to provide a theory that harmonizes judgments that are 
commonly had about certain trolley cases. Three example cases are necessary to show how this 
works (Kamm 2007, p. 92): 
Trolley: “[T]he standard Trolley Case involves, let us say, five people on a track toward 
which an out-of-control trolley is heading. If it continues, it will kill them. However, if 
we redirect it away from them, it will go down another track where it will kill someone 
who is unable to be removed.” 
 
Bystander: “Another way to stop the trolley from hitting the five is to push an innocent 
bystander in front of it. Its hitting him stops it, but we foresee that he will die as a 
consequence.” 
 
Loop: “[E]verything is as it is in the Trolley Case, except that the track to which we can 
redirect the trolley away from the five loops back toward them. Were it not for the 
presence of the one person on the side track whose being hit stops the trolley, it would go 




According to the standard story about these cases, it is permissible to act in Trolley, 
impermissible to act in Bystander, and permissible to act in Loop. Yet many have noted that this 
pattern of reactions is strange; explaining it, and other patterns of reaction that include different 
intuitions, is known as the Trolley Problem (Thomson 1985). First, it is unclear why the means 
matter morally in the first place; for consequentialists, it seems weird to insist that there is an 
actual moral difference between Trolley and Bystander in the first place. Second, and more 
importantly for our purposes, once we take nonconsequentialism on board and grant that there is 
a relevant difference between Trolley and Bystander, it is still unclear why our reactions in 
Bystander and Loop should differ. In both cases, the presence of the person who blocks the 
trolley is causally intended as a means to the saving of the five. If the person’s body were not 
available, then the action wouldn’t be possible. So why would a principle like the DDE, which 
says that it is not permissible to causally intend harms as a means to the saving of lives and is 
often touted as a resolution to the Trolley Problem, accomplish its purpose here? Kamm’s 
solution is to amend the DDE to the Doctrine of Triple Effect (DTE), which distinguishes 
between causally intending a harm because it will bring about an effect, and causally intending a 
harm in order to bring about an effect. Kamm says that DTE gets the right answer in Bystander 
and Loop, in terms of the standard story above, because in Loop, although the harm is causally 
intended, it is causally intended because it will bring about an effect, whereas in Bystander, the 
harm is causally intended in order to bring about an effect. 
Given the enormous complexity of Kamm’s argument, it is fortunate that the details of it 
don’t matter here, because we’re interested in the methodology that she employs. And although 
in the course of her argument, she doesn’t use the word ‘intuition’ to refer to the data that result 
in the pattern of judgment that she wants to account for, it is clear from other passages in 
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Intricate Ethics that the relevant data are intuitions. She writes, for instance, when discussing the 
broader nonconsequentialist theory that results from her discussion of the DTE: “in this section I 
shall propose components of the theory followed by a discussion of cases in which intuitions can 
be accounted for by that component and cases in which intuitions call for further refinements of 
the theory” (Kamm 2007, p. 138). Correspondingly, she dedicates a later chapter of her book to a 
defense of intuitions in the face of empiricist worries about intuition. She is specifically 
concerned to explain how intuition can be reliable in the face of concerns about framing effects 
in classic studies by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, in his 
discussion of the objection to intuition from framing effects, writes that framing effects are 
“effects of wording and context on moral belief” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008, p. 52). Sinnott-
Armstrong continues with an example: “Imagine that Joseph would believe that Marion is fast if 
he is told that she ran one hundred meters in ten seconds, but he would not believe that she is fast 
(and would believe that she is not fast and is slow) if he is told that it took her ten seconds to run 
one hundred meters (or that it took her ten thousand milliseconds to run one hundred meters)” 
(Sinnott-Armstrong 2008, p. 52). In this example, Joseph’s intuition is unreliable, because the 
order of presentation of the words should not be part of what justifies this kind of judgment. But 
supposing that intuitions in ethics were subject to these same kinds of framing effects, that would 
show that those intuitions were unreliable, too. Sinnott-Armstrong (2008, p. 68) uses this 
conclusion to argue that our intuitions need inferential confirmation. Kamm responds to this sort 
of challenge by arguing that, if we can know enough about framing effects to point them out in 
people’s judgments, then we can re-frame cases so as to control for those effects, thereby 
producing reliable intuitions. Consider the following: 
[E]xperimental subjects give different responses about the necessity of a health-care 
policy to deal with a coming [viral epidemic], depending on whether we say either that 
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(a) without the policy, 400 of 600 people will lose their lives, or (b) without the policy, 
we can only save 200 of 600 people. In description (a), the baseline suggested by the 
phrasing is a state in which people are now well but face getting worse; the baseline 
suggested by the phrasing in description (b) is the near-death state people will be in if 
there is no intervention, but from which there can be improvement. Subjects think that it 
is worse if people lose their lives than if they do not gain them, and they are more averse 
to a policy in which people lose their lives than one in which the same number are not 
saved (Kamm 2007, pp. 424-5). 
 
But suppose, with Sinnott-Armstrong, that the framing of the baseline is morally irrelevant; we 
can still say that intuitions can be reliable if the baseline is always framed in the correct way. 
Hence, Kamm proposes that our intuitions can be trusted when they have been framed so as to 
avoid framing effects. In judging that, for example, order is an irrelevant framing effect, a theory 
of what effects are relevant is assumed: “framing effects are supposed to lead to different 
responses that cannot be reasonably justified on account of the frame, that is, the frame must 
introduce what is seen, at least on reflection, to be a difference that should be irrelevant to 
different responses” (Kamm 2007, p. 439). Kamm then argues that cases where researchers like 
Kahneman and Tversky assume that a framing effect is irrelevant might actually be cases where 
the intuition tells in favor of the framing effect’s relevance, and not against the theory that 
assumes that the framing effect is irrelevant. For example, an exemption from paying a penalty 
for doing an action that is the same size, in dollar amount, as a surcharge for performing that 
action under an alternate scheme of enforcement is supposed by some to be an irrelevant 
difference, but it might actually be morally relevant if the surcharge is conceived as depriving the 
actor of something to which they have a right (Kamm 2007, p. 440). 
What arises from Kamm’s discussion of these matters is that the presence of framing 
effects cannot undermine appeals to intuition to do ethics. This is because the relevance of 
framing effects cannot be known in advance of the theories that those intuitions constitute the 
data of, because we can argue about the significance of framing effects, and therefore how big of 
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a problem a framing effect is for an intuition. Ethics is a complex negotiation of our intuitions 
about cases and the theories that inspire those intuitions, and how they can be made to work 
together. In Kamm’s theory, the relevance of an intuition is not that it is an intellectual seeming 
that carries with it some epistemic role, but merely that it constitutes the data that allow us to 
derive and check our moral theories. Simply figure out which framing effects are justified in the 
case, and we know when to write off certain intuitions. 
I could keep going, but the point about intuitions as data points is hopefully clear. Now 
that we have both of these rationalist notions of intuition in ethics on the table, the problem is to 
state a methodology for intuition in ethics. Rationalists typically think that intuition can play an 
epistemic role in ethics because intuition can be given a methodology for investigation, 
somewhat analogous to the role played by the scientific method in scientific investigation, 
specified by the intuition as intellectual seeming view and the intuition as data point view. As a 
matter of fact, these methods can be made to work together, as I will discuss a bit below. For 
now, though, it is helpful to raise the question as to whether, despite appearances, this discussion 
shows that the rationalist conception of intuitions can uniquely play these methodological roles. 
Another way to ask this question is to ask whether an empiricist can make sense of intuitions as 
intellectual seemings or intuitions as data points. If it turned out that empiricist conceptions of 
intuitions could make the case that social intuitions, on Haidt’s line, could play one or booth of 
these epistemic roles, it would show that stronger rationalist claims about intuitions were 
unnecessary.  
Before moving to the next section, I want to take stock of what has been said here. I have 
elaborated the empiricist conception of intuition and the rationalist conception of intuition as 
differing on the epistemic status of moral presentational states, and suggested that the rationalist 
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conception is distinguished by its holding that intuitions can be epistemically valenced, in 
contrast to the empiricist conception, which holds that the valence is merely causal. I then 
elaborated two methodological aspects of the rationalist conception that are supposed to explain 
how intuitions can be epistemically valenced: intuitions are intellectual seemings, and intuitions 
are data points in moral theorizing. Yet in the first section of the paper, I framed my project as 
one of arguing that there is something like a pragmatist conception of intuitions that can 
harmonize these accounts and still play the methodological role we expect of intuition in ethics. 
With that said, then, the task now becomes showing that a pragmatist conception of intuitions 
would have methodological benefits over both the rationalist conception and the empiricist 
conception; neither the rationalist conception nor the empiricist conception can make good on 
the methodological role needed for intuitions alone. By bringing these accounts closer together, 
we can illuminate crucial aspects of moral deliberation that would otherwise have been ignored. 
3.3. A methodological problem with the empiricist conception of intuitions 
If providing a methodology for intuitions requires that we make good on the idea of 
intuitions as intellectual seemings, then the empiricist conception of intuitions surely cannot 
provide a methodology for intuitions, and does not even want to. The empiricist conception, in 
its explanation of intuitions as causally-valenced, emotionally-mediated presentational states, can 
explain why our intuitions are deeply-held and non-negotiable for particular individuals, but it 
cannot explain why that fact can justify our intuition’s having anything like epistemic privilege 
for the agent. In other words, it cannot explain the epistemic status of intellectual seemings. 
However, it does seem like the empiricist conception of intuitions can make perfectly good sense 
of the methodological role of intuitions as data points for moral inquiry. We might take intuition, 
on this view, as simply signaling for an agent that some consideration ought to be accorded a 
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more fundamental role in discourse than some other consideration, defeasibly, given other aims 
and values that they hold, and this can be made sense of without requiring us to take a stronger 
view about the epistemic properties of the intuition. It is as if we treat intuitions as data points 
because they are more centrally-located for us, rather than because they are based on some a 
priori foundation, as a rationalist perspective on the methodological role of intuition as 
intellectual seeming seems to require. Hence, although this methodological role is not properly 
epistemological, as the rationalist thinks it needs to be, the methodological role is explanatory of 
why it makes sense for us to engage in particular kinds of moral discourse from the empiricist 
perspective.  
With these arguments, I take it as clearly shown that intuitions, on the empiricist’s 
conception of intuitions, can play a methodological role, and hence that a rationalist critique of 
the empiricist conception of intuition that alleges that empiricist intuitions cannot play any 
methodological role in discourse would be unfounded. A more nuanced rationalist critique, 
however, would argue that even if intuitions can play some methodological role for the 
empiricist conception, it cannot play the right epistemic role. In alleging that the methodological 
role for intuitions arises because certain intuitions are taken by the subject to be data points for 
moral inquiry, there needs to be an epistemology of which data points we take, because without 
that, there might simply be differing conceptions of the normative data points. An epistemic role 
for intuitions, cashed out as intuition as intellectual seeming, would then have to provide a 
method for deciding between normative data points, or as reconciling disagreements between 
various intuitional data points. Yet while granting intuitions as having merely causal valence, the 
empiricist cannot obviously make good on this. Hence, the empiricist conception has not shown 
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that it can provide a methodological role for intuitions that is robust enough to decide between 
normative data points. 
Here, the rationalist will claim advantage, because the intellectual seemings account can 
apparently provide such a method. Audi, for instance, thinks that holistic reflection can 
undermine some intuitions, and Kamm thinks that intuitions can be reframed. In the next section, 
however, I argue that the intellectual seemings account actually does not help the rationalist, or 
that even on the assumption that it is possible for appeal to intellectual seeming to help provide a 
method, that the range of application of that method is so narrow that the insight is uninteresting. 
As it turns out, the rationalist wants more than any method of intuitions can achieve. 
3.4. Methodological problem with the rationalist conception of intuitions 
In the previous section, I argued that the empiricist’s conception of intuitions cannot 
answer to any meaningful success standard. Hence, it was reasonable to conclude that the 
empiricist’s conception cannot play enough of a methodological role to make it worth having in 
the first place. This provides some reason to explore in more detail the rationalist’s conception of 
intuition, to show whether it is possible for the rationalist’s conception to play that role. Initially, 
it would seem as if the rationalist is in a better position, because the rationalist can employ a 
stronger methodology to account for the epistemic valence of some intuitions. As it turns out, 
though, the rationalist is in no better position with respect to the epistemic valence standard. 
Although the rationalist can explain how a very strong interpretation of the method of intuitions 
can be used to do productive moral work, and hence do something like satisfy the epistemic 
valence standard, the rationalist does this at the cost of narrowing the scope of application of the 
method, making the method of intuitions usable only in a radically narrow set of cases, where 
people are already committed to a philosophical notion of consistency and a philosophical 
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methodology. The majority of people, on the rationalist’s conception of the method of intuitions 
and how it can be used to do work, would be left with the empiricist approach.  
The argument turns on two crucial ideas, which I will introduce now. First, it casts the 
problem of substantiating the methodological role of intuitions as a problem about the calibration 
of our intuitions. The so-called calibration problem comes from a paper by Robert Cummins 
(1998), who argues that the epistemic role of intuitions requires that intuition be verified 
independently of the faculty of intuitions. This verification could take the form of either 
verifying the faculty of intuition itself, or by verifying particular intuitions, one-by-one, by some 
other means. So far, so good. The problem, however, is that neither of these things can actually 
be done. We cannot verify our intuitions one-by-one, because if we are able to verify our 
intuitions by some other method of knowledge-acquisition, then the intuition itself did no 
epistemic work. The intuition was merely a signal for some idea that was then justified. That 
means that it was actually the other, non-intuitive thing, that has epistemic valence. On the other 
hand, we also cannot verify the faculty of intuition itself, for reasons often noted by 
philosophical skeptics, who plausibly hold that there is no methodologically-independent way of 
verifying a method of knowledge acquisition. We rely on perception to give us knowledge, for 
example, without any argument that our perception is reliable. If both arms of the calibration 
problem can be sustained, then this means that we cannot account for the epistemic valence of 
our intuitions, and the rationalist’s conception of intuition must be rejected. 
This framing of the calibration suggests two possible rationalist responses. First, the 
rationalist may simply rest content with their inability to calibrate their intuitions. No attempt, on 
this view, is made to verify particular intuitions. Rationalists simply rest assured that intuition as 
a faculty rests on as firm a foundation as any of our other faculties. This response rejects the 
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implicit premise in the calibration problem which says that we need to verify any of our 
epistemic faculties. We are perfectly justified in forming beliefs on the basis of our perception, at 
least in many cases, just because we have no choice but to sometimes rely on perception. To 
demand verification for any of our epistemic faculties creates a calibration problem for that 
faculty. The structure of this argument is basically to find companions in guilt: on the 
supposition that any demand to verify an epistemic faculty leads to skepticism about that faculty, 
because independent verification of a faculty is not possible, then demanding of all of our 
epistemic faculties that they be verified leads to global skepticism; and hence, we ought to reject 
the supposition that our epistemic faculties demand verification in the first place (Huemer 2005, 
pp. 108-9). A second rationalist response to the calibration problem accepts this supposition that 
we should verify our epistemic faculties, and holds that verification of intuition is possible. 
These rationalists employ holistic reflection to verify intuitions when they are used as data 
points. We can see Kamm’s method here, for instance, in trying to show that some intuitions, 
insofar as they are determined by framing effects, ought to be rejected. The problematic framing 
effects are discovered by reflecting on the seeming moral relevance of those intuitions framing 
effects. Order effects, for example, as discussed before, are irrelevant, and intuitions that service 
to them ought to be rejected. S. Matthew Liao, by contrast, argues that we can provide an active 
demonstration of the possibility of calibrating intuition is by attending to the numerous examples 
where philosophers have actually used reflection and reasoning to calibrate their intuitions (Liao 
2007, pp. 257-60).  On this view, we solve the calibration problem by actually calibrating our 
intuitions, through the use of intuition as epistemic faculty. In other words, we can calibrate our 




The second crucial idea on which my arguments against the rationalist conception of 
intuitions turn is the claim that a rationalist conception of intuitions ought to provide a method 
for solving disagreements about out intuitions. This was also a theme in my criticism of the 
empiricist conception of intuitions, so it will pay to be more explicit about it. Although 
disagreement is one of the most heavily discussed topics in metaethics, most of that literature has 
been focused on problems in establishing the logical possibility of disagreement, given the 
complexities of positions argued for in the literature on moral semantics, or on connecting 
disagreement to issues regarding peer disagreement, and the epistemology of believing an 
agent’s testimony (for an overview, see Frances and Matheson (2019)). The problem of 
disagreement that I discuss here is significantly different. Here, I discuss moral disagreement as a 
practical problem that real agents confront, and which might be aided by the contributions of 
philosophers. 
Putting together these two ideas, the rationalist is confronted with a thorny question: Is it 
possible to employ a method for calibrating our intuitions that can reliably settle interpersonal 
disagreements about intuitions? It seems like rationalists should be able to answer ‘yes’ to this 
question, on pain of providing an error theory about the epistemology of intuitions. But it seems 
like the rationalist actually has to answer ‘no’. I argue that this fact provides reason to reject the 
rationalist’s conception of intuitions, as it is stated by those rationalists. 
Although the resolution of disagreements is hard, on any methodology, this is particularly 
hard for the rationalist. Huemer (2005, p. 142) notes that rationalism entails that many moral 
disagreements are resolvable, in that the method of intuitions can be invoked to help parties 
come to agreement about who was right and who was wrong, but he specifically claims that the 
method need not work often, or nearly ever at all. The method is about establishing the 
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possibility of rational disagreement and its resolution, but the fact that people are unable to do 
this in practice is no issue for the method. We don’t after all, think the fact of inability to resolve 
disagreements in science is evidence against the scientific method. In this, of course, is a kind of 
tacit admission that the method itself is infirm, and an attempt to reconceive the aim of ethics in 
face of that fact. 
Nonetheless, it might be said that Huemer and those who think like him box themselves  
into a corner, precisely because of the way that they view success in the resolution of 
disagreements as a kind of quasi-scientific analysis. On such a view, the resolution of 
disagreements looks quite like a thing which is logically possible but practically unlikely 
precisely because moral beliefs are deeply held, hence placing serious cognitive demands on 
agents who want to change them in others. There is, in other words, a rational persuasion model 
of moral disagreement resolution. I propose to grant this, and to grant that from this, important 
claims about rationalism as a method for resolving disagreements about intuitions follow. At this 
point, it will be useful to remember that this is up for discussion because the empiricist 
conception of intuitions, it was seen, could not answer to crucial challenges that arose given the 
aim of explaining the epistemic status of intuitions. The empiricist conception told us that we 
should treat intuitions as things merely held constant for the sake of argument, which themselves 
had no epistemic valence on their own. This was seen to be unsatisfying, and to render the idea 
of a method of persuasion unintelligible. Rationalism about intuitions, and its stronger standard 
of epistemic valence, in contrast, could at least make sense of this notion of intuitions. But by 
doing this, we see that the rationalist has replaced the problem of the lack of epistemic valence 
with the problem of too much epistemic valence, by setting up a standard for moral success that 
is just too strong to answer to most cases. To take Huemer at his word, disagreement resolution 
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is extremely cognitively demanding. The way I see it, then, we have three choices in the face of 
this: either we can insist that disagreements are generally not resolved, or we simply retreat to 
the empiricist notion that there is no such thing as epistemic valence, or we rethink the idea of 
epistemic valence within a pragmatist framework. Those who’ve read the first two chapters of 
this dissertation should be able to guess that I take the third option. 
It may help to consider an example of what I’m talking about, leading to clarifications in 
the next section. We might imagine two people who find themselves in the following Trolley 
Case: 
Teamwork: Five people [are] on a track toward which an out-of-control trolley is 
heading. If it continues, it will kill them. However, if we redirect it away from them, it 
will go down another track where it will kill someone who is unable to be removed. In 
order to redirect the track, I must stand on a platform at the same time as my friend, 
because the platform is rigged up to a mechanism that turns the trolley and can only be 
triggered if we both stand on it. I have the intuition that we should stand on the platform, 
but my friend does not. 
 
The case is designed to be similar to Trolley, discussed above, and hence for us to have the 
intuition that it is permissible to take the action. If the empiricist conception of intuitions is 
applied in this case, I am told to try to use some degree of non-rational persuasion to get my 
friend to agree with me and to take the action. But on the reasonable supposition that there is 
little time available to try to affect the friend’s intuition in that way, there seems to be little in 
terms of method here. The rationalist may seem to be better off, insofar as the rationalist method 
of intuitions as data points can be operationalized through conversation and can be done by 
anyone who is willing to listen and participate. But these attitudes already presuppose that my 
friend is willing to listen and participate, and hence that my friend probably has some experience 
with moral philosophy. This seems unlikely, and it seems that therefore this is not a particularly 
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valuable method. The mere fact that calibration is possible, in Huemer’s terms, should be worse 
than no consolation for us philosophers who see ourselves as involved in actual decision making.  
 Another reason to think that a Huemer-style solution is not plausible is the fact that it 
seems to result in the indeterminateness of a moral theory. Suppose that some answer to 
Teamwork is an intellectual seeming, and that Huemer or someone like him can say this. For 
example, suppose that Audi comes along, and has engaged in holistic reflection to determine that 
the friend should stand on the platform. Now further suppose that the rationalist were to try to 
convince the friend to comply. Is the method that the rationalist uses here a part of the rationalist 
moral theory, or is it not? It seems like the rationalist should count it as a part of the method of 
intuitions, but this means that any method that the rationalist can use to convince the friend could 
count as a part of the method of intuitions. But there may be an extreme diversity of methods that 
the rationalist can use to convince the friend. This means that if the rationalist says that the 
method of persuasion is a part of the rationalist method of intuitions, then the rationalist method 
is so diverse as to no longer provide something like a theory of the method. It is simply a narrow 
theory that tells us to reflect, and leaves the meaning and implications of that prescription 
radically open. It is, in other words, deeply indeterminate. But it seems that the rationalist’s 
approach to the method of intuitions should be at least a little less indeterminate than this; it 
seems like the rationalist should be aiming at providing a final vocabulary for moral inquiry. 
This openness should be congenial to a pragmatist approach to the method of intuitions, but it 
seems hard to square with a broader rationalist approach. 
 My suggestion here, however, is that simply beginning the rationalist’s method of 
intuitions, by working through a calibration of the particular intuitions that the friend has, is a 
way to acknowledge epistemic valence. The reality of the situation is that the friend will be 
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unlikely to be persuaded, but that our epistemic situation can be improved with the process of 
eliciting the friend’s intuitions with the aim of working toward the resolution of the 
disagreement. It may seem odd to speak of merely trying to resolve a disagreement as an 
improvement of an epistemic situation, but this should seem less so if we keep in mind that even 
being able to elicit an intuition clearly is difficult, because intuitions are ephemeral and subject to 
framing effects. In an important sense, any eliciting of intuitions improves the epistemic situation 
of moral agents. 
 This way of thinking about the epistemic valence of intuition, as something that begins 
weak and through discourse becomes progressively stronger, steers a middle path between 
rationalism and empiricism, as these views have been discussed here. In a case like Teamwork, I 
would make everyone epistemically better-off if I try to persuade my friend, regardless of the 
results of doing so. Rationalists, crucially, cannot account for this because rationalists accept 
knowledge as the relevant standard for judging attempts at disagreements, and that is by 
hypothesis not satisfied in this approach to Teamwork. Empiricists, in contrast, have a hard time 
saying how this improves any epistemic situation, which I find to be implausible. In the next 
section, then, I develop this idea further into something more closely approaching a pragmatist 
account of intuitions and the method of intuitions. 
3.5. Pragmatism and the natural kind theory of intuitions 
The result of the previous two sections is that, for various methodological reasons, 
empiricist and rationalist conceptions of intuition cannot make sense of the actual methodologies 
that moral agents apply, and should apply, to real life cases of disagreements about moral 
intuitions, and cannot provide a more nuanced approach to epistemic valence in real situations. 
The reason for this is that empiricists and rationalists present extreme conceptions of the aim of 
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methodological moves in the face of disagreement. Empiricists about intuitions on one hand 
reject the idea that there could be a method because having a method for resolving disagreements 
requires that method’s aiming at something stronger than emotional persuasion. Rationalists, on 
the other hand, cannot effectively operate the methods that they propose for resolving intuitional 
disagreements, in view of the overly demanding notion of intuitional success that is provided by 
the rationalist. For this conception of intuitions, intuitions are foundational and a priori, with 
their purported epistemic valences. Trying to provide a method for checking intuitions for these 
properties is simply too demanding in view of a large swath of demands that our situations place 
on us, even granting that this checking is possible. 
Rationalists recommend attempts to reflect on our intuitions as a way to determine 
whether the intuition actually falls under the category of an intellectual seeming, or whether it is 
just a causally-valenced presentational state. Hence, the reason that this method does not help the 
rationalist is not because the method itself can play no role, but because the method cannot 
regularly be expected to measure up to the role that rationalism demands of it, in some of the 
most important cases. Similarly, the rationalist can extrapolate a reflective equilibrium style 
methodology from the intuition as data point view, and hence can provide a model for how we 
can trade off our intuitions to produce theories with fewer exception cases and a better internal 
fit. This method, however, is enormously intellectually-demanding, and requires systematic 
thinking that is not germane to the styles in which everyday moral reasoning occurs. But on the 
looser assumption that the aim of calibration is not merely to smooth over theories but to provide 
a tool for thinking about intuitions and their successive refinement over the course of discourse, 
with relatively little expectation of ending up with a theory at the end that can vanquish all 
challengers, this way of doing ethics could very well be something worth teaching people to use. 
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The key, it would seem, is to simply expect less of our method of intuitions; we might then find 
ourselves to be more satisfied with its relatively provisional and defective results.  
The idea of intuition as simply one imperfect method among others for investigation of 
disagreements about ethical intuitions can help us to see how pragmatists can, contra the 
appearances suggested in the first section of this chapter, give an account of intuitions. We saw 
there that pragmatists have been generally quite skeptical of the idea of intuition because of its 
historical links with the ideas of the foundational and the a priori. But the approach to intuition 
that I pursue in this section shows us that the link can be severed. There is a question of whether 
we should accept a rationalist or an empiricist conception of intuitions, but even granted that that 
question is unanswered, we can say quite a lot about the role of the method of intuitions, and the 
relationship that that method has to real intuitional disagreements. In other words, even on the 
assumption that all of our intuitions are not epistemically-valenced, on the rationalist’s idea of 
epistemic valence, there could be some role for our intuitions, if our intuitions aim not at the 
foundational or the a priori, but merely aim at being a back-up for understanding our actions and 
beliefs when no better answers are available. Hence, these methods are quite useful on the 
assumption that the broader epistemological project of intuitionism in metaethics is wrong-
headed. If we want to make sense of our intuition practices, we ought to accept a pragmatist 
notion of intuitional success. 
It is helpful to understand a bit of history to see how this is possible. I have criticized 
something that I called the empiricist conception of intuitions, but as it turns out, that is a bit of a 
misnomer. The Haidt-style approach to intuition in ethics is a kind of empiricism, but Haidt is 
not Quine, who is also associated with a broadly empiricist project. For Quine, empiricism is 
understood in a more classical sense, in which science and scientific investigation come as close 
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as anything to giving the final vocabulary of inquiry (recall the discussion of Quine’s take on 
physics in Chapter 1, 1.3). Understood in this way, empiricism can be leveraged to provide an 
account of intuitions in ethics that is both more methodologically-respectable and in concert with 
a Rortian approach to ethics. Quine, cited in the first section of this chapter as highly skeptical 
about the idea of intuition in philosophy, was associated with naturalized epistemology, which 
views epistemology as a science of people’s knowledge practices as a tool for making 
recommendations about better ways for us to pursue the sciences. This approach eschews 
normative epistemology and epistemologically-weighty notions such as the a priori or the 
foundational. Epistemology is viewed, here, not as providing a foundation for science, as many 
had conceived it in the past, but as being a tool for engaging with science (Quine 1969a, p. 78). 
Hence, on a Quinean view, the idea that an intuition could be an intellectual seeming that 
provided epistemic valence that was a sufficient condition for justifying a knowledge claim 
would be simply absurd. Yet the program of naturalized epistemology, as it developed past 
Quine, looped back toward intuitionism in the work of Hilary Kornblith (1996), who argued that 
a Quinean approach to epistemology could be compatible with a significant epistemic role for 
intuitions. For Kornblith, intuitions are rough-and-ready judgments about natural kind 
membership: a more-or-less well-trained judgment that some object is a member of a certain 
class (Kornblith 1996, pp. 134ff). Scientists, says Kornblith, often do this when confronted with 
a case that they are not sure about. We might imagine a geologist presented with a new kind of 
rock never before seen, and who forms a trained guess that the rock is igneous. When the 
geologist makes this prediction, they can then use this judgment to guide further inquiry. They 
may look first for properties of igneous rock, and may only look for properties of sedimentary 
rock when their judgment that the rock is igneous is ruled out.  
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Correspondingly, the natural kind approach to intuition in ethics would simply view 
intuitions in ethics as rough-and-ready judgments about whether a particular case in ethics is a 
member of, say, the class of morally permissible actions. Hence, upon considering some trolley 
case like Loop for the first time, we might describe what a person does by saying that they have 
gone about it by forming a more-or-less well-trained judgment that it is permissible to act. The 
person could then try to compare that judgment with other judgments about particular cases that 
they are more confident about. This might lead that person to make any number of conclusions. 
Three possible conclusions: that the intuition was right, that the intuition conflicts with some 
other, better intuition, that the intuition is close but that the actual answer is more nuanced and so 
the specific linguistic content of the claim accepted on the basis of the intuition would need to be 
revised. 
One feature of the natural kind view of intuitions that is congenial to pragmatism is the 
way in which it situates intuition within the broader pragmatist approach to the scientific method. 
Pragmatists are often charged with being skeptics, insofar as they reject the idea that the 
scientific method provides a final method for investigating reality that answers to the very real 
demands of epistemic justification (Boghossian 2006, pp. 92-3). Here, the move is much like the 
earlier pragmatist move to reject the idea of final vocabularies, even while they must accept 
some vocabulary as final. We pursue science not because we believe that some day we will, 
through the rigid deployment of the scientific method, converge on the final description of the 
world, but because the scientific method has proved to be a useful way of trying to solve human 
problems. For Rorty,  
there is no reason to praise scientists for being more “objective” or “logical” or 
“methodical” or “devoted to truth” than other people. But there is plenty of reason to 
praise the institutions that they have developed and within which they work, and to use 
these as models for the rest of culture” (Rorty 1991a, p. 39).  
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The value of scientific inquiry, on this view, is primarily in the institution of science, including 
the norms that govern the way that people go about studying natural phenomena. It is good if 
scientists follow the scientific method not because there is something intrinsically credible about 
that method, or because the method will converge on the truth if played out correctly, but 
because following the scientific method has proven to be relatively successful over time at 
helping communities and individuals to achieve their goals. In demythologizing science in this 
way, Rorty leaves open the possibility that much of what science does is not properly described 
as aiming at the truth. The value of science is in the virtues that the institution of science entails. 
Catherine Elgin (2017, pp. 127-9) agrees with Rorty and the pragmatist approach to science. 
Elgin expands these ideas to amount to the claim that normativity in science is moral, rather than 
epistemic: good science is science that is done by virtuous scientists who, while operating within 
epistemic communities, who act as though they are members of an epistemic kingdom of ends.  
 The connection between the natural kind conception of intuitions and the Rorty-Elgin 
conception of the scientific method is found in the fact that, on this conception, intuitions are 
better or worse to the extent that the method of appealing to natural kind intuition is called for in 
scientific investigation. Sometimes, scientists understand the subject matter that they are 
exploring quite well, and in such cases likely will make no appeal to intuition. Similarly, in 
moral cases, sometimes subjects need to make no appeal to intuition. It is not anything about the 
reliability of the method of intuition itself that allows this conclusion to be drawn, but simply our 
understanding of what sorts of methodological moves are possible and desirable, given the 
situational constraints on our inquiry and prior understanding of the subject matter, as we 
understand it. Hence, scientists rely on intuition more, and can do so with deeper confidence, 
when their subject matter is less well-understood. Similarly, in ethics. 
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 This approach to intuitions can make sense of the deployment of the method of intuition 
as productive, given that we sometimes understand our subject matter poorly. As we come to 
understand our subject matter better, and feel more confident with several of the claims we 
make, our intuitions are either discarded or revised in favor of theories that serve the purposes of 
the intuitions more effectively. On such a view, conversely, it makes little sense to appeal to 
intuitions when some claim, or some subject matter, is already well-understood. This 
understanding of intuition, as I have already argued, comports well with the pragmatist’s 
conception of science as one tool among others by which we come to understand phenomena that 
we are interested in. This understanding of intuition is also beneficial, in that it allows the 
pragmatist to make sense of the notion of epistemic valence in a way that leaves broader 
pragmatist epistemological critiques intact while still granting the epistemic valence of intuitions 
as having a robust, legitimate epistemic role in our lives. The natural kind conception of 
intuitions, in divorcing the epistemic authority of intuitions from the rationalist’s foundational (in 
a strong, epistemological sense where a foundation is known through its status as intellectual 
seeming) and a priori aspirations can say why some intuitions are better than others. This is 
because some intuitions will more effectively stimulate and situate further scientific 
investigation, which is to say that, on the natural kind conception of intuitions, there will be 
cases where having an intuition about an action’s being a member of a moral kind leaves us in a 
better epistemic position to investigate that moral kind, and its membership, than we would be if 
we had had some other intuitions. 
Elgin’s discussion is fruitful for the further reason that it explains how our practice of 
science, and by extension the practice of the method of intuition in ethics, can be valuable with 
no reference to strong philosophical properties like convergence on the truth. We might argue 
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that intuitions on the natural kind conception are best understood as felicitous falsehoods, or as 
judgments that we make that are epistemically justified because they are useful in guiding our 
investigations, and not because they are true, or because they have some other, similarly strong 
epistemic property (Elgin 2017, pp. 23ff). Consider the ideal gas law, PV=nRT, an equation that 
conceptualizes the relationships between various properties of gases. Elgin notes that the ideal 
gas law is false, in that actual gases do not always have properties that are predicted by the 
equation, and that even given that, the ideal gas law is a useful tool for estimating the properties 
of a specific quantity of gas, when all the values in the equation, except one, are known (Elgin 
2017, p. 15). Elgin considers the ideal gas law to be a felicitous falsehood, because even though 
it is not even approximately true, and has a number of counterexamples, scientists regularly find 
the equation to be useful. Intuitions, under the natural kind conception of intuitions, are much 
like the ideal gas law in this regard. According to the methodological role that this conception 
grants to them, it does not matter, for the epistemic valence of an intuition, that the intuition is 
predictably false. Intuitions need not be true, and indeed need not care about the truth in any 
way, to have epistemic valence. We instead know the epistemic valence of intuitions 
retroactively, by looking at the history of some scientific investigation and seeing whether 
having that intuition was conducive to the understanding that has been progressively reached, or 
else know them inferentially, by making judgments about the potentially reliability of the 
intuitier who tokens the intuition. At no point in judging this is a claim about the truth 
conduciveness, foundational status, or a prioricity of the intuition; even on the supposition that 
there are true intuitions, whatever that means, we can get along just fine with only the class of 
the useful intuitions. 
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Before I move on to further elaborate the natural kind method of intuitions in a 
pragmatist framework, I want to address problems surrounding the term ‘natural kind’ in this 
context. In the cited Kornblith essay, the argument proceeds from two claims: first, that science 
is a matter of sorting physical objects into the natural kinds to which they belong, and second, 
that intuition as a practice is justified by its essential role in the first. From this arises a problem. 
Speaking of science as the investigation of natural kinds suggests a kind of realism about science 
which is unpalatable to pragmatists, because the language of natural kinds suggests that there is 
something natural, outside of the scientific discourse itself, to which that discourse respond. 
What I have argued so far is that pragmatists ought to cash out the idea of intuition and its 
epistemic role in virtue of Kornblith’s second claim. But what of the first, about the aim of 
science? Pragmatists want to accept the second claim, but accepting the first claim seems to be 
necessary to cash out the second claim, because only if science concerns itself with natural kind 
memberships would the method of intuition play its purported epistemic role. To name the 
problem according to language that Rorty criticizes, the idea of a natural kind might imply the 
idea that science responds to some metaphysically-independent notion of a world which is then 
categorized by scientific investigation. But, according to Rorty, that notion of a ‘world’ is 
nonsensical for pragmatists, insofar as some primordial conceptual ordering of these entities is a 
presupposition of our being able to scientifically investigate them in the first place (Rorty 1982c, 
pp. 14-15). What, then, could cash out the idea of a natural kind for a pragmatist? I think the 
pragmatist essentially has two options here. First, the pragmatist could try to establish a social 
constructionist conception of natural kinds, according to which natural kinds are fully 
metaphysically real, but metaphysically real because human practices have modified the world in 
such a way that the natural kinds are what they are. We make natural kinds become real by 
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talking about them and using them to understand the world, on this line. A second option is to 
decline to provide a theory of natural kinds that makes them metaphysically real, but that instead 
views natural kinds as a mere convenient way of talking about what we do in science. On this 
second option, natural kinds are not real in any metaphysical sense, but are theoretical posits that 
we use to guide scientific investigation (see Bird 2018, sec. 1.1.3; the claim is that the contrast 
between the first and second options here mirrors Bird’s contrast between strong and weak 
conventionalism). I think that a social constructionist conception of natural kinds is possible, but 
I take the second option here. I think that pragmatists should treat natural kinds as practical 
posits that are justified, to the extent that they are justified at all, just insofar as talking about 
natural kinds is a useful tool for guiding scientific investigation (in other words, I think 
pragmatists should be weak conventionalists, in Bird’s language). One can adopt this second 
option with while remining agnostic on whether there is a social constructionist account of 
natural kinds that is consistent with pragmatism. In other words, despite initial appearances, it is 
possible to account for the role of intuition as essential in investigating natural kind memberships 
(Kornblith’s second claim) while rejecting the stronger claim about the role of kinds in science. 
The pragmatist can claim that science can investigate natural kind memberships even without 
endorsing any kind of realism about those kinds themselves. Rather, on this view, what science 
does is engage in processes of kinding observed phenomena, where the goal is to produce an 
ordering of those phenomena into kind-like groups that serve the practical purposes to which we 
put our science. Processes of kinding, then, it claims, make perfectly good sense even if there are 
no natural kinds. In contrast, a pragmatist who defends social constructionism about natural 
kinds would accept both of Kornblith’s claims, and simply argue that the apparent difficulties 
with defending Kornblith’s first claim can be overcome. Hopefully it is clear, then why it makes 
96 
 
sense to avoid social constructionist claims, from a pragmatist perspective: if we can get along 
just fine with processes of kinding that make no claim to the reality of natural kinds, then the 
further social constructionist claims would at best be pragmatically neutral, because even if the 
account worked, it would add nothing that was not captured in the processes of kinding that are 
more obviously the way to address the problem, on a Rortian approach to science. 
 Now to conclude this chapter. In further cashing out the idea of the natural kind 
conception of intuitions, and motivating it as a pragmatist conception, it will be helpful to 
discuss calibration, and to see why the natural kind conception does not fall to the calibration 
problem in the same way as the rationalist’s conception does. To recall, the calibration problem 
holds that intuition must be verified against some non-intuitive standard in order to have some 
epistemic valence. We must be able to check our intuitions in order to show that they are 
reliable, insofar as some judgments that seem like intuitions, in the rationalist’s sense, are false, 
or misleading. But the calibration problem is that checking our intuitions shows that the intuition 
itself is irrelevant, because whatever confirms the intuition, and not the intuition’s epistemic 
status itself, is the thing that explains its epistemic valence. For instance, we might try to confirm 
an intuition by checking it against our theories. But if the theory confirms the intuition, then it is 
the theory itself that has epistemic valence. On the other hand, if the intuition is not calibrated, 
then it is not clear why it should have epistemic valence in the first place. So, for the rationalist, 
an explanation of the intellectual authority of an intuition is both necessary, and cannot be 
provided. The natural kind conception, however, entirely bypasses the calibration problem, while 
still making sense of the fact that we have epistemically-valuable practices of calibration. This is 
because the natural kind conception grants intuitions their epistemic role while simultaneously 
holding that intuitions aim at being tossed aside by being assimilated to our broader theories. 
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Natural kind intuitionists grasp gladly the claim that, when we confirm an intuition by checking 
it against our theories, we often show that the intuition is superfluous. But natural kind 
intuitionists deny that this fact shows that the intuition plays no epistemic role. The intuition 
played the epistemic role of guiding investigation into a case where the theory was applied, and 
can therefore show how the theory is stretched and expanded to cover the previously unknown 
case. There is no further expectation that, after inquiry has stopped, the intuition itself still 
occupies the same epistemic role it did when inquiry began. It does not matter whether further 
evidence is used to check the intuition, because the goal of providing intuitions in the first place 
is to effectively guide the search for better, non-intuitive evidence. Hence, the natural kind 
conception can make sense of the calibration methodology, while stopping short of shaping that 















CHAPTER 4: A Pragmatist Metaethics? Reconstructing the Terrain 
4.1. Introduction: plan of the chapter 
Liberal ironism, which is a crucial tenet of Rorty’s version of pragmatism, tells us to treat 
our own moral and metaethical commitments as incomplete, contingent, and radically amenable 
to rejection and revision. As such, it posits a kind of internal tension in the beliefs of a moral 
agent. Yet although it has these implications, pragmatism can also make sense of our actually 
having moral and metaethical beliefs. It is not so much that we cannot believe what we believe, 
if we are liberal ironists, but more that we must treat our beliefs with a bit of suspicion. This was 
seen as a potential problem in Chapter 1, but here, I will show that it is an important feature of 
the view, because it means that pragmatism can offer a more plausible account of the contents of 
moral discourse than can some standard metaethical views, which deny moral belief the space 
that it would seem it clearly occupies. Pragmatism can also account for the most plausible 
aspects of many of those practices. Pragmatism is hence shown as having the unique ability to 
absorb the best of the terrain, while rejecting the worst. 
4.2. Non-cognitivism 
 Non-cognitivism is the metaethical view which says that moral sentences do not aim to 
state truths; in the jargon of the field, moral sentences are not truth-apt. Although the early non-
cognitivists generally adopted this position because they saw moral sentences as semantically 
infirm when compared to sentences such as the sentences that constitute scientific theories (Ayer 
1952, p. 107), others have gone to see this quality of moral sentences as independently plausible, 
given the poor prospects for showing that there are moral facts that could make a moral belief 
true or false (Blackburn 1984, pp. 188-9). 
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 Non-cognitivism has been subject to persistent criticism because it seems to entail that 
our moral sentences do not function in our actual discourses as non-cognitivism says that they 
do. One way to state this is in terms of the embedding problem. If non-cognitivism is to be 
believed, and moral sentences are not truth-apt, then the following sentence is not truth-apt: 
1. Stealing is wrong. 
This sentence is instead read as an emotional expression toward the idea of stealing, or as a 
covert attempt to get other people to not steal things, or as the expression of the commitment to a 
norm against stealing. But any moral sentence will also have this property; this means that the 
following sentence is also not truth-apt: 
2. Stealing the Mona Lisa is wrong. 
This much is clear. But ordinary people would normally say that 2 could be inferred from 1. In 
virtue of knowing 1, it seems like I am now in a position to construct an argument that justifies 
concluding 2, because there would be a conditional relationship between 1 and 2, with 1 being 
the antecedent and 2 being the consequent. The argument might take the form of modus ponens, 
as follows:  
1. Stealing is wrong. 
3. If stealing is wrong, then stealing the Mona Lisa is wrong. 
4. Therefore, stealing the Mona Lisa is wrong. 
 
It seems like a metaethical account should not entail that this argument is invalid. But non-
cognitivism is thought to entail exactly that. For note that neither the antecedent nor the 
consequent of the conditional premise are truth-apt. Yet nonetheless, the conditional itself seems 
to be truth-apt, and obviously so; it asserts an intuitively plausible inferential relationship 
between the two constituent sentences. But if the conditional is truth-apt, then the argument does 
not go through. The instance of ‘stealing is wrong’ that occurs in the first premise does not 
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clearly mean the same as the instance of ‘stealing is wrong’ that occurs in the second premise, 
because the second premise’s truth-aptness means that there is no neat linkage between the 
semantic properties of the conditional and the non-conditional premise. Hence, non-cognitivism 
entails that we cannot make this inference. But insofar as we are happy to grant that inference as 
a paradigmatic vase of valid reasoning, that means that non-cognitivism has a serious flaw, and 
entails that people are generally wrong about how their moral sentences function in moral 
discourse (Geach 1965). 
 Of course, non-cognitivists have spent a lot of effort trying to answer these challenges, 
and have been successful to various degrees. In this section, I want to focus on Simon 
Blackburn’s (1984) quasi-realist version of non-cognitivism for reasons that will become 
apparent in a moment. Blackburn thinks that we can explain inferences like the inference from 1 
and 3 to 4 by appeal to a logic of higher-order attitudes: the validity of the inference is explained 
by the fact that, contrary to appearances, 3 is actually not truth-apt, but instead is interpreted as a 
kind of expressive commitment to a relation obtaining between two sentences, each of which is 
itself not truth-apt. Inference between non-cognitive sentences is not analyzed as a logical 
notion, but as a practical notion (Blackburn 1984, pp. 193-5). Hence, the mere occurrence of the 
non-cognitive sentences in the conditional does not undermine the validity of the inference, 
because the semantics of the conditional have been revised so as to match the non-cognitive 
semantics of its constituent parts. 
 Perhaps a Blackburn-style strategy could be made to work, but I think we should resist it, 
and along it with it the broader quasi-realist project. It is one thing to say that moral sentences 
and moral conditionals have an expressivist semantics that can be brought out through quasi-
realist critique of moral discourse, but entirely another to posit a revision to the common-sense 
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rules of inference. I read a Rortian pragmatist as committed, at least as a first rule, to leaving 
common-sense attitudes toward our language intact. Hence, we should be strongly inclined to 
treat modus ponens in moral reasoning as the reasoning from assertion to assertion, rather than 
employing a higher-order attitudes approach to those inferences. This, of course, is not to say 
that this approach to moral semantics is incoherent; it is just to say that we have good pragmatic 
reasons to treat inferences along common-sense cognitivist lines. It also seems to me that the 
reasons for accepting non-cognitivist analyses in the first place, many of which appeal to some 
subjectivist critique of the possibility of moral truth values, are simply not strong enough to 
overturn this inclination. A subjectivism about moral sentences actually does not leave non-
cognitivism about moral sentences as the only option, because a subjectivism about moral 
sentences is compatible with their having an extensional, Quine-Rorty semantics (again recall 
Chapter 1, 1.3) that allows moral modus ponens to go off without a hitch. Although this idea will 
get built out in later sections, I mean here something like a disquotational account of semantics, 
according to which, for any sentence p, p is true if and only if p (Rorty 1991c, pp. 137-8). On 
such an account, there is no complex question about the semantics of moral sentences as they are 
placed into conditionals; the truth values, insofar as they are specified disquotationally, are 
relaxed enough so that they are not relevant as to whether the inference goes off as valid. There 
is no problem with saying that (1) and (2) above entail (3), because the constituent pieces of all 
sentences have their meanings as a purely formal matter. 
As an aside, I think the claim that Rorty-style pragmatism should accept the 
disquotational theory about truth needs some defense, because Diane Heney (2016, pp. 97-8), in 
a recent attempt to build out a pragmatist metaethics, argues that pragmatists should reject 
deflationism about truth and embrace social constructionism about truth. For Heney, we can’t 
102 
 
abstract our truth-claims from our social practices, as a pragmatic matter, because our truth-
claims just are social practices. What matters is whether there is a kind of responsibility taken for 
a claim if it is a truth-claim. Hence, insofar as the disquotational theory is merely formal and 
contains nothing normative, it robs truth-claims of what is most distinctive about them. I think 
that Heney is wrong about this, for two reasons. First, Heney offers no explanation of how this 
normative account of our sentences that is not disquotational can solve the embedding problem. 
But second, and more importantly, this seems to represent a misunderstanding of the 
disquotational theory. The disquotational theory does not aim to rob concepts of their normative 
nature, but aims to recast truth-claims in a formal scheme which is more germane to the level of 
analysis at which it is necessary. With all that Heney claims, there is no reason to think that a 
pragmatist cannot adopt something like a pluralist conception of semantics, treating truth-claims 
as social properties and as socially embedded here, and as purely formal theoretical constructs 
there.  
 The criticism of Heney shows that moral sentences may be governed by different 
semantics as the context varies. This is important for what follows. For instance, a moral 
sentence may turn out to have the form of a truth-apt assertion, yet is uttered primarily because 
of the non-cognitive force that the utterance would have. It’s not hard to find examples where 
this seems to be the case. Imagine that a pro-choice partisan shouts ‘a woman has a right to 
choose’ at a pro-lifer holding a sign that says ‘abortion is wrong’. Both of these state moral 
sentences, and both sentences would be read as cognitive and truth-apt if we simply left the 
surface form of the sentences stand, as I have suggested is both plausible given a pragmatist 
metaethics and a consequence of a good general attitude toward analyzing sentences. It also 
seems plausible to say that their utterances have something like a non-cognitive dimension. After 
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all, shouting ‘a woman has a right to choose’ at a political opponent could be well-understood as 
aimed at expressing a person’s rejection of the pro-lifer’s values; we should say the same for the 
pro-lifer’s sign. If anything, a surface-level account of the qualities of these utterances suggests 
that a relaxed account of moral semantics can live comfortably alongside the non-cognitive 
elements endemic to many examples of moral discourse. 
Of course, I am not the first person to provide a so-called hybrid theory of moral 
semantics. Friends of non-cognitivism, like Michael Ridge (2006), have long posited such 
theories as a way to reconcile the non-cognitive elements of moral discourse with the semantic 
complexities that arise in those accounts.1 Ridge, who defends a view that he dubs ecumenical 
expressivism, holds that moral sentences always express desires and sometimes express beliefs, 
and that, in moral sentences, the desires have logical priority over the beliefs (Ridge 2006, p. 
309). Ridge cashes this out as the idea that moral sentences sometimes carry with them an 
anaphoric reference to a belief about moral fact which itself carries with it no assumption of the 
facticity of the belief (Ridge 2006, pp. 313-14). Although Ridge, in that paper, is hard to pin 
down on whether the Quine-Rorty view on semantics is the right one, that view seems to be most 
compatible with the usage that Ridge finds in the cognitive element in ecumenical expressivism. 
Although Ridge’s discussion provides a road map for the kind of semantic theory I think that a 
Rortian could endorse to avoid the muddle of quasi-realist semantics, I take issue with Ridge’s 
claim of priority of the non-cognitive element of moral sentences. Ridge holds this view because 
he wants to show that ecumenical accounts of moral semantics are incorrectly, in the literature, 
viewed as privileging the cognitive elements of moral discourse. If the cognitive element of a 
 
1 Although I focus on Ridge here, it is controversial whether Ridge counts as a proponent of a hybrid theory, or is 
just an expressivist. See Bar On et al. (2014) for some of the nuances here. In any case, Ridge’s work is hybrid 
enough for my tastes because it does try to provide the distinctive balance of a hybrid semantics. 
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moral sentence were always prior, then the cognitivist is left with the challenge of providing a 
non-reductionist explanation of how that sentence could refer to a moral property, a challenge 
which itself arises because of the connection between the cognitivist/non-cognitivist debate and 
the debate over moral properties arising out of Moore’s open question argument. By prioritizing 
the non-cognitive element, Ridge’s semantics allows reference without non-reductionism. Ridge 
can simply say that reference is explained by the non-cognitive elements of the moral language 
employed: a moral sentence like ‘stealing is wrong’ expresses disapproval of whatever property 
happens to be picked out by ‘is wrong’, and the cognitive element of the sentence is parasitic on 
that sentence’s internal structure being disquotationally referred to by the non-cognitive element. 
If the cognitive element were prior, conversely, the non-cognitive element of approval would 
need to be derived from the surface-level assertion, but that notion is quite a lot less clear than 
the former (Ridge 2006, p. 306). Yet the idea of building out the non-cognitive element from the 
cognitive element, which Ridge thinks is implausible, is actually nothing like that. It is true that 
it can be hard to see how the non-cognitive element of the semantics could be derived from the 
cognitive element, just because the non-cognitive element would then seem to be subject to open 
question concerns, but actually, the idea of closing the question regarding motivation is made 
possible if we accept the broadly Rortian picture that has been hinted at in previous chapters. The 
error in Ridge’s account arises from the fact that the argument against privileging the cognitive 
element assumes that the sentence, rather than the vocabulary, is the relevant unit of analysis. It 
is hard to see how a non-cognitive element could be derived from a cognitive element if all we 
have is a singular moral assertion, such as ‘stealing is wrong’, and hence hard to see how we 
could have an ecumenical cognitivism that speaks to the non-cogntivist’s concerns. It is hard to 
see how something with non-cognitive motivational force is derived from a mere sentential 
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assertion, if all we can look at is a single sentence. Yet if moral sentences are semantically 
interconnected in holistic unities, as the Quine-Rorty view suggests, then inferring the non-
cognitive element from ‘stealing is wrong’ could be a function of a broader commitment of 
endorsing various other sentences which are constitutively related to ‘stealing is wrong’. The 
wrongness of stealing might be, to take just a single, narrow example, constitutively related to 
the social disutility involved in stealing. Hence, a sentence like ‘stealing is wrong’ might be used 
to derive a non-cognitive association about stealing by placing the idea of stealing within a 
broader nexus of desires that the agent has, such as the desire to live in a stable society, or one 
that does not allow theft to disproportionately harm marginalized groups. Rather than requiring 
us to go in for an ecumenical cognitivism or an ecumenical expressivism, then, a holistic 
approach to moral semantics allows us to see how the cognitive and non-cognitive elements are 
negotiated in a delicate balancing of semantic relationships within the normative discourses that 
we actually engage in while stopping short of broad claims about which element is prior to the 
other.  
The value of the holistic approach can be brought out by considering an objection. One 
might say that this picture of moral semantics cannot make sense of the motivational character of 
moral discourse. An ecumenical theory has to privilege the non-cognitive element because a 
theory that privileges the cognitive element would make the motivational element of ethical 
judgment extrinsic to the judgment (Ridge 2006; Blackburn 1998, p. 61). But this is 
unacceptable, for non-cognitivist reasons (Blackburn 1993, pp 168-70). But, so goes the 
objection, the holistic approach to ecumenical moral semantics I propose here also severs the 
link between moral judgment and motivation. If the Quine-Rorty response has the implication 
that motivations are merely contingently connected to moral reasoning, as breaking the proposed 
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tight link, then although that response might be good for other reasons, it cannot be a legitimate 
reconstruction of quasi-realism. Now of course we could bite the bullet, and say that we can just 
accept judgment externalism. Instead, however I want to argue that my proposal can 
accommodate the link between moral judgment and motivation, and hence serve as a 
reconstruction of some of quasi-realism’s semantic ideas. Allen Gibbard, in discussing the link 
between motivation and moral judgment, appeals to the notion of internalization, rather than 
internalism, as Blackburn does in “How To Be An Ethical Anti-Realist” (1993). For Gibbard, the 
internal connection between judgment and motivation is a learned connection, which is formed 
by an adaptive tendency to develop understandings of norms that follows from broader 
biological imperatives which we human agents share with non-human animals (Gibbard 1990, 
pp. 68-71). But appeal to biological imperatives does not help as Gibbard thinks it does. 
Biological imperatives are potentially cognitive, or at least tied up with cognitive expressions. A 
particularly salient case here could be the case of thick ethical concepts, which are evaluative 
terms that have descriptive components. It might be argued that saying something like ‘murder is 
cruel’ states a thick ethical concept of cruelty (Väyrynen 2021). Cruelty is both non-cognitively 
valenced when used this way, and also has a clear descriptive component. But that descriptive 
component may itself be part of the adaptive tendency of the term; it affixes the non-cognitive 
valence to the ability to attach the non-cognitive valence to cases. This is not sufficient to refute 
quasi-realist theories. Blackburn rightly holds that externalists can account for some cases of 
moral judgment, and also that there are descriptive components to our ethical judgments. But 
Blackburn wrongly holds that this line is clear, as does Gibbard. After all, if appeal to biological 
imperatives is to support a non-cognitivist view, it must be clearly able to demarcate the non-
cognitivist elements of internalization. Absent those, it leaves open a holistic semantics that 
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treats crucial elements of assertoric moral discourse as constitutively linked, in a web of moral 
ideas, with non-cognitivism’s expressive components. The conclusion, then, is that the best 
account of non-cognitivist explanations of their supposed superiority on the question of moral 
motivation and its internal character support an approach to semantics that rejects both 
ecumenical expressivism and ecumenical non-cognitivism. Quasi-realism, along with its 
motivational and semantics claims, is better accounted for by a pragmatist approach to moral 
semantics, on the lines of the Quine-Rorty view.  
4.3. Error theory 
Error theory is a metaethical approach that attempts to debunk morality by showing that 
its conceptual aspirations far exceed its actual conceptual reach. More specifically, error theorists 
try to argue two claims: first, that morality is logically committed to some normatively-
significant conception of moral objectivity, and second, that that conception of moral objectivity 
fails to obtain. These two claims are then thought to entail the conclusion that, conceptually-
speaking, our moral practices are flawed. Richard Joyce (2001), probably the most-commonly 
read contemporary error theorist, cashes out the relevant conception of moral objectivity as a 
variety of motivational internalism. Joyce thinks that our concept of morality is non-negotiably 
committed to the reality of motivational internalism, which, recall, is the claim that, if a person 
has a moral belief, then that person also has a motive to act on that moral belief. His reasoning 
for this is that nothing else can explain the overridingness of morality that our practices are 
seemingly committed to. If a person had a moral belief that was seemingly not motivationally 
overriding, then they do not have the thing that is supposed to make moral belief ontologically 
distinctive. Joyce then argues that motivational internalism is false. Hence, there is an error 
buried deeply in our moral practices. 
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A common way of responding to error theories is to insist that the first claim is false, and 
that morality is not committed to the error theorist’s notion of objectivity. Although one might 
plausibly believe this, such claims are not effective against error theories, because error theorists 
can merely insist that the proposed argument shows that there is some other notion of objectivity, 
but not a notion of objectivity that is properly moral. In other words, one cannot simply object to 
the error theorist’s claim by pointing out that sometimes people seem to use moral terms in 
senses that are at odds with the error theorist’s notion of objectivity. Nonetheless, it may temper 
the error theorist’s enthusiasm for their claims to see that, even granting that moral discourse 
makes the purported claim to objectivity, there are options that are nearby to this purported claim 
that do not entail any error. The plausible view we end up with, on this approach to the problem, 
is that there could be a core notion of moral objectivity that entails error while at the same time 
lots of things that bear relevant similarities to moral objectivity that entail no such error. 
Begin with Victor Moberger’s clever discussion of John Mackie’s (1977) founding 
statement of error theory. In his paper, “Not just errors: a new interpretation of Mackie’s error 
theory,” Moberger argues that there is textual support in Mackie to attribute to him a hybrid 
interpretation of moral discourse, where some moral claims are cognitive, and hence subject to 
the error theorist’s critique, while other moral claims are non-cognitive, and hence not subject. 
For example, although Mackie thinks that moral sentences refer to objective properties which do 
not exist, he also thinks that some moral discourse is aimed at expressing people’s allegiance to 
socially-mediated codes of behavior, as evinced by his using of moral language consistent with 
expressivism (Moberger 2017, p. 8). Moberger, however, does not explore these claims in any 
systematic way, beside suggesting that they render error theory more defensible.  
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Of course, Joyce can still insist that non-cognitive ‘moral’ claims are not properly moral, 
because morality just is what is intrinsically motivating. It may be the case that we can get along 
just fine with non-cognitive ‘moral’ claims because they serve our practical purposes, but those 
claims are something else, which we might call following convention schmorality. Schmorality 
is great for our purposes, but it is not morality, and so moves like the ones suggested by 
Moberger do not really answer the error theorist’s challenge. We simply would not understand a 
term that is schmoral as properly moral (Joyce 2001, p. 23ff). If someone were to assert ‘stealing 
is wrong’ yet not view themselves as having reason not to steal, then one would to fail to grasp 
the concept of moral wrongness, although they may successfully grasp other concepts that are 
similar to moral wrongness. 
So construed, I think there is no real way to refute the error theorist’s point. If one is 
really committed to understanding the concept of morality in this way, then it is hard to know 
what would convince them otherwise. I suggest, instead, we simply embrace the fact that that the 
error theorist’s point must be granted. Instead, it is worth thinking about how error theorists need 
to think about integrating various normative conceptions that are nearby to the moral into a 
broader conception of the ethical life. If it turned out that moral discourse was in error, but that 
most of what is nearby to the moral but not actually moral was not in error because it had weaker 
conceptual aspirations, then that would show that error theory’s scope has to be traded off 
against its theoretical correctness. Either it is narrow enough to be true, yet does not covver the 
very important, closely related conceptions nearby the moral, or it is wide enough to include 
these things in its conception of the moral, yet false, because those nearby conceptions do not 
actually entail error.  
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Let me clarify what I mean by ‘nearby to the moral’. It may be helpful to distinguish 
morality, explicated in the narrow way in which Joyce explicates it, from normativity more 
broadly, which allows commitment to a norm which one does not see oneself as having a reason 
to abide by. Nearby notions to the moral are normative notions that are similar to morality, but 
that differ in their relative laxity. For instance, someone might use the concept ‘moral’ in the 
institutional, non-cognitive way that Moberger suggests. Others might use the concept ‘moral’ in 
the natural kind sense imagined in the coming discussion of Cornell realism. But the Cornell 
semantics doesn’t seem to entail motivational internalism, and the non-cognitivists accept 
internalism in a weaker sense that is explained by emotions, rather than by anything objective 
about the meaning of a moral concept. If we hold fast to the error theorist’s conception of 
morality, then this will be no trouble, and ruled out by the theory. But this means that the scope 
of error theory is so narrow as to include only a singular, relatively uninteresting notion of 
morality.  
The import of this line of criticism can be expanded when we notice that, once the nearby 
senses of morality are being specified, the floodgates open to a diversity of nearby senses of 
morality. If we can observe normative notions that are similar to in some way, but not reducible 
to, the error theorist’s conception of the moral, then we expand the scope of what is nearby to the 
moral. This allows us to see our discourse as sometimes errant and sometimes not errant, 
depending on which terms we pick, given the broader purposes of normative discourse that we 
are a part of. Hence, when we make moral claims, we are necessarily in error, but when we make 
moral or nearby-moral claims, we are not necessarily in error. But as it turns out, actual moral 
discourse is more like the nearby-moral than the moral simpliciter. Hence, as I suggested above, 
the error theorist’s dilemma is between the scope of the theory and its correctness. 
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Notice, by the way, that pragmatism, which is more ecumenical and potentially more 
open to broader thinking about what sorts of things constitute the moral, can make a better sense 
of these claims than can error theory. After all, suppose that the pragmatist were to say that 
ethics properly deals with the nearby-moral, rather than merely the moral. They would be able to 
argue that the moral, as used by the error theorist, is a sub-part of the nearby-moral. Hence, the 
pragmatist can cleanly make sense of how some of our moral practices are constituted such that 
they entail errors. But they can also capture the more plausible thought that many of the things 
that we do, such as trying to convince people to be feminists while being indifferent to the truth 
of feminism, are not at all in error.  
4.4. Cornell realism 
It is clear, in the face of all of this, that pragmatism can be used to provide a more 
plausible conception of moral semantics than non-cognitivism and error theory, and hence that 
we have some initial reason to accept pragmatism. However, the conception of semantics that 
has been defended here, an extensional, disquotational semantics that is a respectable extension 
of what I called the Quine-Rorty view, is quite thin, and hence potentially uninteresting, even if 
true. After all, Quine (1979) argues that, even though this semantic view can be used to make 
sense of the semantic adequacy of moral terms, that nonetheless there is very little that can be 
positively said in ethics, because there is vast extensional diversity in how actual moral agents 
view the class of sentences that fall under moral concepts like ‘morally permissible’. Ethics is, in 
that way, importantly unlike science, and hence even granted the extensional semantics that has 
been provided here, very little of interest in moral reality would follow. It is the aim of this 
section to argue that Quine’s conclusions in that paper are overstated, and that even granted the 
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extensional diversity of moral concepts, it is possible to make interesting and convincing moral 
arguments that a wide variety of people will be able to understand and engage with.  
The arguments for this claim are, I think, surprising, because they make reference to the 
so-called Cornell realist school of moral semantics. This is surprising for three reasons. First, this 
way of thinking about moral semantics analogizes moral concepts to natural kinds, and holds that 
we can investigate the memberships of moral natural kinds through a broadly scientific 
methodology. Yet a pragmatist, at least on the face of the matter, would be disposed to deny the 
idea that moral investigation is like scientific investigation. Second, the scientific methodology 
used to investigate moral natural kind membership is highly realist in its assumptions, insofar as 
it takes itself to be investigating moral properties that are viewed as natural properties of objects, 
which are had by those objects as an objective fact. Yet it seem that a pragmatist would be more 
inclined to treat moral properties, to the extent that they want to speak in those terms at all, as 
being social properties, or perhaps as projective, secondary properties of objects. Third, and 
more generally and worryingly, Cornell realism treats moral natural kinds on the Kripkean rigid 
designator model of natural kinds (c.f. Kripke 1980, p. 121), and hence on an essentialist model 
that Quine and Rorty would surely reject. On this model, the extension of a natural kind term 
would be locked in and hence constructed as an aspect of moral reality through the causal history 
of the term’s being used in a certain way. Although this view surely allows the possibility of 
changing extensions through complex causal historical processes, it is on the face of it hard to 
see how rigidification as a process could be anything more than a way of simply picking out 
certain causal histories as contingently privileged, if the Kripke model is read through a 
pragmatist lens. After all, it is not as if pragmatists like Rorty will resist the idea that causal 
histories are a crucial determinant of the extension of a moral natural kind. It is only when that 
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idea is expanded to include some notion of essence, or linguistic privilege, that the pragmatist 
should jump ship. But Cornell realism seems to require that this ship not be jumped. So clearly 
the pragmatist has their work cut out for them, if they are to appeal to Cornell realism in a way 
that leaves crucial features of pragmatism intact. 
I think the pragmatist’s answer here is to attempt a reconstruction of Cornell realism that 
is parasitic on the loose conception of natural kinds that is presented in Chapter 3, 3.5. Recall 
that, in that section, I argued that pragmatism can fruitfully make sense of the idea of intuitions 
in ethics as aiming to sort ethical sentences into moral kinds. Having an intuition, on such a 
view, is a defeasible suggestion that some action or state of affairs falls under the extension of a 
moral concept. These suggestions are then explicitly dropped or modified when further 
investigation raises doubts as to the wisdom of construing the extension of the moral concept in 
that way. This way of thinking about moral natural kinds, then, requires nothing other than that 
we often, as a matter of our epistemic practice, try to place ethical sentences into various kinds, 
on the basis of our immediate judgments about what kinds those moral sentences fall under and 
then further investigation into whether that immediate judgment is best, on the pragmatist 
standard of ‘best’. Therefore, if my contentions in Chapter 3 are to be believed, then there is a 
way forward for the Rorty-Quine view in tandem with the Cornell realist view. This is because 
the essentialism of the Cornell realist view is not actually essential to the Cornell realist view, 
and because stripped of that essentialism Cornell realism provides a plausible model for how our 
moral concepts can be sturdy enough to do practical work in ethics, even granted that the 




To get more specific as to how this is possible, it is helpful to consider the results that 
Richard Boyd thinks arise from his defense of Cornell realism in “How To Be A Moral Realist” 
(1988). Boyd thinks that it is crucially important for ethics that ethical reasoning and scientific 
reasoning are very similar in their structures: both involve the investigation of metaphysically  
real natural kinds, and involve a kind of theory-laden intuitionist method of reflective 
equilibrium that can take us to knowledge about these kinds and the properties that are 
embodied. To take his example, Boyd thinks that he can demonstrate the truth of a version of 
consequentialism by arguing that human goods form a natural kind that is referred to by our 
concept of moral goodness; there is a homeostatic property cluster of things like health, wealth, 
happiness, etc., which are clustered together because we know certain more basic natural facts 
about what makes a human life go well, and we know these more basic natural facts in turn 
because we have done centuries of painstaking scientific investigation to figure out what makes 
human lives go well (Boyd 1988, pp. 203ff). Hence, when we use moral sentences that make 
reference to goodness, such as, for example, ‘Biden’s infrastructure plan is good’, we do so by 
referencing this homeostatic property cluster of the good things that we have picked out through 
our scientific investigation. I think that a pragmatist can agree with Boyd up to this point. This is 
the value of the pragmatist disquotational semantics that I have defended here so far: it can make 
ample good sense of substantive claims of moral goodness, insofar as substantive claims are 
trivially permitted by the disquotational truth schema, and anchored in reality through the causal 
historical properties of the idea of moral goodness that many people can see through just a basic 
understanding of human society. It also comports well with the holism of that view. 
One issue, I think, with Boyd’s account is the notion of a homeostatic property cluster. 
For Boyd, the various human goods form a cluster property because there is a kind of natural 
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equilibriation that occurs just because of human biological, psychological, and social nature that 
makes it the case that the natural kind of moral goodness includes them, and he thinks that we 
can know truths about these properties because we can observe human history to see that these 
goods actually do cluster in this way. To take the examples from the previous paragraph, health 
and wealth cluster together under the kind of moral goodness because a good human life must 
include both of these things in a kind of equilibriated balance; too much of one and the other is 
undermined. And note that health and wealth are merely two examples; the homeostatic property 
cluster that defines goodness, on Boyd’s view, likely includes much more than these two 
elements. Yet I think the idea of homeostasis here is problematic, insofar as the contents of the 
properties picked out by goodness are themselves radically contingent. Boyd, for instance, thinks 
that there is a notion of health that can be seen by all (most?) as being an essential feature of 
goodness, but it’s not clear that the contents of the idea of health actually are essential in any 
way. There are examples where notions of health and healthy behavior can be seen to diverge 
due to differing cultural features. Imagine a person who expresses joy regularly, with large 
smiles and lots of positive words toward friends and family members. In an American or 
European context, this person would be transparently viewed as expressing a healthy affect. 
Although we understand that people express emotions that do not accurately reflect how they 
feel, the external signs expresses by this person are associated with a healthy affect. However, in 
an East Asian context, expressing lots of joy would be viewed as an indication of an unhealthy 
affect; in those contexts, this would be associated with an unhealthy affect because East Asian 
societies prioritize the idea that expressing joy is socially harmful for those who are not feeling 
joyous (Chentsova-Dutton et al. 2014, pp. 345-6).2 This means that the way in which people 
 
2 I am indebted to Jesse Prinz for introducing me to this literature. 
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would be disposed to apply the concept of health shows significant diversity and varies in regular 
ways across cultural barriers. Now surely Boyd has resources to explain examples like this: 
assuming this divergence is true, we discovered this through careful ethnographic study of 
mental health in cultural context, and that therefore, contrary to how it used to seem, health is 
promoted in a way that we could never have seen before. Hence, Boyd can appeal to the 
science/ethics analogy, and then claim that ethics often makes progress by better integrating 
scientific advance into its dictates. But this response may be less attractive than it seems at first. 
If scientific evidence is supposed to settle the constituent features of the property cluster of 
goodness, and the scientific evidence itself points toward irreducible diversity in that property 
cluster, we may wonder whether health is really an aspect of the property cluster of goodness. 
Boyd’s analysis may have instead just shown that there are multiple candidate homeostatic 
property clusters each purporting to be goodness, each varying (at least) along the dimension of 
the causal history of the concept of health that they employ. 
The combination of homeostasis with the internal diversity of the relevant cluster 
properties thus leaves Boyd with a dilemma. Either we accept his notion of homeostasis, or we 
reject it. If we accept it, then it turns out that we actually end up with multiple, overlapping 
causal histories of the kind moral goodness. That’s unattractive for Boyd, because he aims to 
show that a fairly robust variety of moral realism is true, but this pluralism about the causal 
history of goodness would undercut the case for the extensional adequacy of moral goodness that 
is supposed to ground moral truths. In other words, moral causal regulation would no longer be 
significantly similar to scientific causal regulation; scientific kinds do not typically result in 
multiple candidate property clusters. Alternatively, Boyd could reject his notion of homeostasis, 
although rejecting this notion is tantamount to rejecting the naturalistic reduction that Boyd 
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thinks is distinctive about extensional definitions. Causal histories, without homeostasis, would 
not be unified enough to account for the possibility of scientific and moral realism. The best he 
could hope for, in that case, is disquotation and the Rorty-Quine view, and the extremely relaxed 
semantics that would follow from that.  
Yet as it turns out, the Rorty-Quine view can readily incorporate the idea of causal 
regulation without ending up in the dilemma that Boyd does. That is because Rorty-Quine can 
grant the first horn of the dilemma, and accept homeostasis along with the causal chain pluralism 
that would arise from it. Recall that I said that accepting causal chain pluralism is problematic 
for Boyd, because Boyd takes himself to be arguing in favor of moral realism. Hence, it’d be a 
serious problem if homeostatic property clusters ended up with plural causal chains. But this is 
not so for the Rorty-Quine pragmatist semantics, because that view can treat the pluralistic 
element of the causal chains as simply a feature of the complex diversity of moral life. What the 
pragmatist can say is that there are multiple causal histories for terms like moral goodness, and 
that when we reason morally, we elide many of these differences for pragmatic purposes, and 
when eliding those differences leads to moral problems, we appeal to pragmatics to fix our sense 
of goodness. We, in other words, grant that the extensional semantics provided by Boyd 
rigidifies the extensions of the terms that we use, but that because the causal histories of the 
terms we use are so complex, we need to clarify which rigidification of the term we are using to 
ground discourse. Again, this is perfectly consistent with Boyd’s approach to semantics, but 
because he ties his position to moral realism, the appeal to pragmatics to fix the context of the 
natural kind term would not be available to him. 
118 
 
One seeming problem that this approach to semantics can solve is that it can make sense 
of the logic of disagreement.3 On semantic pluralism, the logic of disagreement can seem to be a 
mystery. If diverging causal histories and their corresponding rigidifications are what lead the 
contents of moral kinds like goodness to become fixed, then individuals can transparently appear 
to be using the same terms when they disagree over whether, say, Biden’s infrastructure plan is 
good, but actually be using the term good with different causal histories in mind. Further, if this 
is always a possibility, then it leaves people who use moral concepts like goodness in a poor 
epistemic position to know that they are really talking about the same thing; the depth of this 
problem is correspondingly proportionate to how divergent causal histories actually turn out to 
be. Although I do not provide a full answer to this problem, and would like to address it in a 
future paper, I think that Rorty gives us resources to respond to it. I can say that the pragmatics 
of situations allow, or rather require, people to elide differences in the causal histories of their 
concepts when they engage in discourse. As situations place more epistemically-weighty 
demands on people’s semantic capacities, we have to work harder to take account of the 
pragmatics. If two people disagree over the extension and causal history of goodness with 
respect to just a few cases, then they may be quite close in terms of their semantics, and can 
transparently talk about the same thing. As the number or magnitude of the disagreements 
increases, their semantics become further apart, and they have to do some more significant 
clarification so that they can come to talk about the same thing. In his essay “Texts and lumps,” 
Rorty writes that, in order to be talking about the same thing in some case, all discussants need is 
to be close enough to be able to articulate the differences in their ideas. They need not share the 
same concepts and semantic contents, but they need to be able to analyze each other’s semantic 
 
3 For putting this objection to me, I am indebted to Gary Ostertag. 
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contents and their concepts (Rorty 1991b, pp. 88-9). I think we should say something like this to 
the objection. If it is a problem that people’s semantics do not overlap because that means that 
they do not share the concept in some important sense, the problem arises because of a tendency 
to analyze the semantics in an overly synchronic way. It seems likely, however, that 
disagreement is at least partly diachronic, in that it may take significant intellectual effort to even 
conceptualize the terms of disagreement. Although this answer entails that it is possible for 
people to really feel as though they are disagreeing but not actually be disagreeing, that seems to 
be no more of a problem than is the fact that people in general can be deeply confused whenever 
they attempt to disagree with each other, in a variety of ways. A thoroughly pragmatic approach 
to semantics can thus capture the possibility of disagreement even given divergent causal 
histories, and can say that it is possible to apply the predicate ‘same concept’ to those divergent 
causal histories. The error is in thinking that, in order to render the logic of disagreement 
intelligible, parties need to share the concept precisely right at the outset. 
This shows that there is a significant difference between much of what is done in science 
and ethics, contra Boyd: we can’t expect scientific kinds to remain plural like this for a 
significant period of time. Homeostasis is likely to be more robust in science than it is in ethics, 
because opposed conceptions of scientific kinds do not live together as comfortably as 
opposition between conceptions of moral kinds does. Indeed, it seems like scientific kinds are 
likely to converge more readily than moral kinds because scientific kinds are often created by 
eliminating the pluralism that it seems to be deeply hard to eliminate in moral kinds. 
Recall that, at the beginning of this chapter, I pointed toward Quine’s (1979) claim that 
the extensional diversity of moral concepts undermines the possibility of giving a genuine moral 
semantics. I promised to show that Quine was wrong about that. Here, we can see why. Quine 
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need not move from extensional diversity, which is genuine, to the impossibility of a real moral 
semantics, because the pragmatics of moral semantics, that is, the actual way in which people 
work on the way that they split moral notions into kinds in practice, specifically takes on board 
extensional diversity, and does so in a way that enables people to at least come to clarify, 
through discourse, what they are talking about. Indeed, it is quite ironic that Quine, who 
criticizes logical positivists in his work, famously in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951), ends 
up with a positivist skepticism about the possibility of moral discourse and semantics. A more 
thoroughgoing application of the Quinean semantics would prevent Quine from having to go to 
that implausible end point, and would also distinguish his unique body of work from that older 
view. 
4.5. Constructivisms Humean and Kantian 
So far, Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation have taken a long tour through the weeds of 
several theories in metaethics and moral epistemology, with the goal of showing that pragmatism 
has the resources to account for the reality of moral discourse, and the rationality of engaging in 
that discourse by appeal to intuitions. In doing this, it shows that pragmatism is not empty, 
pejoratively subjectivistic, and arational, as some have supposed. It shows, in other words, that 
pragmatists can provide a cogent metanormative framework in which moral discourse can occur. 
In this final section, then, one final task remains: to build up more substantively these insights 
into a satisfying account of how this metanormative framework can be leveraged to fill out a 
pragmatist conception of moral progress. After all, if we think of the natural kind theory of 
intuitions in ethics proposed in Chapter 3, what is argued there is that the method of intuition 
interpreted in the naturalized way that Kornblith interprets it can be given a full-throated 
pragmatist explanation. But it does not explain what it is for an intuition to be successfully 
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refined and reconstructed, on pragmatist lights. This section aims to explain that feature of 
intuitions by appeal to a theory of pragmatist constructivism. Although I have argued that 
pragmatists can adopt various aspects of Cornell realism, semantic deflationism, and intuitionism 
as part of their metanormative framework, I believe, and will argue, that if pragmatists want to 
adopt a more fully fleshed out normative framework, that they should be constructivists; in that 
sense, I agree with Robert Schwartz (2016) on this point. Schwartz argues that Dewey’s writings 
on ethics can be interpreted as committing him to a broadly constructivist view of moral 
discourse. I show that, although Schwartz’s paper is a great first step, that its conception of 
pragmatism should be expanded in light of my earlier discussion. 
Before laying out the fundamentals of pragmatist constructivism and introducing the 
reader to Schwartz’s view, however, I want to introduce some literature that provides something 
like a pragmatist account of moral progress, insofar as the aim of this section is to show that 
constructivism gives the pragmatists the best tools to think about progress. Two excellent 
philosophical works provide nearby conceptions that will help to fix ideas: Michele Moody-
Adams’s Fieldwork in Familiar Places (1997), and Phillip Kitcher’s The Ethical Project (2011). 
Moody-Adams considers herself to be a moral realist and to be in the business of providing a 
robust notion of moral objectivity; however, the way in which she introduces what I will call a 
dialogical conception of moral progress positions her as a very strong ally, at minimum, with the 
pragmatists. For Moody-Adams (1997, pp. 169-177), moral discourse is a complex social 
function whereby moral agents air problems and search for solutions that would harmonize their 
various aims in a way that renders the projects of all to be satisfiable to the greatest possible 
extent. To engage in moral discourse, then, is to be a party to a social practice that has publicly-
available rules for interpretation; although not writing specifically in reference to Moody-Adams, 
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we can view Elizabeth Anderson (2015, esp. p. 40) as joined in this project when she points out 
that the public-facing element of moral progress and moral interpretation must include the voices 
of those who are marginalized, and who are the beneficiaries of moral progress. From this 
perspective, then, moral progress is a kind of settling of practical problems through dialogical 
methods in a way that renders the problems of more people or groups to be satisfied in a way that 
is more satisfactory to them. Moody-Adams’s conception of moral progress is functional, in that 
a moral change is progressive insofar as it renders social functions more easily and cheaply 
satisfied then other possible changes. Kitcher’s conception of moral progress is also functional, 
although it specifies a very different notion of function than does the conception of Moody-
Adams, For Kitcher (2011, pp. 218-229), moral progress is measured in terms of evolutionary 
progress: a moral change is progressive insofar as it renders evolutionary functions more easily 
and cheaply satisfied than other possible changes.  
Rorty, however, who also styles himself a pragmatist, thinks that we have to accept a 
weaker notion of moral progress, which I will call the ethnocentric conception of moral progress. 
For Rorty, progress is always progress by our own lights; particular cultures, which are the 
location of a particular set of goals and aims, make progress insofar as they reach agreements 
where they satisfy their goals and aims more effectively, through whatever means or methods are 
most acceptable by their own lights (Rorty 1998b, pp. 172-3). Rorty’s conception of moral 
progress is considerably thinner than that offered by Moody-Adams or Kitcher. For Kitcher, 
different cultural groups will tend to converge, to at least some extent, in what sort of aims and 
goals they take themselves to be required, insofar as the evolutionary needs of humans are 
relatively stable across those groups. Moody-Adams, by contrast, would say that the notion of 
discourse that explains how progress is possible is more substantive than would Rorty. Now, if it 
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turned out that the best option for accounting for moral progress were what Rorty offered, that 
would be a mark against the pragmatist, insofar as the pragmatist wants to provide a 
reconstruction of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy has to aim at something a bit more 
ambitious than that. For instance, Rorty gives no account, and indeed likely can give no account, 
of how the relevant cultural group is to be demarcated. Societies are made up of differing and 
overlapping sub-cultures, and if we are to make sense of moral progress, on a view like the one 
he provides, we need to come up with a way of individuating the relevant groups. But it’s not 
clear how Rorty could do that. So it seems like there is motive to go toward an account like that 
of Moody-Adams or Kitcher. Yet the objection from the Rortian direction is that neither of these 
accounts can explain how moral progress is possible, given pragmatist assumptions. Actually, 
the argument might go, Moody-Adams and Kitcher are still stuck within a representationalist 
paradigm, whereby moral discourse attempts to represent some correct view about how 
evolutionary functions are best to be discharged, or about the contents of the dialogical norms 
that most effectively satisfy our aims. In this section, I leverage a detailed discussion of various 
kinds of constructivism to show that, contra this imagined Rortian reply, we could go in for some 
notion of moral progress that is more substantive than Rorty’s ethnocentric conception, without 
taking on the more realist elements of the Moody-Adams and Kitcher conceptions.  
The first point I want to argue is that, if they want it, pragmatists can have a Humean 
version of constructivism for free, or on the cheap, if they want it. I’ll follow Sharon Street 
(2008) in conceiving of Humean constructivism as making two key claims. First, moral 
sentences are conative and connected with subjective desires, in a fully Humean conception of 
those ideas. Second, complex or derived moral sentences are “constitutively entailed” (Street 
2008, p. 232) by other more basic moral sentences. Street’s constructivism is holistic, insofar as 
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the lines between complex and more basic moral sentences need not be direct, and can be 
potentially confused. Further, Street’s constructivism comports well with the semantics that has 
arisen in earlier sections of this chapter. Street, then, bites the bullet on objections that show that, 
according to this, it is possible to have a perfectly cogent racism, insofar as one’s racist beliefs 
can be constitutively entailed by moral sentences that one accepts as more basic. Those more 
basic moral sentences cannot be bludgeoned away by moral argument, and insofar as all of these 
moral sentences are subjective, this is no problem for the theory. Street, of course, does think that 
it is possible for people’s moral views to change over time, and that if this happens, it is because 
one simply comes to accept different constitutive entailment relations within one’s moral views. 
So, when I said that a pragmatist can have Humean constructivism for free, the reason for that is 
clear: this way of thinking about moral construction requires nothing that is unacceptable in a 
pragmatist’s metanormative framework. Causal histories, the deflationist moral semantics, and 
the natural kind conception of intuitions all explain how we might view certain moral beliefs as 
entailed by other moral beliefs that we already accept. Pragmatism, insofar as it attempts to treat 
the surface forms of our moral discourse as transparently as possible, can further explain how a 
moral sentence might be subjectively basic, for a person.  
Further evidence that pragmatists can adopt Humean constructivism comes from the 
already-cited paper by Schwartz (2016, pp. 43-44), who argues that the Deweyan notion that, 
when engaged in moral discourse, we start with the beliefs that we already have and then try to 
both build out further beliefs from what we already have and subject the beliefs that we already 
have to some degree of critical scrutiny, can explain how pragmatists can make sense of the idea 
of objectivity in moral reasoning. We can read Schwartz’s claim here as holding that moral 
discourse is the investigation of the constitutive entailment relations of the moral sentences that 
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we accept when we begin the process of moral discourse. Humean constructivism thus follows 
for pragmatists on the cheap. 
Of course, Humean constructivism is a pretty minimal constructivism. The only standard 
on the values one may hold, on such a view, is internal consistency; this is the real meat of the 
constitutive entailment criterion. Other versions of constructivism are more ambitious, and offer 
the moral agent more than mere consistency among conatively constituted moral sentences as the 
progress criterion. I want to focus in particular on Kantian constructivism, likely the most 
popular alternative to Humean constructivism. The contrast between Humean and Kantian 
constructivisms mirrors the traditional philosophical divide between consequentialism and 
deontology, and hence seems ripe for pragmatist dissolution and reconstruction. Kantian 
constructivists like John Rawls (1980) and Christine Korsgaard (1996) agree with the Humean 
constructivists up to a point, specifically on the view that a person’s or group’s system of values 
is constituted through something like a procedure of constitutive entailment, also known in the 
literature as reflective equilibrium. However, Kantians diverge from Humeans on whether there 
is a thicker normative idea, itself necessarily a part of the construction procedure, that serves to 
impose a more stringent criterion on normative theorizing: Kantians say that there is such a 
thicker normative idea, while Humeans deny this. By far the most common thicker criterion for 
Kantian cosntructivists is the idea of the Kantian notion of the self as an autonomous self-
legislator. Rawls, in his paper “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” (1980), explains that 
the construction procedure is grounded by the idea of the moral agent as having the two moral 
powers of a sense of justice and a conception of the good. Persons, on Rawls’s view, are 
conceived as being mutually disinterested in what is good for all others (a conception of the 
good), but as being mutually interested in establishing a fair scheme of social cooperation on 
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which all persons, to the maximal extent possible, can realize their own private conceptions of 
the good (a sense of justice) (Rawls 1980, pp. 525ff; Rawls 1985, pp. 233-4). Korsgaard expands 
on Rawls’s metaphysics of the Kantian self and defends a more nuanced version of the 
argument; although the details don’t necessarily matter that much here, it is perhaps worth 
quoting her at length to get the flavor for how the Kantian self can help to ground a conception 
of normativity: 
Your humanity requires you to conform to some of your practical identities, and you can 
question this requirement as you do any other. Does it really matter whether we act as our 
humanity requires, whether we find some ways of identifying ourselves and stand by 
them? But in this case you have no option but to say yes. Since you are a human you must 
take something to be normative, that is, some conception of practical identity must be 
normative for you. If you had no normative conception of your identity, you could have 
no reasons for action, and because your consciousness is reflective, you could then not 
act at all. Since you cannot act without reasons and your humanity is the source of your 
reasons, you must value your own humanity if you are to act at all (Korsgaard 1996, p. 
123). 
 
Hence, the take-home for the Kantian constructivist is that we can avoid the more relativistic 
elements of Humean constructivism, such as the fact that it leaves open the possibility of a 
perfectly cogent racist, by appealing to a more metaphysically-substantive conception of who are 
the parties to the construction procedure. Try as they might, the perfectly cogent racist could not 
sustain that belief in moral discourse, given Kantian notions of persons as being constituted by 
the two moral powers. 
 If pragmatists can get Humean constructivism on the cheap, then they’d need to work 
quite a lot harder to explain how Kantian constructivism could be acceptable. Yet nonetheless, 
for reasons discussed in Chapter 2, pragmatists have a pragmatic reason to find a way to 
incorporate Kantian considerations into their moral theory, insofar as many people who are 
targeted by pragmatists for persuasion are themselves Kantian, and those people would be more 
likely to be persuaded if they could keep some feature of their Kantian views. Given the central 
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role that the Kantian self plays in Kantian constructivism, then, the question to pursue now is 
what sense can be made of the Kantian self within a pragmatist framework, given that the 
Kantian self as presented here seems to be just the sort of thing that Rorty would argue cannot be 
sustained given the commitment to avoiding philosophy in the pejorative sense discussed in 
Chapter 2.  
 Nonetheless, I think a pragmatist could give a place to a version of the Kantian self. 
Again consider what would be allowed by Street’s method of constitutive entailment. This 
method states a requirement on moral beliefs that they either be basic for the agent in question or 
constitutively entailed by one of the agent’s basic beliefs. Yet what exactly the basic beliefs are 
is left radically open; one might, on such a view, with no irrationality, be a committed racist, if 
one can get the constitutive entailment relations among one’s other beliefs to match it in the right 
way. A plausible defense of Street then holds that it is simply extremely hard to get the 
constitutive entailment relations to work along with racist commitments in the right way, just 
because there is so much in the world that militates against having a cogent set of racist 
commitments. But if one can, in principle, construct a system of constitutive entailments that 
give place to racist beliefs, then surely we can also construct a system of constitutive entailments 
that gives place to the Kantian self. To do this is as if one takes a plausible set of constitutive 
entailments and adds an additional, further restriction onto it: that certain constitutive entailment 
relations be rejected in virtue of the fact that they undermine, to take just one example, the 
Kantian notion of autonomy. We might think of the story as follows: Humean constructivism 
sets a minimal constructivist floor for the moral beliefs that one might have, with that floor 
specified by constitutive entailment from one’s basic moral beliefs, and the Rawlsian system of 
constructivism is then an optional add-on for those who take Rawlsian liberal values seriously. 
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 Now obviously, Rawls and other Kantian constructivists will not want to think about 
deontology as an ‘optional add-on’ to a Humean model of constructivism. It would be said, to 
take just one possible line of criticism, that treating deontological values this way makes them 
heteronomous, and hence not really deontological. Imperatives that command categorically and 
which flow from the Kantian conception of the self, on the traditional way of thinking about 
these ideas, cannot be negotiable in this way. In stating these views, therefore, it is important to 
be clear about what exactly is implied by the idea of the Kantian constructivist’s ideas being 
cashed out in such a way. Although it is perfectly cogent for a person to reject the Kantian self, 
on these terms, for those who do not reject it, it is not exactly right to say that the Kantian self is 
negotiable. Moral agents, being historically conditioned, find themselves with a diverse amalgam 
of moral ideas, and for most of us, Kantian notions of the self are at least a partial feature of that. 
It is true that we cannot develop these points to produce truly categorical imperatives, in the way 
that a classical Kantian would want to, but it is also true that historicizing the Kantian self 
produces a valuable second-best option for the Kantian, if the choice is between the truly Kantian 
self, the historicized Kantian self, and the Kantian’s last place option of being fully Humean. In 
other words, a plausible reading of Kantian constructivism as aiming at the full notion of Kantian 
autonomy informally entails a pragmatist bargaining down to a weaker notion.  
 Such a bargaining down is not unprecedented for Kantian constructivists who take 
seriously criticism of the fuller, Rawlsian version of their position. I want to canvas two attempts 
to explain how Kantian constructivism could be rescued, given plausible critiques of the Kantian 
self: Sem de Maagt’s (2019) instrumentalist reconstruction of categoricality, and Onora 
O’Neill’s (1988) appeal to the circumstances of justice as grounding feature of Kantian 
constructivism. To prefigure the conclusion, I think that O’Neill’s answer is closer to the best 
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option than is de Maagt’s, but as we will see O’Neill’s project is overly ambitious, and must be 
toned down to produce a fully satisfying answer to these problems. In this way, the accounts 
work best when they are fit together. 
 Both writers note that the idea of universal categoricality is problematic, given familiar 
concerns about the historical contingency of the idea of the self, and more generally the presence 
of broad ethical pluralism about basic moral ideas. De Maagt’s solution to this issue is to grant 
the Humean’s assertion that all practical reasons are instrumental, but to argue that some among 
these instrumental reasons are categorical. The way this argument works is to point out that the 
categorical instrumental reasons are the reasons that are instrumental to the having of all other 
reasons. This is supposed to defuse the Kantian’s insistence on the distinction between 
hypothetical reasons, which are reasons that we have given our desires that certain ends be 
brought about, and categorical reasons, which are reasons that we have regardless of our desires 
about which ends should be brought about. What de Maagt does is argue that there are reasons 
that we have regardless of which ends we desire, but that need appeal to nothing more 
substantive than the fact that all people have certain higher-order instrumental reasons regarding 
our first-order instrumental reasons, which are negotiable and totally hypothetical. Hence, the 
idea of a categorical instrumental reason (de Maagt 2019, pp. 288ff).   
 Although de Maagt’s account is plausible as an explanation of why some reasons are 
deontic, it doesn’t clearly explain the scope of those deontological reasons. Even granting that 
everyone has some higher-order instrumental reasons, it’s not clear why that fact need show that 
there is enough overlap between the higher-order instrumental reasons that people have in order 
to make sense of a social contract. If, as seems plausible, some societies have people who hold 
different categorical instrumental reasons than the society from which de Maagt hails, then de 
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Maagt has an explanation only for how isolated individuals can be autonomous, in the sense 
entailed by the notion of the Kantian self. To explain how there could be a truly social 
construction, on Kantian constructivist lines, de Maagt needs to appeal to a supposed overlap of 
categorical instrumental reasons. But patently there is no such global thing; it is no more 
plausible to insist on this than it is to insist that, as Boyd does, goodness is a homeostatic 
property cluster. Hence, de Maagt could profit considerably by looking to O’Neill’s Kantian 
constructivism, which provides a limited-yet-principled interpretation of overlapping categorical 
instrumental reasons. O’Neill achieves this by denying that the relevant construction class, or the 
group of individuals who are conceived as constructing moral principles, includes all persons, or 
all rational beings. O’Neill (1989, pp. 9-10) instead argues that the relevant construction class is 
not the individual and not the set of all individuals but is any set of individuals grouped together 
and unified by the particular circumstances of justice. The idea here is that people must construct 
principles for living together when their social and material circumstances place demands on 
them that force them to aim at designing such principles, under the auspices of what O’Neill 
calls an ethical plurality. In appealing to the particular circumstances of justice as a way to 
specify the construction class, O’Neill would provide the account that fleshes out de Maagt’s 
account of categorical instrumental reasons by explaining how there could be sufficient overlap 
of categorical instrumental reasons without needing to stretch the idea further than it can go. 
Despite this, problems remain for O’Neill’s account. It might be said that the notion of 
the circumstances of justice are slipperier than O’Neill appreciates. Consider the fact that 
globalization has brought together previously far-separated corners of the globe under market 
forces. For instance, because of the way that global supply chains work, many of our products 
are made in China. This means that the people who produce those goods in China are a part of 
131 
 
our circumstances of justice, and we can plausibly owe things to each other. Fewer of my 
products, let’s stipulate, are made in India, but enough that Indian manufacturing is still part of 
our circumstances of justice. But then suppose that the supply chains shift and the trade balance 
shifts toward India. There has been a kind of shift in the plurality: our plurality still contains both 
India and China, but now India is more central. So it seems that O’Neill’s constructivism should 
be able to account for that. As a matter of fact, O’Neill can: she can grant that it is simply true 
that whomever could have claims against us is part of our plurality, and we simply work that out 
by applying something like an idea of the transitivity of plurality membership. But now it is 
plausible to worry that this means that the plurality is really just all of humanity. China engages 
in trade with North Korea, and hence North Korea and China would seem to be part of the same 
plurality. But it also seems like plurality membership should be transitive, because it is inevitable 
that, as a part of the microcausal economic process, American companies interact with Chinese 
companies that do business with North Korea. So this means that any person who does business 
with India or China is part of the American plurality. But now note even further that this is true 
for any country that does business with America. So it seems like we have discovered that we are 
all part of the same ‘plurality’: humanity. The idea seems to collapse, and we lost the aspect that 
seemed to make O’Neill’s constructivism unique. O’Neill could argue that, within all of 
humanity, as plurality, we’d still get the right moral conclusions that, say, slavery and trafficking 
are wrong, because persons within a plurality cannot be reasonably expected to consent to their 
own domination; yet even given this, because this response endorses the idea of minimal 
rationality, it seems that proposing the idea of minimal rationality as an idea that unites all of 
humanity would run into the exact same concerns about universalizing that motivated the 
Rawlsian constructivist attempt to bypass Kantian problems in the first place. In other words, 
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without a more particular and exclusive notion of ‘plurality’, O’Neill cannot make sense of how 
Kantian constructivism provides a broadly plausible ethical ideal. 
It seems that O’Neill needs to endorse a stricter notion of plurality membership, and 
hence a narrower view of what the relevant construction class is. Without providing an answer to 
this question that will satisfy all, it pays to note that this is a point at which it would be helpful 
for the Kantian constructivist to think really carefully through the fact that they get Humean 
constructivism for free, and that their arguments amount to arguments for the adding-on to that 
theory. They can avoid this dilemma by simply granting that the Kantian self is historically 
conditioned, and so that it is much more ethnocentric than it has previously seemed that it must 
be. Perhaps the Kantian should content themselves, then, with the fact that they can come up 
with quite convincing arguments that, within certain narrowly-defined contexts, the Kantian self, 
and hence Kantian constructivism, is a powerful live option, and that de Maagt’s notion of 
categorical instrumentality explains how certain aspects of our autonomy can be non-negotiable, 
again within context. But this notion, it follows, if perfectly compatible with a notion of 
pragmatism that takes on board Humean constructivism’s commitments, as I have suggested that 
it has good reason to. It turns out, then, that pragmatists can endorse a wide variety of 
constructivisms, and that those varieties turn out to have a common basis. 
These claims can be brought into relief by considering Sabina Lovibond’s criticism of 
Rorty’s approach to ethics as overly ethnocentric, insofar as it requires that the criticism of social 
practices be too narrowly focused on the tightly-delineated norms of the ethnos itself, to the 
detriment of attention to the ways in which broader, even global norms condition those tightly-
delineated norms. Lovibond argues that feminist criticism of patriarchal social practices, for 
example, cannot be properly conducted by careful attention to the tightly-delineated norms of 
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some particular society, because groups relate to each other internationally in potentially 
ethically-significant ways. Lovibond writes:  
Consider for example such mind-boggling, yet urgently necessary undertakings as the 
global redistribution of wealth and resources, the reallocation of work and leisure, the 
prevention of war and environmental destruction. Well, no doubt we shall be told that 
there is something passé in the very habit of mind which can still frame this kind of 
classically humanist agenda, given the alleged ‘exhaustion’ of all our political traditions 
(MacIntyre) and the extinction of any shared ‘nostalgia for the unattainable’ (Lyotard). 
But on the other hand, if there can be no systematic political approach to questions of 
wealth, power and labour, how can there be any effective challenge to a social order 
which distributes its benefits and burdens in a systematically unequal way between the 
sexes? (Lovibond 2015a, p. 22) 
 
Lovibond may well be right that criticism of injustice may require us to move beyond our ethnos 
in a way that a Rortian may find uncomfortable. I do think, however, that it is implausible to 
suggest that a Rortian should flee from this discomfort. A pragmatist approach to discourse and 
moral progress tells the pragmatist to try to extend their rhetorical framework to whomever could 
be convinced to accept it, and when nations come into relationship with each other through 
processes of globalization, it is not implausible to say that pragmatists have reason to try to 
extend their framework in those contexts. As the normative significance of national boundaries 
and the world becomes flatter, it becomes more and more reasonable to expect people outside of 
one’s ethnos to care about what goes on in there, and vice versa. To deny that is to require an 
implausibly narrow approach to norm-construction, and to land in exactly the problem that 
O’Neill lands in. Hence, although Lovibond’s criticism is initially plausible, ultimately it 
provides fuel for the pragmatist’s critique, insofar as it forces us to see that pragmatism, as Rorty 
imagines it, actually demands that we treat people outside of our ethnos with at least some 
degree of consideration, and conversely that their practices be taken up as objects of criticism. 
Whether they accept is, of course, not something that a pragmatist, nor anybody else, whatever 
their metanormative commitments, can guarantee. 
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Now that the framework for a pragmatist version of constructivism is developed, we can 
say something about moral progress, which was the stated purpose of this discussion. Moody-
Adams and Kitcher are pragmatist-adjacent philosophers who have proposed various 
functionalist conceptions of moral progress: for Moody-Adams the functions in question are 
dialogical, and for Kitcher, the functions in question are evolutionary. I wondered, however, 
whether these notions could avoid falling into representationalism, because they require that the 
functions in question are stable enough to explicate prior to the debate in question. Conversely, 
we wanted to avoid falling into an ethnocentric account of progress, because that account is not 
ambitious enough to count as a legitimate reconstruction of the aims of moral philosophy. 
Whatever else is true, we can’t have a conception of moral progress that makes no sense of the 
reasons that we may have to expand our ethnos. The account of constructivism that I have 
outlined here, then, is more effectively pragmatist than the functionalist one that has proved 
attractive to Moody-Adams and Kitcher, insofar as it can accommodate an anti-
representationalist notion of moral function that does not appeal to dialogical success or to 
evolutionary function to be cashed out, yet is more substantive than the account offered by the 
Rortian ethnocentrist. It can make very good sense, on pragmatist lines, why our moral discourse 
often aims at those outside of our own ethnos, while still being beholden to a pragmatist notion 
of thinking of moral discourse as an ongoing process that we find ourselves as a part of at 
specific historical positions. On my view, to make moral progress is to find solutions to moral 
problems, whether that is cashed out in terms of evolutionary or dialogical success, or something 
else entirely, while appealing to shared moral understandings that could provide the basis of 
agreement. One crucial element of many people’s moral understandings, however, turns out to be 
the notion of the Kantian self. My version of constructivism thus endorses the more ambitious 
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notions of the Kantian constructivist when doing so would not alienate individuals from that 
ongoing process of developing shared moral understandings, yet tempers them in view of the fact 























CONCLUSION: Pragmatism, Reconstruction, and Philosophy on the Cusp of the Real World 
 In a sense, the results of this dissertation are modest: it demonstrates little more than that 
a pragmatist can, contra Rorty’s views expressed in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, do moral 
theory and metaethics in a way that allows them to make substantive contributions to debates 
about topics that would be traditionally be ignored by pragmatists. In other words, Rorty’s 
(1991d) distinction between democracy and philosophy in the pejorative sense is a contextual 
vestige that can be done away with should the pragmatist choose to orient themselves in a way 
that makes that distinction irrelevant. But what the dissertation does not show is that anything 
like a ‘pragmatist normative ethics’ or a ‘pragmatist metaethics’ follows; while a pragmatist can 
take a position coherently and contribute to debates in normative ethics and metaethics, 
pragmatists are not compelled, by virtue of the basics of their position, to accept any particular 
view. As it turns out, though, this is just fine, because while pragmatists cannot claim that some 
moral theory is the pragmatist moral theory, they don’t need anything more than reconstruction 
to do what is needed of a moral theory. A moral theory has multiple aims, as we saw in Chapter 
1, but one of those aims is to develop methods for settling debates that can win at least some 
agreement. And the method of reconstruction demonstrated throughout can do this even better 
than can a more traditional approach to moral theory. While a full argument for this conclusion 
would require the development of a fifth chapter, rather than a conclusion, the idea is that 
pragmatism and the idea of reconstruction is better placed to develop normative approaches to 
practical problems that avoid the dogmatism of the more traditional approach that attempts to 
hold some moral theory as being the right one. Take the example of medical ethics, where 
principles like beneficence and autonomy are regularly appealed to for the purpose of prescribing 
a doctor’s action in some case. A pragmatist, reconstructionist approach to moral theory better 
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explains how a principle of, say, autonomy could be weighted off against some other principle, 
in virtue of the fact that pragmatism offers a highly plausible framework for thinking about 
deontological ideas like autonomy in a way that can institutionalize and justify a narrow 
procedure for doling out exceptions to the principle. In other words, it is because pragmatism can 
reconstruct moderate deontology within a Rawlsian framework, on the lines of the account 
developed in Chapter 2, that it provides a better approach to medical ethics than does a purer 
commitment to moderate deontology. A Rorty-style approach to moral theory, counterintuitively, 
can provide a framework for the resolution of clinical dilemmas for something approaching a 
principled reason: it treats moral philosophy as a tool for the resolution of problems, as 
demanded by the real world, and avoids engaging in theorizing that requires more substantive 
commitments that would be required by the former. Pragmatist reconstruction brings philosophy 
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